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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OFTHE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiffi'Respondent 
vs 
TRICIA FRANKLIN, 
Defendant/ Appellant 
Appealed from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for Boise County 
Honorable PATRICK OWEN, District Judge 
LA WREN CE G. WASDEN 
Attorney for Respondent 
~ ,~ ~fD. 
Attorney for Appellant 
Filed this 3(1" day of March, 2015 
Mary T Prisco, Clerk 
By Kelly White, Deputy 
JUL t 5 2015 
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) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
CASE NO CR-2013-458 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and 
For the County of Boise. 
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Defendant: Franklin, Tricia 
Judge 
New Case Filed - Felony Roger E. Cockerille 
Prosecutor assigned Boise County Prosecutor Roger E. Cockerille 
Criminal Complaint Roger E. Cockerille 
Summons Issued Roger E. Cockeril!e 
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 05/20/2013 Roger E. Cockerille 
09:30 AM) DUI X3 
DWPX2 
Hearing result for Arraignment scheduled on 
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Appearance DUI X3 
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Personal Return Of Service 
Roger E. Cockerille 
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Hearing result for Preliminary scheduled on Roger E. Cockerille 
07/22/2013 11 :00 AM: Bound Over (after Prelim) 
Cont. as per Gordon - DUI/ DWP 
Commitment 
Change Assigned Judge 
Information 
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Discovery 
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Patrick Owen 
Patrick Owen 
Patrick Owen 
Patrick Owen 
Patrick Owen 
)ate: 3/26/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Boise County User: HZIMMERS 
rime: 10:40 AM ROA Report 
'age 2 of 4 Case: CR-20·13-0000458 Current judge: Patrick Owen 
Defendant: Franklin, Tricia 
State of Idaho vs. Tricia Franklin 
)ate Code User 
1/12/2013 ARRN LONDON Hearing result for Arraignment scheduled on Patrick Owen 
09/12/2013 10:00 AM: Arraignment/ First 
Appearance 
HRSC LONDON Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Patrick Owen 
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MEMO LONDON Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Patrick Owen 
1/26/2013 RETN AUBREY Return Of Service-Robert Tatilian Patrick Owen 
2/2/2013 RPTD AUBREY States Fifth Supplemental Response To Patrick Owen 
Discovery 
2/3/2013 HRSC LONDON Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Suppress Patrick Owen 
12/23/2013 01:30 PM) 
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2/17/2013 STIP LONDON Stipulation Re: Hearing on Motion to Suppress Patrick Owen 
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01/30/2014 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
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10:00 AM) 
Motion to Reconsider Denied- on record 
Patrick Owen 
Patrick Owen 
Patrick Owen 
Pre-Sentence Investigation Evaluation Ordered - Patrick Owen 
Document dated 01/29/2014 
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Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 
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Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
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-50 
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Boise County Prosecuting Attorney 
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MAGISTRAl i;'~ DIVISION 
O!S"rRICT COUF-JT . 
POJd.flDi J_UOICIAL DISTRICT 
t:,UISt <..;Oi INTY. IDAHO 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, 
DOB
OLN
ADD:4875 W. BLOOM ST. 
BOISE, ID 83703 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____ D_e_fe_n_da_n_t ______ . ) 
Case No. CR 2013-0 
COMPLAINT 
PERSONALLY APPEARED before me this t q day of /+pp, .. L, 
2013, IAN W. GEE I JAY F. ROSENTHAL, Prosecuting Attorney/Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorney, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, who, being first duly sworn, complains 
and says that the Defendant, TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, on or about the 6th day of February, 
2013, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, did then and there commit the crime(s) against 
the people of the State ofidaho, to-wit: 
COMPLAINT (TRICIA M. FRANKLIN), Page 1 
COUNT! 
A VEHICLE WHILE UNDER INFLUENCE 
ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS 
(THIRD OFFENSE WITHIN 10 YEARS) 
Idaho Code §18-8004, §18-8005(6), Felony 
That the Defendant, TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, on or about the 6th day of 
February, 2013, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, did drive a motor vehicle, to-wit: 
a red Ford pickup truck bearing Idaho License number 1A1P638, on or at Banks Lowman 
Road, milepost 5.7, while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, with an alcohol 
concentration of .08 or more, to-wit: approximately 0.236, as shown by an analysis of her 
- blood, while having pled guilty to or having been found guilty of at least two violations of 
I. C. § 18-8004 or substantially conforming statute of another jurisdiction within the 
previous ten years. 
COUNT II 
DRIVING WITHOUT PRIVILEGES 
(SECOND WITHIN FIVE YEARS) 
Idaho Code §18-8001( 4), Misdemeanor 
That the Defendant, TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, on or about the 6th day of February, 
2013, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, was in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle, to-wit: a a red Ford pickup truck bearing Idaho License number 1A1P638, on or 
at Banks Lowman Road, milepost 5.7, knowing her operator's license or permit was 
suspended in Idaho, while having pled guilty to or having been found guilty of a violation 
of LC. § 18-8001 within the previous five years. 
All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute( s) in such case, 
and against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
Said Complainant therefore prays that a Summons be issued for the Defendant, 
COMPLAINT (TRICIA M. FRANKLIN), Page 2 
MAGISTRATE 
COMPLAINT (TRICIA M. FRANKLIN), Page 3 
• 68-COURTROOM 
1 :06:26 PM JRosenthal :DUI 3rd within 10 and such Franklin complaint with 
: :summons .. ... 
··········································· '···· ·············· ······························ ························'··············· ····································································--··················································································································j 
1 :07: 16 PM JJudge Jaccepted for filing ... ... with summons.... , 
4/29/2013 1 of 1 
5 
• 68-COURTROOM 
Time Speaker . · : .. Note . · · . 
9:41 :38 AM /Arraignment CR-2013- i 
1458 State of Idaho v : 
:Tricia Franklin- Judge I i Roger E Cockerille - · 
i Dpty Prosecutor Ian 
[ Gee - Clerk Kelly 
:White 
i ! 
9:41 :41 AM :,!Judge j Rights (yes) charges .... Felony penalties are as follows .... i Preliminary heaiing and that date 1,vill be on 
........................................... : .......... ............................ ................ .................... , : ................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
9:44:04 AM :Gee . 
9:44:30 AM /Judge /short time date,,, and the attorny 6/24/2013 @ 11 :00 being 
I Jheld without bond and I encourage you to show on time. 
5/20/2013 1 of 1 
lo 
FOlJRT JTJDIClA..L DISTRTCT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF BOISE 
Deputy 
1. You have the right to silent; statement you can used against 
2. You have the right to have an attorney represent you at all stages of these proceedings; if you are 
poor and unable to pay coUJ.-isel you are entitled to a court-appointed attorney at public V-~,_,~-'-"'"'~ 
3. You have the right to a iurv trial and to com.Del the attendai.1.ce of vvitnesses on -)1our behalf Viithout 
- _i ,,, .I. 
expense to you. 
4. You have the right to confront or ask questions of any ·witness who testifies against you. You 
cannot be compelled to testify and your silence will not be used against you. 
5. You may enter a plea of guilty or not guilty at this time or request a continuance order to consult 
your attorney as to the plea. 
6. If you plead NOT GUILTY the Court will set a trial date. 
7. If you plead GUILTY the Court will set a date for sentencing. Prior to the sentencing you will be 
required to undergo, at your expense, an alcohol evaluation which will be considered by the court in 
determining the appropriate sentence. At sentencing you will be allowed to make a statement by 
way of explanation or mitigation. 
8. If you plead guilty or are found guilty of driving under the influence maxim.um penalty is: 
(a) If a first DlJl offense - 6 months in jail, a fine of $1,000.00 and a suspension of your driving 
privileges for 180 days; during which, the fust 30 days absolutely no driving privileges may 
be granted. 
(b) For a second DUI offense (within a five year period) - at least 10 days but not more than 
one year in. jail; a fine of $2,000.00; and a suspension of your driving privileges for one year 
after your release from jail during which absolutely no driving privileges may be granted. 
(c) For a third DUI offense ("within a five year period)- a felony; a sentence to the State Board 
of Corrections for up to five years; a $5,000.00 fine; and a suspension of your drivrng 
privileges for at least one year but not more than five years after release from imprisonment; 
during which time absolutely no driving privileges may be granted. 
9. If you plead guilty or are found guilty, a record of the conviction vvill be sent to the State 
Department of Law Enforcement and becomes part of your driving record. There is a traffic 
violation point system and the accumulation of po in.ts may lead to a suspension of your drivrng 
privileges if the Court has not already done so. 
I acknowledge tha.t I have read this statement a.nd folly understand its contents. 
Defendant 1 
J:\Court\M..A.GISTRA .. TE C01JRT\CRL""MJNA.L\Rights\Rights for DUI.doc 
06/03/11 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF BOISE 
OF 
1. You the right to any statement you make can used against you. You can not be compelled 
to incriminate yourself. 
2. You have the right to bail. The amount and type of bail or release on your o,vn recognizance is determined by the 
judge after considering factors provided by law. 
3. You ha"ve the right to have an attorney represent you at all stages of these proceedings; if you are poor and unable 
to afford counsel, you may apply to the Court for the appointment of an attorney to represent you at public 
expense. 
4. You have the right to a jury trial, or you may waive jury and have the matter tried before the Court. At the trial, 
the prosecution has to prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt Any guilty verdict by a jury must be 
unammous. 
5. You have the right to confront or ask questions of any witness who testifies against you; and to compel the 
attendance of witnesses on your own behalf without expense to you. 
6. You may enter a plea of guilty or not guilty at this time or request a continuance in order to consult your attorney 
as to the plea. 
7. If you plead GUILTY, you waive or give up all of the above rights and you waive or give up any defenses you 
may have to the complaint filed against you. Specifically, by pleading guilty you waive or give up your right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, which is the right to remain silent or not to incriminate yourself. You also 
waive or give up your right to a trial by jury and your right to confront witnesses against you. 
8. You have the right to appeal any conviction or sentence to the District Court. The appeal must be filed within 
forty two ( 42) days after the judgment of conviction is entered. 
9. If you plead NOT GUILTY, the Court will set a trial date and you or your attorney will be notified of that date. 
10. If you plead GUILTY, the Court will set a date for sentencing. 
11. If you plead guilty or are found guilty of driving or being in actual physical control of any motor vehicle upon the 
highway with knowledge that your driving privileges have been cancelled, revoked, or suspended, the minimum 
and maximum penalties are: 
(a) If a first offense: At least two (2) days but not more than six (6) months in jail; a fine of up to one thousand 
dollars ($1,000); and suspension of driving privileges for six ( 6) months following the end of that period of 
suspension existing at the time of the violation. 
(b) If a second offense (within any five (5) year period); At least twenty (20) days but not more than one (l) year 
in jail; a fine of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000); and mandatory suspension of driving privileges for one (1) 
year following the end of any period of suspension existing at the time of the second violation, during the first 
thirty (30) days of which time there are no driving privileges of any kind. 
(c) If a third or subsequent offense ('i\ri.thin a five (5) year period): Incarceration in the county jail for a minimum 
of thirty (30) days and up to one (1) year; a fine of up to three thousand dollars ($3,000); and mandatory 
suspension of driving privileges for an additional two (2) years following the end of any period of suspension 
existing at the time of the violation, during the first ninety (90) days of which ti.me there are no driving privileges 
of an kind. 
I acknowledge that I have read this statement and fully 
Dated: 5 \ )..() I l ~ Signed:----"'-""-'---'-"-'-'-'-'-'~'--'-.::.......J,...--=--='-------
\ \ 6/3/2011 
Philip Gordon, ISB #1996 
GORDON 
623 W. Hays Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 345-7100 
Facsimile: (208) 345-0050 
Attorneys for Defendant 
MAGitn tiA1 t:;:, u,v1:::s1or, 
DISTRICT COURT 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BOlSE COUNTY IDAHO 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TRICIA FRANKLIN, 
CASE NO. CR 2013-0000458 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE, 
ENTRY OF "NOT GUILTY 
PLEA" REQUEST FOR JURY 
TRIAL AND DEMAND FOR 
SPEEDY TRIAL 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW, Philip Gordon of Gordon Law Offices, Chartered, and hereby: 
1. Appears as attorney of record on behalf of the defendant herein; and 
2. Enters a plea of not guilty for and on behalf of said defendant, to any and all 
charges in this case; and 
3. Requests a jury trial in the above entitled matter; and 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - Page 1 
4. Invokes the Defendant's right to a speedy trial, as guaranteed to her by the 6th 
Amendment to the United States Constitution; Article 3, Section of the 
Constitu~ ofldaho, and Title 19, Chapter 35 of the Idaho Code. 
Dated: May~ __ , 2013. 
By: 
I hereby certify that on May , 2013, I caused e within and foregoing document, to 
be served on the following pers , by the met a indicated below: 
Boise County Prosecuting Attorney 
PO Box 186 
Idaho City, ID 83631 
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Philip Gordon, ISB # 1996 
GORDON LAW OFFICES, 
W. Hays Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 345-7100 
Facsimile: (208) 345-0050 
Attorneys for Defendant 
MAG1S'i riAi i::." LilV,ciiON 
DISTRICT COURT 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BO!SF r.r.1, 1!\tTY IDAHO 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TRICIA FRANKLIN, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CR 2013-0000458 
WAIVER 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through her attorney Philip Gordon of Gordon Law 
Offices, Chartered, and hereby: 
1. Waives her right to have her Preliminary Hearing held within 21 days of her 
arraignment on this charge. And 
2. Requests the Court to set her Preliminary Hearing for June 24r\ 2013, at 11 :00 
am ~ 
Dated: MayZQ_, 2013. 
W AIYER - Page 1 
I I 
CERTIFICATE OF 
d7Jo 
I hereby certify that on MayW , 2013, I the within and foregoing 
served on the following person, by the method indicated 
Boise County Prosecuting Attorney 
PO Box 186 
Idaho City, ID 83631 
W AlVER - Page 2 
£ HAND DELfVERY 
U.S. MAJL 
to 
SB-COURTROOM 
11: 12:46 AM/ Prelilimary Hearing CR- 1 Present W Philip Gordon 
12013-458 State of IDahoi 
!v Tricia Franklin - Judge ! 
! Roger E Cockerille - ! 
i DPTY Prosecutor Jay · 
!Rosenthal -Defense Atty! 
! David Smethers-- Clerk ! 
!Kelly White I 
11: 12:54 AM JJudge jl have been advised that there is a stip and no warrant. .. . 
1 1 : 1 3: 33 AM f Rosenthal .......................... na·cr·oriAiiirr~i"n{.Ts ... n.on··warranc···· ..........................................................................  
E ii ;~ ;~ l!~~~~hai --- -- li~!i~:~::.~,~~~~;~~~it~~~~ Exclude__ --- --- --
11 :14:47 AMf Rosenthal I 
11 :15:11 AMf Judge !testified before,, refresher of record and court rules ..... 
j l 
11 :15:53 AMiRosentahl / Devalle jJohn Devalle,,,, fire chief for GV fire ..... Direct 
! !examination 
11 :17:40 AMf Gordon Jobject hersay 
·~·~-:-~-;::~.;~,~~:;;thal ................................................ 1.~:~a;~ .. ~~~:~:~~ .. that .. in .. motion ... is .. sustained ............................................... . 
11 :18:04 AM1Rosenthal / Devalle !cont with Direct examination .... 
E 1~ ~~ ;~ /;J;;;~h~~v~1~t11· - i~:h:a~:bn::~z:~::~~~:~i:!::~~~~t ~:01"~\~5:egula, -
........................................... i ................................................................................. itiem ................................................................................................................................................................................  
11 :21: 11 AM !Gordon / Devalle !document you looked at and did you prepare it.. .. Cross 
! !examination make a copy before you leave .... Jason 
........................................... 1 ................................................................................. 1.Y earsley. · ............................................................................................................................................................. . 
11 :31 :16 AM!Rosenthal !speak slower 
.1.1.:.31.:24.AMjGordonJ.Devalle ...................... ..Jcross .. examination._._._..__Yol.firefighters_._._. .............................................................. .. 
11 :32:54 AM !Judge ! Nothing further and the witness steps down 
.1 .. 1.:.33: 1. 2 __ AM j Rosenthal .............................................. ..i.make .. copies .. _._please .. T ati_ltian ............................................................................... . 
11 :33:45 AM!Rosenthal / Tatilian !Tatilian, Robert Direct examination .. .. 
. 1.1.:34:57.AMjGordon ........................................................ / ............................................................................................................................................................................................ .. 
11 :34:59 AM! Rosenthal !only for foundation not truth 
11 :35:09 AM jJudge ito extent sustained and not for truth of the matter therefor 
i i he may answer 
11 :35:34 AM1Rosenthal / Tatilian !cont. Direct examination ..... Tf:':3~f3:r;;:rv;T60.rci'ori ......................................................... rmayT.ask .. a ... q.ues·tr;;·;:;·:-.. c;-;;;-ititied·:·:·:·--takeri···carses·:-··wrih,fr.awi ........ l 
! i 
11 :40:23 AM/Rosenthal/ Tatiltian jcont. Direct examination ... states #1 move 
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• • 68-COURTROOM 
Time Speaker Note 
11 :44 :56 AMJGordon ]object. .. . reserve ruling 
11 :45: 12 AM f Judge j I will note that state,#1 offered and understood mr. 
; ]Gordon has objections and given oppertuning to adress 
. ]and reserve ruling 
I; ··:;.~;-~~ l ~:;;:~ht~ ~;l~~~an [6~::s examination .. did you try to obtain a warrant from···· 
' )udge Cockerille ..... 
12:03:49 PMiRosenthal / Tatilian iRe-direct examination ... . 
12:04:42 PMiJudge : 
12:04:44 PM.,/ Gordon / Tatilian /2/6/2013 have you ever participated in obtaining a search 
. ]warrant .... 
12:06:05 PM1Rosenthal / Tatilian : 
12:06:28 PMf Gordon/ Tatilian jdid you know that judges have power to issue search 
: jwarrant. ... . 2/6/2013 .... boise city officer .... 
12:07:22 PM] ]Nothing further and the witness steps down 
12:07:36 PMiRosenthal / Rogers ioale Rogers ... BCSO and an officer for 37 yrs Direct 
i jexamination ..... . 
. ) ~·  i.;•J~ :~ l~u:::n . / · Rog era - -l ~~l~~;:~~~:::~~i~:;:;~~~:;;i =~~~~hibit · .·.· - - -
i ]Gordon no evidence .... 
12:17:52 PMiGordon iruling on exhibit #1 by state .... reasonings ... statement.. ... I 
i jdon 
12:26:30 PM/Gordon j I don't think the state has meet the burdon of proof. .. . I 
·1··:i:.3'f:·1·Lrr·11Ai·R·a·se.ri'fhaT···············································j·re.s'i;o·ri·se.To···ci'eFc:'~ii'n···;:;·ot'·rei'vo·i<e··he·r··can·s·e·;:;r:·:··.·we··w1iT··················1 
! /submitt it your honor .... certified under 8004 
·~·~:·~~:!~···~~t~~~~:n······················································fopty .. Rogers ... doesn.'t'°even .. know .. who.drew.that'°blood ... ·.············ 
l I 
12:33:24 PM!Rosenthal ; 
12:33:34 PM JJudge io.k. let me make my ruling on exhibit #1 .. ... 5.1b states 
J !that .. .. .whith all due respect to Judge Owen, however it 
; !requires all judges to make a ruling on preliminary 
jissues .. .. the issue before the court is ....... I am bound by 
]that and I will say a district judge would not supress .... . 
]due to state vs. Diaz .. . statement on these issues ... . rule 
/41 clears that up .... . search warrant may be issued by 
Uudge in judicial district.. ... given the location of secene 
!and all the details and I view that time was an important 
!factor .... however under state vs . Diaz, there for exhibt #1 
]comes into the record .. .. I 
. . ' 
·~ ~:: ~·:~~···~~ f ~~;;~~hal··························· ···················f ·::~~~s .. not .. meet .. its .. burdon .. of · proof ................................................................... i 
12:43:07 PMjJudge 1 
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Time Speaker · Note · 
12:43: 12 PM : Rosenthal \on topic of drive of vech . .. .. statement... l 
12:44:01 PMlJudge j100% crystal clear ... evidence that was not submitted to I 
.......................... 
· :the court .. ... only on evidence that was given to the j 
!court .... ! am not deciding right now that you were driving I 
lthe car ... . ! can see that he could have been on scene, I 
!question is based on the fact of Ms. Frankins location is ; 
jshe is probable the driver and I think there is PC to say 
) hat she could have been the driver ... .. statement .... .. and 
:therefor I find the state meet the burdon and I Bound over. 
. . 
12:47:39 PM I :8/8/@10:00 
12A7:45._PM /Gordon ......... ............................................... · ........................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
12 AB: 58 .. PM l J udg e ............ ...... .................... ...................... l.~(~.~!..?..?..~ .. ~.@.~_g .. ~~t~.i.~.~.J.~.~0.~~: .. ~0.~.~ .. ~~············· ······· ··········  ......... .. .....  .
12:49: 18 PM i Gordon i fun to be here. 
12:49:29 PM!Judge [venue has alot to do with that. .. Franklin I wish you good 
:luck 
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IS 
IANW. GEE 
Boise County Prosecuting Attorney 
406 Montgomery Street 
P.O. Box 186 
Idaho Cit/, Idaho 83631 
Tel: (208) 392-4485 
Fax: (208) 392-3760 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR-2013-00458 
COMMITMENT 
---~D~efi_en_d_a_n_t. ______ ~) 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT, TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, having 
(~fen brought) before this Court for a Preliminary Examination on the 1>2 day of 
\_] "1 I~ , 2013, on a charge that the Defendant on or about the 6th day of 
February, ; 13, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, did c01mnit the crimes of COUNT 
I, OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS (THIRD OFFENSE WITHIN 10 YEARS), Idaho Code 
§18-8004, §18-8005(6), Felony and COUNT II, DRIVING WITHOUT PRIVILEGES 
(SECOND WITHIN FIVE YEARS), Idaho Code §18-8001(4), Misdemeanor, as 
follows: 
COUNTI 
PART I 
That the Defendant, TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, on or about the 6th day of 
February, 2013, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, did drive a motor vehicle, to-wit: 
a red Ford pickup truck bearing Idaho License number 1AlP638, on or at Banks Lowman 
COMMITMENT (TRICIA M. FRANKLIN), Page 1 
Ila 
Road, milepost 5.7, while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, with an alcohol 
concentration of .08 or more, to-wit: approximately 0.236, as shown by an analysis of her 
blood, a felony, in violation of Idaho Code Sections 18-8004, 18-8005(6), and against the 
power, peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
COUNT II 
DRIVING WITHOUT PRIVILEGES 
(SECOND WITHIN FIVE YEARS) 
Idaho Code §18-8001(4), Misdemeanor 
That the Defendant, TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, on or about the 6th day of February, 
2013, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, was in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle, to-wit: a a red Ford pickup truck bearing Idaho License number 1A1P638, on or 
at Banks Lowman Road, milepost 5.7, knowing her operator's license or permit was 
suspended in Idaho, while having pled guilty to or having been found guilty of a violation 
of LC. § 18-8001 within the previous five years. 
PART II 
That TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, did willfully, knowingly, intentionally, unlawfully 
and feloniously commit those acts set forth in Part I of this Complaint in that said Defendant 
has heretofore pled guilty to or been found guilty of at least two or more violations of 
Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol, a felony, pursuant to 
Section 18-8004 of the Idaho Code, or substantially conforming statute of another 
jurisdiction within ten (10) years from the 6th day of February, 2013, to-wit: 
On or about the 23rd day of June, 2010, the Defendant, under the name of TRICIA 
M. FRANKLIN, pled guilty to or was found guilty of the crime of Operating a Motor 
Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs (Second Offense), a 
Misdemeanor, in the Magistrate Court, of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Ada, Case Number CR-MD 2010-0001887; and 
On or about the 6th day of December, 2010, the Defendant, under the name of 
TRICIA MARIE FRANKLIN, pled guilty to or was found guilty of the crime of 
Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol (Second Offense), in the 
Magistrate Court, of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County 
of Ada, Case Number CR-MD-2010-0009994; 
COMMITMENT (TRICIA M. FRANKLIN), Page 2 
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The Defendant having so appeared and having had her preliminary examination, the 
Court sitting as a Committing Magistrate finds that the offense charged as set forth has been 
committed Boise Idaho, and that there is sufficient cause to believe that the 
Defendant is guilty of committing the offenses as charged. 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant, TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, 
~e he~d~ to ~nswer to th: ~i~trict ~ou~ of th~ F o~rth J~di~ial ~i~t~ict o~ th~ State o~ I~~ 
rn ana tor me County or tl01se, to t~ge nerem set rortn. .tlall 1s set m the sum or ~ E_. 
DATED this f/1tray of \j IA 17 , 20 --~. -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ,30 day of J:1J LL/ , 2013, I caused 
to be served a true copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: 
U.S.MAIL _HANDDELIVERED ~TELECOPY 
POSTAGE PREPAID 
Philip Gordon 
Attorney at Law 
623 West Hays St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
IANW.GEE 
Boise County Prosecuting Attorney 
406 Montgomery Street 
Idaho City, Idaho 83631 
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IANW.GEE 
Boise County Prosecuting Attorney 
406 Montgomery Street 
P.O. Box 186 
Idaho City, Idaho 83631 
Tel: (208) 392-4485 
Fax: (208) 392-3760 
RICT COURT BOISE COUMTY, IDAHO 
rded in 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR-2013-00458 
INFORMATION 
=D-"-e=fe=n=da=n=t __________ ~) 
IAN W. GEE I JAY F. ROSENTHAL, Prosecuting Attorney/Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorney, in and for the County of Boise, State of Idaho, who in the name and by the 
authority of the State, prosecutes in its behalf, comes now into District Court of the County 
of Boise, and states that TRICIA M. FRANKLIN is accused by this Information of the 
crimes of: COUNT I, OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS (THIRD OFFENSE WITHIN 10 
YEARS), Idaho Code §18-8004, §18-8005(6), Felony and COUNT II, DRIVING 
WITHOUT PRIVILEGES (SECOND WITHIN FIVE YEARS), Idaho Code §18-
8001(4), Misdemeanor, which crimes was committed as follows: 
COUNTI 
PARTI 
That the Defendant, TRICIA l\'l. FRA.c~KLIN, on or about the 6th day of 
February, 2013, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, did drive a motor vehicle, to-wit: 
a red Ford pickup truck bearing Idaho License number 1AIP638, on or at Banks Lowman 
INFORMATION (TRICIA M. FRANKLIN), Page 1 
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Road, milepost 5.7, while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, with an alcohol 
concentration of .08 or more, to-wit: approximately 0.236, as shown by an analysis of her 
blood, a felony, in violation of Idaho Code Sections 18-8004, 18-8005(6), and against the 
peace and dignity of the State ofidaho. 
COUNT II 
DRIVING WITHOUT PRIVILEGES 
(SECOND WITHIN FIVE YEARS) 
Idaho Code §18-8001( 4), Misdemeanor 
That the Defendant, TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, on or about the 6th day of February, 
2013, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, was in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle, to-wit: a a red Ford pickup truck bearing Idaho License number 1A1P638, on or 
at Banks Lowman Road, milepost 5.7, knowing her operator's license or permit was 
suspended in Idaho, while having pled guilty to or having been found guilty of a violation 
of LC. §18-8001 within the previous five years. 
PART II 
That TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, did willfully, knowingly, intentionally, unlawfully 
and feloniously commit those acts set forth in Part I of this Complaint in that said Defendant 
has heretofore pled guilty to or been found guilty of at least two or more violations of 
Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol, a felony, pursuant to 
Section 18-8004 of the Idaho Code, or substantially conforming statute of another 
jurisdiction within ten (10) years from the 6th day of February, 2013, to-wit: 
On or about the 23rd day of June, 2010, the Defendant, under the name of TRICIA 
M. FRANKLIN, pled guilty to or was found guilty of the crime of Operating a Motor 
Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs (Second Offense), a 
Misdemeanor, in the Magistrate Court, of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Ada, Case Number CR-MD 2010-0001887; and 
On or about the 6th day of December, 2010, the Defendant, under the name of 
TRICIA MARIE FRANKLIN, pled guilty to or was found guilty of the crime of 
Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol (Second Offense), in the 
Magistrate Court, of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofidaho, in and for the County 
of Ada, Case Number CR-MD-2010-0009994; 
INFORMATION (TRICIAM. FRANKLIN), Page 2 
All of which is contrary to the form, force, and effect of the statutes in such case 
made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State ofidaho. 
Pursuant to Rule 7(b ), Idaho Criminal Rules, the following is a list of all witnesses insofar 
as they are known to the State at this time, who are or may be witnesses in this action: 
Witness: 
ROB TATILIAN 
BRENDA GLENN 
DALE ROGERS 
RACHEL CUTLER 
KERRY RUSSELL 
JOHN DELVALLE 
HOLLY PERAZZO 
JANET SCHAADT 
Address: 
BOISE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
BOISE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
BOISE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
IDAHO STATE POLICE FORENSICS 
IDAHO STATE POLICE FORENSICS 
17 WILDWOOD DR., GARDEN VALLEY 
2 COYOTE LN., GARDEN VALLEY 
24/7 PRO SOLUTIONS 
Felonies: 
NONE 
NONE 
NONE 
NONE 
NONE 
UNKNOWN 
UNKNOWN 
UNKNOWN 
**All reports disclosed are incorporated by reference and any individuals named in 
such reports may be called as witnesses. **Any photographs, video or audio listed are 
available for your review at the Boise County Prosecutor's office through appointment at 
(208)392-4485. In the event you would request a copy, please provide this office with the 
necessary tape. 
I Ian e,A Jay F. Rosenthal 
Bo u · ty Prosecuting Attorney/ 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3D day of ::S::V L \( , 2013, I caused 
to be served a true copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: 
U.S.MAIL _HANDDELIVERED _}LTELECOPY 
POSTAGE PREPAID 
Db;1;_ I:..r....,.d~~ 
.L H.UJJ u VJ. Vll 
Attorney at Law 
623 West Hays St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
IANW.GEE 
Boise County Prosecuting Attorney 
406 Montgomery Street 
Idaho City, Idaho 83631 
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Distric Court September 1 ,'2013 Honorable Patrick H Owen, pre I g 6B-COURTROOM 
10: 12: 13 AM[Arraignment CR-2013-
!458 State v Tricia . 
i Franklin - Judge Patrick i 
lH Owen - Chief Dpty l i Prosecutor Jay i 
: Rosenthal - Defense ' 
JAtty Phillip Gordon -
!COURT REPORTER 
: Roxanne Patchell -
: Clerk Lisa London 
10:12:16 AM JHonorable Patrick H !call of case. Defendant previously informed of rights 
/Owen , 
10:13:32 AMf Gordon :waive reading information 
10:13:38 AMfHonorable Patrick H ]Advises defendant of penalties . 
.... .................................. Jowen ............................. ............................ .L ............................ ............... .......... ... .. ............... ..................... ........... .... .................................. ............. ............  
1 O: 14:48 AM :,,:· d J Understands penaltiesUnderstands rightsUnderstands 
jcharge(s) 
10:15:01 AMfHonorable Patrick H 1 
!Owen . 
10:15:14 AM jGordon jclient wants add'! time 
10: 15:49 AM j Honorable Patrick H jwill set ?Ver for furth~: proceedings-eop on 10/10/13 _at j 
:Owen :1oam. impose cond1t1ons of release: operate no vehicle 
/while unlicensed/uninsured or drinking. consume no 
. !alcohol 
10:17:09 AM iend : 
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District Court Thursday, Octo..,er 10, 2013, Honorable Patrick H Ower1, pres68-COURTROOM 
Time :- Speaker · , . . . ·. . . .'Note ~ . : · :, 1- . . • ·:. 
10:04:53 AM!Entry of Plea CR-2013- /present w/atty 
/458 State v Tricia ! 
!Franklin - Judge Patrick ! l H Owen - Chief Dpty ; 
/ Prosecutor Jay 
i Rosenthal - Defense 
!Atty David Smethers -
]COURT REPORTER 
i Kamra Toalson - Clerk 
! Lisa London I 
i I I 
·ro:·os·:··1·5··AKii" i H·on·ar.ahie···Pafrl"ck·H··············i·c"ALL···of··f'H°E~··c;;.:s·E···································--········································-- ·--···--··----····------··--·----······ ·1 
jOwen , ! 
_1_0 :_05 :29_AMJgordon ....................................................... ..Jenter_.ng __ plea __ and __ ask_for_trial ___ dates_ .......................... ............................................. J 
10:05:59 AM/Honorable Patrick H !enter ng plea and set for ptc and jt 
........................................... !Owen .............................................................. i ....................................................... ..................................................................................................................................... .. 
10:07:29 AMirosenthal :2 days 
_1 _0:_07_:30_AM !g_ordon ___ __ __ ................................................... ; .............................................................................................................................................................................................. . 
10:07:38 AM iHonorable Patrick H Uan 2 work 
jOwen ; 
10:07:44 AMjgordon jwon't be in country 
10:07:51 AMjHonorable Patrick H Jan 16 
........................................... !Owen .............................................................. ' .............................................................................................................................................................................................. . 
_1 _0:_07: 55 _AM i gordon ..................... ..................................... !.still .. out __ of _country ........................................................................................................................... .. 
10:08:01 AM!Honorable Patrick H /discuss speedy? 
!Owen i 
10:08:12 AMfgordon )waive speedy . 
10:08:21 AM1Honorable Patrick H )advises defendant of speedy trial rights 
:ow0 n 
: - : 
10:09:09 AMjd jwaives right to speedy 
10: 09:23 AM i Honorable Patrick H ; 
jOwen . 
1 __0 :_09: 3 5 __ AM l rosentha1 ................................................... i.!~.~ .  _i~.Y~-~y-~il·~·~1-~ ... f.?r. .. ?~.~-t-~ ........................................................................................................ . 
10:09:43 AMU Uan 30 
10:09:46 AM jgordon jworks 
10:10:04 AM jj jjan 30 and 31 for jt 
10: 11 :28 AM j gordon i could run over into 3rd day 
1 O: 11: 38 AM Jj i monday would be a scheduling issue. will sort out if 
: i comes to that / 
10:12:10 AMjend I 
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Uct. 1~. LUU j:11nv1 \Jordon Law UTT1ces 
Philip Gordon, ISB # 1996 
GORDON LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
623 W. Hays Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 345-7100 
Facsimile: (208) 345-0050 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IVO, I /V'J ,, L 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO; IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) CASE NO. CR 2013-0000458 
Plaintiff, ) 
) MOTION TO SUPPl{ESS 
vs. ) 
) 
TRICIA FRANKLIN, ) 
) 
Defendant .. ) 
-~---------- ) 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, by and through undersigned counsel, and hereby moves 
this Court for its Order as follows: 
1. Suppressing as evidence in the trial or any other proceedings in this cause, the following: 
a. The results of the test for alcohol concentration. performed on blood taken from the 
Defendant (against her will) on or about the day of February, 2013. 
b. Each and every statement made, or alleged to have been made, by Defendant to any 
law enforcement officer subsequent to the Defendant having been initially contacted by 
law enforcement at the scene of a vehicular accident at approximately mile of the Banks 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS- Page 1 
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to Lowman Road Boise County, Idaho, on or about the day of February, 2013. 
c. ,A.ny and all tangible evidence, statements, observations, conclusions or testimony 
any type or kind which are or may be deemed to be "fruits of the poisonous tree" (as that 
doctrine is set forth either in the opinions of the appellate courts of the State of Idaho, or 
the federal appellate courts), of any violation ofthe Defendant's rights under or pursuant 
to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and/or Article 1, Section 17 
of the Constitution of!daho. 
This Motion is made and brought pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and/or Article I, § 17 of the Constitution ofldaho, and the specific bases and grounds 
for this Motion are as follows: 
1. Defendant's blood was taken without her consent and without a search warrant while 
she was a patient in St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, despite the fact that several 
hours had elapsed between when law enforcement officers first made contact with the 
Defendant and first suspected that she was or may have been ru1der the influence of 
alcohol, and when a sample of her blood was taken. There was accordingly more than 
ample time for officers to obtain a search warrant for a sample of the Defendant's blood, 
yet they made no effort to seek a warrant. 
2. No officer observed Defendant driving a motor vehicle, and there was evidence at the 
scene of the crash that the vehicle may have been driven by another person. 
Additionally, several hours then elapsed before a law enforcement officer encountered 
Defendant in the hospital. The combination of these factors militate in favor of requiring 
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that the Defendant be given her Miranda before questioned, no 
warnings were given. 
3. Defendant reserves the right to assert such other, further and additional grounds as 
may be revealed in subsequent discovery, testimony and presentation of evidence . 
.A~RAL ARGUMENT rs REQUESTED. 
Dated: October ~013. 
CERTIF~E OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on October£, 2013, I caused the within and foregoing document, 
to be served on the following person, by the method indicated below: 
Boise County Prosecuting Attorney 
PO Box 186 
Idaho City, ID 83631 
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Philip Gordon, ISB #1996 
GORDON LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
623 W. Hays Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 345-7100 
Facsimile: (208) 345-0050 
Attorneys for Defendant 
ui RiCT COUF{T BOiSE COl.Ji'~TY iDAHO 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) CASE NO. CR 2013-0000458 
Plaintiff, ) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
vs. ) MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
) 
TRICIA FRANKLIN, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, by and through undersigned counsel, and hereby provides 
the Court with her pre-hearing Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress, on file herein. 
In consequence of the fact that this Memorandum is being submitted in advance of the hearing on 
the Defendant's Motion, Defendant reserves the right to submit a supplemental Memorandum 
subsequent to the said hearing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The great majority of the operative facts which dictate the result in this instance can be 
gleaned from the transcript of the Preliminary Hearing (hereafter "PH") held in this matter before 
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the Honorable Roger Cockerille on the 22nd day of July, 2013 (references to that Transcript 
will be U.vJ..iVC'->U as followed by page and line numbers). are largely 
undisputed. 
The first witness for the State at the PH was John Delvalle, who is the Garden Valley Fire 
Chief. TR, P. 7, 11. 13-18. On February 6t", 2013, he responded to a report of single vehicle 
accident on the Banks to Lowman road. TR, P. 7, 11. 19-25. He was not the first rescue person on 
the scene, TR, P. 8, 11. 2-7, arriving approximately three minutes behind the rescue truck, TR. P. 
15, 11. 17-21. The Chief promptly commenced assisting in caring for the Defendant 
approximately 2-3 minutes after arriving on the scene. TR, P. 8, 11. 10-14; TR., P.14, 11. 12-16. 
As Chief Delvalle was "performing C-spine immobilization", he detected an odor of alcohol 
coming from the Defendant. TR, P. 10, 11. 2-5. After Ms. Franklin was immobilized, her care 
was transferred to the Crouch Ambulance, whose responsibility it was to transport her to a 
helicopter landing zone in Banks, where she was to be further transferred to a Life Flight 
helicopter. TR, P. 10, 11. 9-19. The Department's official log revealed that members of his 
department arrived at the accident scene at approximately 10:30 p.m. TR, P. 12, 11. 14-19; TR, P. 
13, 11. 6-18. 
While performing first aid on Ms. Franklin, Chief Delvalle observed that "she had some 
head trauma" TR, P. 16, l. 5, with "considerable amount of -of hemorrhage", TR, P. 16, 11. 11-
12. The Chief estimated that it took between 10 and 12 minutes to fully immobilize Ms. 
Franklin on a backboard, so that she could be turned over to the care of the Crouch ambulance, 
TR. P. 1 7, 11. 16-2 0. 
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Boise County Deputy Sheriff Robert Tatillian arrived at the accident scene prior to Chief 
Delvalle. TR, P. i L 18, L 6, who informed the Deputy of his observation that Ms. 
Franklin had the odor of alcohol about her person. TR, P. 18, L 16 to P. 19, L 1 O; TR, P. 40, IL 
17-23. 
Deputy Tatillian was the State's second witness. He testified that he was dispatched to 
the scene of this accident at 10: 12 p.m. TR, P. 41, 11. 3-8, and that dispatch gave him a 
description of the involved vehicle, Ibid. LL 16-19. Immediately upon being provided with the 
description of the vehicle, "the first thing that came to my mind" TR, P. 42, 11. 1-2 was that it was 
the same vehicle whose two occupants he had spoken to earlier that evening at the Wander Inn in 
Crouch, and he believed that one of the two people he had spoken to earlier had driven the 
vehicle to the accident scene. Ibid, 11. 3-8. He also concluded that, if the vehicle had been driven 
to the accident scene by one of the two people he encountered earlier -who were the only two 
people associated with that vehicle, TR. P. 42, 11. 23-25- that meant that it had been driven there 
by a person who was under the influence of alcohol. Ibid., 11. 15-22. The Deputy admitted that it 
was possible that he had received confirmation that Ms. Franklin was at the scene of the accident 
even before he arrived there. TR, P. 45, 11. 1-4. 
Deputy Tatillian undertook no efforts whatsoever to get a search warrant to take the blood 
of Ms. Franklin after her identity was confirmed as the individual found at the scene of the 
accident. TR, P. 45, 1. 18 - P. 49, 1. 24, (with particular emphasis on the colloquy on P. 49, 11. 12 -
24). 
Deputy Tatillian acquired "actual knowledge" TR, P. 50, 1. 15, that Ms. Franklin had been 
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transported by ambulance to a landing zone so that she could then be taken by Life Flight to St. 
Alphonsus Hospital. Ibid., 11. l 18, but, despite having this knowledge, he still made no efforts 
to obtain a warrant. Ibid., 11. 19-21. He did, however, remain on site and conducted an accident 
investigation, TR., P. 51, 11. 7-9, at the conclusion of which he returned to Crouch to look for 
Jacob Snowball, whom he had encountered earlier that evening at the Wander Inn. TR., P. 51, 11. 
15-16; TR, P. 39, 11. 13-24. 
After describing the search he undertook at and near the scene of the accident, he testified 
that he "had dispatch get in contact with Chief Deputy Rogers, who was in Ada County at the 
time ... ", TR, P .. 34, 11. 15-16, to request Rogers "to [go] to the hospital with and do a blood draw 
on the victim [sic]." Ibid, 1. 20. Tellingly, though he went through dispatch to reach Chief 
Deputy Rogers so he could do a blood draw on Ms. Franklin, he did not ask dispatch to have 
anyone "get a warrant for Chief Deputy Rogers to do that blood draw ... ". TR, P. 51, 11. 23-25, 
even though he knew that Judge Cockerille [the resident Boise County Magistrate Judge] had the 
power to issue search warrants at any and all times TR, P. 55, 11. 16-21; even though he assumed 
that there were sitting Magistrate Judges in Ada County [the location of St. Alphonsus hospital] 
who had the power to issue search warrants TR, P. 57, 11. 8-11; and even though he knew that 
Deputy Rogers "had been a Boise City Police officer for an extended period .. ". Ibid, 11. 15-21. 
Dale Rogers was the State's third and final witness at the Preliminary Hearing. He 
candidly admitted that Ms. Franklin did not consent to having her blood drawn. TR, P. 60, 11. 12-
17. He testified that the call asking him to draw Ms. Franklin's blood was received by him at his 
home (in Ada County, TR, P. 62, 11. 1-3) between 12:20 and 12:30 a.m., TR, P. 61, 11. 14-17; 11. 
24-5. He thought the call came "through our dispatch", rather than from Deputy Tatillian. TR, P. 
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62, 11. 4-8. Rogers neither made any effort to ascertain whether or not a warrant had been 
obtained for this blood draw, TR, P. 62, 11. 20-23, nor did he make any eff01is to obtain a warrant 
to take Ms. Franklin's blood. TR, P. 62, 1. 24 - P. 63, 1. 1. 
Deputy Rogers testified that Ms. Franklin made it very clear to him and hospital 
personnel in the room with him that she would not submit to having her blood drawn. TR, P. 64, 
11. 2-5, 11. 12-14. Despite learning that Ms. Franklin would not voluntarily submit to having her 
blood drawn, Rogers still made no effort to obtain a search warrant, Ibid., 11. 15-19, and 
proceeded to take her blood against her will, Ibid. LI. 20-21. At the time he elected not to seek a 
warrant Rogers was aware that there Magistrate Judges were available at all times for the purpose 
of granting warrants, TR, P. 65, 11. 13-24, and he even knew one or more of the currently sitting 
Ada County Magistrates. TR, P. 65, 1. 25 - P. 66, I. 2, yet he made no efforts to find out which 
Magistrate was then on-call for the issuance of warrants. TR, P. 66, 11. 3-8. 
Taken together, all of these unchallenged facts establish that: 
1. A minimum of 2 1/2 hours elapsed between the time Deputy Tatillian first learned of the 
accident and the time when blood was drawn from Ms. Franklin against her will and 
without a warrant while she was a patient in SARMC. 
2. It was Boise County Dispatch which informed Deputy Tatillian about the accident and 
provided him with the license number and/or a description of the involved vehicle. For 
the next couple of hours Deputy Tatillian was always able to access Dispatch. 
3. During the entire sequence of events culminating in the involuntary draw of Ms. 
Franklin's blood, Chief Deputy Rogers was in Boise, within a short distance of SARMC, 
and he could be and was in fact reached by Dispatch. 
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4. Rogers had been an officer with the Boise City Police Department for over 30 years, 
knew that was always an on-call Magistrate, and he could obtain a warrant to 
seize Ms. Franklin's blood from that judicial officer. 
5. No attempt was ever made by either officer to obtain a warrant to seize blood from Ms. 
Franklin. 
6. Ms. Franklin did not consent to having her blood drawn by law enforcement, and her 
blood was taken over her objection. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
\Vhether the involuntary taking of Franklin's blood without a warrant constitutes an 
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
A compelled physical intrusion beneath one's skin and into one's veins to obtain a sample 
of one's blood for use as evidence in a criminal investigation is an invasion of bodily integrity that 
implicates an individual's "most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy." Missouri v. 
NcNeely, 569 U.S._ (2013) (slip op., at 4 -5), citing Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985). 
I. A Blood Draw is a Seizure and thus Requires a Warrant. 
The taking of a blood alcohol content test is a seizure within the context of the fourth 
amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 370 (1989). Any 
warrantless search or seizure of a citizen is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain 
specific and well delineated exceptions. Id. When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged by 
defendant, the burden is on the prosecution to show that evidence seized falls within a recognized 
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exception to the warrant requirement. Id. 
While officers on scene are likely to be hurried, excited and intent on securing an arrest, a 
neutral and detached magistrate serves to safeguard the constitutional liberties of the suspect. "[T]he 
detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, [] is a more reliable safeguard against improper searches 
than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise 
of ferreting out crime." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (internal quotation omitted) 
(abrogated on other grounds by Californiav. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991)). Simply stated, without 
a magistrate standing guard between police and citizens, the Fourth Amendment becomes 
meaningless. 
II. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement. 
A. Per Se Exceptions. 
The Supreme Court has recognized very few per se exceptions to the warrant requirement, 
which can be generally grouped into distinct categories. It should be noted at the outset that "for the 
most part, per se rules are inappropriate in the Fourth Amendment context." United States v. 
Drayton, 536 U.S. 194,201 (2002). 
The first per se exception is for searches or seizures that comport with Congress' power to 
protect the Nation. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 US 531,538 (1985). 
"Routine searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of 
reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant." Id 
The second is for "special needs." Searches that fall within this exception include searches 
of probationers' homes, Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), government employee work 
spaces, O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987), and student's property by school officials, New 
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Jersey v. TL. 0., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). "A State's operation of a probation system, like its operation 
of a school, government office or prison, or its supervision of a regulated industry, likewise presents 
'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant 
and probable-cause requirements." Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-874. 
The third per se exception to the warrant requirement is for searches incident to arrest. 
"When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in 
order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his 
escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated." 
Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-763 (1969). 
B. Exigent Circumstances Exception. 
The exigent circumstances exception is a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment 
warrant requirement. Unlike the above cited per se exceptions to the warrant requirement which 
require little, if any, analysis of the specific facts of the case, a warrantless search based upon the 
exigent circumstances exception requires a court to evaluate the totality of the circumstances to 
determine whether an emergency existed which would justify a warrantless intrusion. "The 
exceptions are jealously and carefully drawn, and there must be a showing by those who seek 
exemption ... that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative." Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,455 (1971) (internal quotation omitted). "In cases where the securing of 
a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 
(1925). 
The Supreme Court has recognized only a few well delineated situations in which the exigent 
circumstances exception applies. See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (hot 
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pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-299 (1967) (same); Schmerber v. 
California. 384 U.S. 757, 770-771 (1966) (destruction of evidence); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 
296 (1973) (same); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (same); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499. 
509 (1978) ( ongoing fire). "Prior decisions of this Court, however, have emphasized that exceptions 
to the warrant requirement are few in number and carefully delineated." Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 
U.S. 740, 749 (1984) (internal quotation omitted). "Police bear a heavy burden when attempting to 
demonstrate an urgent need" for a warrantless search under the exigent circumstances exception. 
Id., 466 U.S. at 749-750. "When an officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, he ought to be 
in a position to justify it by pointing to some real immediate and serious consequences if he 
postponed action to get a warrant." Id., at 751 (citing McDonald v. US, 335 U.S. 451,460 (1948)). 
The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to delay their investigation if doing so 
would endanger the lives of themselves or others. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Brigham 
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006). When officers are faced with a situation where the delay in 
obtaining a warrant could result in the destruction of evidence, an exigency may also exist. Ker, 3 74 
U.S. at 40-41; Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757. When determining whether there is a risk of destruction 
of evidence sufficient to excuse a warrant courts also consider the seriousness of the offense. Welsh, 
466 U.S. at 751. Simply because evidence may or will be destroyed in a particular case does not 
necessarily mean that an exigent circumstances exception applies. See, e.g., Johnson v. US, 333 
U.S. 10 ( 1948) (warrantless search not appropriate simply because opium fumes were dissipating); 
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (warrantless search not appropriate simply because 
whiskey mash smell may dissipate); Welsh, 466 U.S. 740 (warrantless seizure of defendant not 
appropriate simply because blood alcohol level was dissipating). 
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The Supreme Court has rejected prior attempts to create new per se exigency rules. Mincey 
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (rejecting per se exigency rule when police are investigating a 
murder scene); Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17 (1984) (same). The Court has similarly rejected 
attempts to create per se exceptions to the knock and announce rule. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 
U.S. 385 (1997) (rejecting per se exception in felony drug cases). 
Idaho Courts have also recognized that "[t]he exigent circumstances exception allows agents 
of the State to conduct a wanantless search when there is a 'compelling need for official action and 
no time to secure a wanant."' State v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470,472 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting 
Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509). "The exigent circumstances exception does not apply where there is time 
to secure a wanant." State v. Robinson, 144 Idaho 496,501, 163 P. 3d 1208, 1213 (Ct. App. 2007). 
This exception does not serve to streamline police procedures or investigations. "The mere 
fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the 
Fourth Amendment." Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393. "The investigation of crime would always be 
simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the Fourth Amendment reflects the view of those who 
wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person's home and property may not be totally sacrificed 
in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of the criminal law." Id. 
Exigent circumstances cases are always fact-specific and require the State to show that 
immediate action was necessary to prevent flight, safeguard the police or public, or stop destruction 
of evidence. The word itself, exigent, connotes urgency and implies that immediate action is 
necessary. Whether sufficient exigent circumstances existed at the time of the anest or search to 
obviate the need to obtain a wanant should always be a fact intensive analysis based upon the 
particular facts of the case, with consideration being given to the totality of circumstances. 
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III. There is no Per Se Exigency Exception in all DUI Cases. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a wmTantless blood draw can, in some 
circumstances, fall under the exigent circumstances exception in Schmerber v. California, 3 84 U.S. 
757 (1966). In Schmerber, the defendant was involved in a serious car accident that required his 
hospitalization and a police investigation of the crash. 384 U.S. at 771. The Court engaged in an 
exigent circumstances analysis and concluded that "[g]iven these special facts", this warrantless 
blood draw falls within the exception. Id. The fact the defendant's BAC was diminishing was only 
one of the factors the Court considered in reaching its conclusion. Also important to the Court's 
analysis was the fact that the officer had to spend time to conduct an accident investigation, and the 
fact that defendant had to be taken to the hospital to be assessed for injuries. Id. Given these two 
additional delays, coupled with the fact that defendant's BAC was dropping, the Court found that 
exigent circumstances existed to negate the warrant requirement. The Court concluded by stating, 
"[i]t bears repeating, however, that we reach this judgment only on the facts of the present record." 
Id., at 772. 
In the recent opinion in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. _ (2013), the United States 
Supreme Court explicitly found that the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream, a 
factor present in every "dui" investigation, does not give rise to a per se exigency always justifying 
an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The Court explicitly found and held 
that exigency in this context must be determined on a case by case basis after careful analysis of the 
totality of the circumstances. 569 U.S._ (2013) (slip op., at 1). The Court further found that "[i]n 
those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a 
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blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth 
Amendment mandates that they do so." Id. at p. 9. 
In McNeely, the Court recognized that the "context of blood testing is different in critical 
respects from other destruction-of-evidence cases in which the police are truly confronted with a 
'now or never' situation." 569 U.S._ (2013) (slip op., at 10). "[B]ecause a police officer must 
typically transport a drunk-driving suspect to a medical facility and obtain the assistance of someone 
with appropriate medical training before conducting a blood test, some delay between the time of 
the arrest or accident and the time of the test is inevitable regardless of whether police officers are 
required to obtain a warrant." Id. The court acknowledged that BAC evidence is lost gradually and 
relatively predictably (Id. at12-13) at the rate of approximately 0.015 to 0.02 percent per hour once 
the alcohol has been fully absorbed. (Id. at 9.) 
As part of its effort to distinguish Schmerber, supra, the Court taught that: 
The State's proposed per se rule also fails to account for advances in the 47 years since 
Schmerber was decided that allow for the more expeditious processing of warrant 
applications, particularly in contexts like drunk-driving investigations where the evidence 
offered to establish probable cause is simple. Ibid, Slip Opinion pp. 10-11. 
The first category of advances noted by the Court fall within the realm of technological aids 
which facilitate the process of securing warrants. Ibid, P. 11. After noting that since 1977 Federal 
Magistrates have been empowered to issue warrants "based on sworn testimony communicated by 
telephone" Ibid, the majority opinion also acknowledged post-1977 amendments to the law which 
now allow the consideration of"information communicated by telephone or other reliable electronic 
means." Ibid., quoting Fed. Rule Crim Proc. 4.1. The Court further observed that "well over a 
majority of states allow police officers or prosecutors to apply for search warrants remotely through 
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various means, including telephonic or radio communication, electronic communication such as e-
and video conferencing." 569 U.S._ (2013) (slip op., at 11). This latter proposition was 
buttressed with an extensive footnote listing the various state statutes which are similar to the 
Federal Rule. Tellingly, Idaho was mentioned as among the majority of jurisdictions, with the Court 
citing to Idaho Code § § 19-4404 and 19-4406. 1 
IV. Idaho's Implied Consent Statute does not void the Fourth Amendment's 
Requirement that law enforcement officers must obtain a warrant prior to conducting an 
evidentiary blood draw in the absence of exigent circumstances. 
It can be anticipated that the State will argue that warrantless blood draws are 
countenanced under the Idaho Implied Consent Statute. In order fully to appreciate why this 
argument is groundless, it is important to realize that, like Idaho, Missouri (where McNeely was 
arrested) has an "implied consent" law, a fact acknowledged by the Supreme Court, which added 
that: 
and each state's officers are required to read a form to the driver whose blood or breath 
they wish to test. Ibid. ("Upon arrival at the hospital, the officer asked NcNeely whether 
he would consent to a blood test. Reading from a standard implied consent, the officer 
explained to McNeely that under state law refusal to submit voluntarily to the test would 
lead to the immediate revocation of his driver's license for one year and could be used 
against him in a future prosecution." Ibid.) 
1. While working on this brief, the undersigned attorney received a call from a Deputy Prosecutor in a relatively 
small outlying county. After discussing the case she is prosecuting and I am defending, an exchange of pleasantries 
ensued. We discussed cases we were working on, and I mentioned the fact that I was, at that moment, drafting this 
very brief. She infonned me that many of the officers she works with now carry thumb drives containing, inter alia, 
form applications for search warrants in "dui" cases. This fact is offered as being illustrative of the accuracy and 
reach of the McNeely Court's proposition that technological advances can and do aid law enforcement officers in 
promptly securing search warrants in "dui" cases. The undersigned will, upon request of the Court, reveal the name 
of this Prosecutor in chamber. 
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The fact that the United States Supreme Court -the final arbiter of federal law- did not 
allow Missouri's implied consent statute to defeat McNeely's claim that his rights under the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States constitution had been violated by the warrantless taking 
of his blood (In both the case at bar and McNeely, the sample of the Defendant's' blood was 
taken over their objection. See, Statement of Facts, supra P. 5, and McNeely Slip Opinion, P. 2.) 
must be binding upon this Court, given that the majority opinion specifically expressed its 
awareness of the existence and proper role of such enactments: 
As an initial matter, States have a broad range oflegal tools to enforce their drunk-driving 
laws and to secure BAC evidence without undertaking warrantless nonconsensual blood 
draws. For example, all 50 States have adopted implied consent laws that require 
motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC 
testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense. 
(Citation omitted). Such laws impose significant consequences when a motorist 
withdraws consent: typically the motorists's driver's license is immediately suspended or 
revoked, and most States allow the motorist's refusal to take a BAC test to be used as 
evidence against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Ibid, P. 18.2 
The United States Supreme Court is plainly the Court of last resort when it comes to the 
interpretation of the United States Constitution, and that document's Supremacy Clause bars 
Idaho Courts from disregarding the Supreme Court's interpretation of Federal law. Plainly 
stated, in the instant context, the line of Idaho cases with holdings contrary to McNeely, supra can 
no longer be interposed as a rationale for excusing the requirement of a warrant to draw blood 
from a "dui" suspect, absent a clear showing of exigent circumstances.3 
2. The Idaho Implied Consent Statute, namely I.C. §18-8002 is quoted in full at Page 5. of the Memorandum 
Decision and Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Suppress, issued on June 13th, 2013 by the Honorable Benjamin 
R. Simpson, a District Judge of the First Judicial District of the State ofldaho, which is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A". A plain reading of that law shows that our enactment contains precisely the type of penalty for a refusal to 
submit to testing mentioned by the Supreme Court. 
3. See the discussion of this topic in Pages 8-10 of Judge Simpson's attached Memorandum Opinion. 
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V. The facts in the instant action are demonstrate that there were no "exigent 
circumstances" sufficient to excuse the requirement that a warrant had to be obtained 
before drawing Ms. Franklin's blood: 
In the absence of a per se exigency in "dui" cases, the Court's plain duty is to consider all 
of the salient facts to detennine whether or not there was an exigency sufficient to dispense with 
a warrant for the taking of Ms. Franklin's blood against her will. A comparison of some of the 
facts which obtain in the instant action and those in McNeely follows: 
a. 
b. 
Time between arrest and blood draw: McNeely was stopped at 2:08 a.m., and the sample 
of his blood "was secured at approximately 2:35 a.m." Slip Opinion, P. 2., accounting for 
a mere 27 minute interval. In sharp contrast, approximately 2 1/2 hours elapsed between 
the time Deputy Tatillian was dispatched to the scene of the accident involving Ms. 
Franklin, and when her blood was drawn over her objection. 
This contrast demonstrates that, in the case at bar, officers had approximately 5.55 
times as long an interval within which to secure a warrant. This factor plainly militates 
against a finding of exigent circumstances. 
The officer's ability to seek a warrant: In McNeely, supra, it appears that only one officer 
was involved. He stopped Mr. McNeely and, after McNeely failed field sobriety tests, it 
was he who transported him to the hospital. Ibid., P. 2. In contrast, as the facts educed at 
the Preliminary Hearing herein display, at least two officers were involved, one of whom 
lived not in Boise County, but in Boise City, the location not only of the hospital to which 
Ms. Franklin was taken, but also of an on-call Magistrate, who could have taken a phone 
call from either Deputy or from Boise County Dispatch. This latter office was a 30 year 
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veteran of the Boise City Police Department, and testified that he was aware of the 
procedures for obtaining a warrant from the on-call Magistrate. The Preliminary Hearing 
record is replete with evidence that Deputy Tatillian was in near constant contact with 
Dispatch, and Chief Deputy Rogers testified that it was Dispatch which contacted him 
and requested him to go to the hospital and draw blood from Ms. Franklin. Nothing 
prevented Deputy Tatillian from, at any time, working through Dispatch to reach either 
the resident Magistrate or the on-call Magistrate in Boise City to obtain a warrant. 
Of significance, Deputy Tatillian was not involved at all in treating or transporting 
Ms. Franklin. These tasks were accomplished by the members of the Garden Valley Fire 
Department, the Crouch Ambulance, and (presumably) St. Alphonsus Life Flight. Thus, 
though Ms. Franklin sustained serious injuries necessitating her being stabilized and 
transported by air to SARMC, because others handled the mechanics of the transport, 
Deputy Tatillian was not precluded from utilizing a small portion of his time to obtain a 
warrant. 
c. Neither Deputy identified a single fact or factor suggesting that he faced an emergencv or 
unusual delay in securing a warrant. Both simply elected to make no effort to obtain one. 
As soon as Ms. Franklin was transported from the scene of the accident by 
paramedical personnel, Deputy Tatillian's involvement with her, such as it was, ended. 
While her medical condition appears to have required emergency care, it was not Deputy 
Tatillian who provided it, even at the scene. Once the ambulance left with Ms. Franklin, 
and without the Deputy, he could have immediately notified Dispatch on his patrol car 
radio to institute the process for obtaining a warrant. He simply elected to forego so 
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honoring the Constitution, and elected instead to devote his time to other, non-emergency 
tasks, such as helping to clean up debris from the area of the accident, and traveling back 
to Crouch to look for Jacob Snowball. Surely he could have contacted Dispatch while en 
route to perform this latter task, if not before. His plain and simple rationale for not 
seeking a warrant in the hours available to him to do so was reliance on the implied 
consent law. TR, P. 54, 11. 2-6. 
As for Deputy Rogers, it appears that he was at home, off-duty when Dispatch· 
contacted him and requested him to go to SARMC to obtain a blood sample from Ms. 
Franklin, a task he performed in an official vehicle. TR, P. 62, 11. 1 7-19. Nothing 
whatsoever amounting to or even suggesting an exigency prevented Deputy Rogers from 
obtaining a warrant to draw Ms. Franklin's blood. Further, the fact that Rogers was 
initially contacted at home through Dispatch suggests that he could have been so reached 
at any time during the 2 hour interval commencing when Deputy Tatillian learned that 
Ms. Franklin was found at the scene of the accident. 
Indeed, the factual pattern here is so egregious as to justify invoking Justice 
Sotomayor' s informative illustration of a situation where a warrant is clearly required: 
Consider, for example, a situation in which the warrant process will not 
significantly increase the delay before the blood test is conducted because an 
officer can take steps to secure a warrant while the suspect is being transported to 
a medical facility by another officer. In such a circumstance, there would be no 
plausible justification for an exception to the warrant requirement. 
McNeeley, supra, at P. 10 ( emphasis added) 
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CONCLUSION 
Careful analysis of the totality of the facts in the instant case clearly demonstrates that 
there was ample time for the officers to obtain a warrant. Accordingly, by definition, no 
exigency. In the absence of both an actual exigency and a per se exigency applicable to any · 
"dui" case, the Fourth Amendment accordingly required that a search warrant be obtained in 
order to draw Ms. Franklin's blood. The warrantless seizure of a sample of her blood violated her 
rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution to be free from 
umeasonable searches and seizures. Therefore, any evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful 
blood draw must be suppressed. 
Dated: November 11 1h, 2013. 
I hereby certify that on ovember 11, 2013, I ca sed the within and foregoing document, 
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CLERK, DISTRICT COURT 
IN nrn DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOIBNAI 
STATE OF 1DAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICAH ABRAHAM WULFF, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR-12-19332 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is based upon the following factuaJ history; 
On October 23, 2012, at approximately 11 :24 p.m., Deputy Larsen of the 
Kootenai County Sheriff's Department was stationary in the north parking lot of the 
Sheriffs Department Public Safety Building, when his attention was dravm to the sound 
of a vehicle accelerating at a rugh rate of speed. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. 
Larsen): Deputy Larsen noted in his report that he observed a dark colored vehicle pass 
the north gate heading eastbound on Dalton Avenue. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. 
Dep. Larsen; Incident Report). Deputy Larsen estimated the speed of the vehicle at 50-60 
miles per hour. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen; Incident Report). Deputy 
Larsen pulled out of the par.king lot, began to foHow the vehicle, and radioed other patrol 
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units in the area that he was trying to catch up to the vehicle. (Mot to Suppress Hearing, 
Test. Dep. Larsen; Incident Report). During the pursuit, Deputy Larsen estimated that the 
vehicle was traveling at 60 miles per hour in areas where the posted speed limit ranges 
from 25 to 35 miles per hour. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Tesl Dep. Larsen; Incident 
Report). As he approached Deerhaven A venue, Deputy Larsen activated his overhead 
lights; the vehicle came to a stop at this point. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. 
Larsen; Incident Report). 
Deputy Larsen approached the driver's side door and spoke with the driver, whom 
he identified by his Idaho Driver's License as Micah A. Wulff, Defendant. (Mot. to 
Suppress Hearing, Test Dep. Larsen). Deputy Larsen reported that he asked Defendant 
why he was driving so fast, to which Defendant replied "I don't know, 1 probably 
shouldn't be driving." (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dcp. Larsen; Incident Report). 
Deputy Larsen noted that he detected a strong odor of alcoholic beverage coming from 
the vehicle as Defendant spoke. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen). Deputy 
Larsen also reported that, without prompting, Defendant told him that he had been 
"drinking in town." (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dcp. Larsen; Incident Report). 
Deputy Larsen infonned Defendant he was being detained and asked Defendant 
to exit the vehicle. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen; Incident Report). 
Deputy Larsen noted that Defendant was cooperative and complied. (Mot. to Suppress 
Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen; Incident Report). As Defendant neared Deputy Larsen, 
Depufy Larsen observed that the odor of alcohol grew stronger and that Defendant was 
unsteady on his feet. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen; Incident Report). 
When Depu1y Larsen asked Defendant how much he had had to drink, Defendant, 
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with some additional prompting, infonned Deputy Larsen that he had had some "vodka 
drinks." (Mot to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dcp. Larsen; Incident Report). Deputy Larsen 
reported that during his conversation with Def end ant, Defendant was having a difficult 
time maintaining his balance and that his eyes were red and bloodshot. (Mot. to Suppress 
Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen; Incident Report). 
Deputy Larsen informed Defendant that he was going to have Defendant perform 
some field sobriety evaluations; Defendant had some difficulties perfonning the field 
sobriety evaluations. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen; Incident Report). 
B~ed upon Defendant's performance of the field sobriety evaluations, the odor of 
alcohol emitting from Defendant's person, Defenda.'1t's admission to consuming alcohol 
that evening, and Defendant's high rate of speed while driving, Deputy Larsen reported 
that he believed Defendant had been operating a motor vehicle while under the influence, 
in violation ofl.C. § 18-8004. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen; Incident 
Report). Deputy Larsen placed Defendant into custody and transferred him to the 
Kootenai County Puhlic Safety Building ("PSB"). (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. 
Larsen; Incident Report). At the PSB, Deputy Larsen began the process to take a breath 
sample from Defendant. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test Dep. Larsen; Incident Report). 
When Deputy Larsen asked Defendant to sit in the chair near the breath sampling 
instrument, Defendant stated "I'm not going anywhere near that" and pointed to the 
breath sampling instrument. (.Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen; Incident 
Report). 
Deputy Larsen then informed Defendant that he would transfer Defendant to 
Kootenai Medical Center ("KMC") for a blood draw. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. 
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Dep. Larsen; Incident Report). Defendant stated he understood and accompanied Deputy 
Larsen to his vehicle. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen; Incident Report). At 
no point did Deputy Larsen obtain a warrant for the blood test. 
At KMC, a nurse began to prepare Defendant's ann for the blood draw, however, 
Defendant allegedly became uncooperative and placed his left arm in a "block" position, 
telling the nurse "you're not touching me." (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen; 
Incident Report). When two security officers arrived Defendant allowed the nurse to 
perfonn the blood draw without further issue. 
Defendant has brought this Motion to Suppress the blood draw on the basis that it 
was an unreasonable search since it was done without first obtaining a search warrant. 
DISCUSSION 
I. Whether e,ridence obtained as a result of drawing and testing Defendant's 
blood must be suppressed because the blood draw was conducted without a 
search warrant'! 
Administration of blood alcohol testing constitutes a seizure of the person, and a 
search within the purview of the Fourth Amendment State v. LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905, 
243 P.3d 1093, 1095 (Ct. App. 2010), citing Schumber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 
86S.Ct. 1826, I833-34, 16L.Ed.2d908,917-l8(1966);Statev. Diaz, 144Idaho300, 
302,160 PJd 739, 741 (2007) (other citation omitted). Searches and seizures performed 
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Id (citation omitted). 
To overcome this presumption, the State bears the burden of establishing two 
prerequisites. First, the State must prove that a warrantless search fell within a weU-
recognized exception to the warrant requirement Second, the State must show that 
even if the search is permissible under an exception to the warrant requirement, it 
must still be reasonable in light of all of the other surrounding circumstances. 
Id (internal citations omitted). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 4 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Idaho's Implied Consent Statute, I.C. § 18-8002 provides that: 
(1) Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in 
this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for 
concentration of alcohol ... , and to have given his consent to evidentiary testing 
for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances, provided that such 
testing is administered at the request of a peace officer having reasonable grounds 
to believe that person has been dri.vi...,g or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle in violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, or section 
18-8006, Idaho Code. 
(3) At the time cvidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol, or for the presence 
of drugs or other intoxicating substances is requested, the person shall be 
informed that ifhe refuses to submit to or if he fails to complete, evidcntiary 
testing: 
(a) He is subject to a civi.l penalty of two hundred fifty dollars ($250) for 
refusing to take the test; 
(b) He has the right to request a hearing within seven (7) days to show 
cause why he refused to submit to, or complete evidentiary testing; 
( c) If he does not request a hearing or does not prevail at the hearing, the 
court shall sustain the civil penalty and his driver's license will he 
suspended absolutely for one (1) year if this is his first refusal and two (2) 
years if this is his second refusal within ten (10) years; 
( d) Provided however, if he is admitted to a problem solving court 
program and has served at least forty~five (45) days of an absolute 
suspension of driving privileges, then he may be eligible for a restricted 
perm.it for the purpose of getting to and from work, school or an alcohol 
treaunentprogram;and 
( e) After submitting to evidentiary testing he may, when practicable, at his 
own expense, have additional tests made by a person of his O'Wn choosing. 
( emphasis added). 
Under Idaho's implied consent statute, anyone who drives or is in actual physical 
control of a vehicle is deemed to have impliedly consented to evidentiary testing for 
alcohol when an officer .who has reasonable grounds to believe an individual is driving 
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under the influence requests this testing. LeClercq, 149 Idaho at_, 243 P.3d at 1095-
96, quoting Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741 (other citation omitted); I.C. § 18-
8002(1). Such implied consent is an exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 1095, 
citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) 
( other citation omitted). This implied consent to evidentiary testing includes testing of a 
suspect's blood or urine under LC. § 18-8002, in addition to breathalyzer testing-the test 
requested is of the officer's choosing. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741, citing 
Halen v. State, 136 ldaho 829, 833, 41 P.3d 257,261 (2002). 
According to Idaho case law, the right of an officer to order a blood draw is not 
limited by LC. § l 8-8002(6)(b). Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 742. Under LC. § 18-
8002(6)(b), an order for a blood draw must be supported by probable cause that one of 
the enumerated crimes, such as aggravated DUI or vehlcular manslaughter, have 
occurred. J.C. § l8-8002(6)(b). However, in lfalen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833-34, 41 
P.3d 257, 261-62 (2002), the Supreme Court ofldaho ''held that Idaho Code§ 18--
8002(6)(b) limits only when an officer can order medical personnel to administer a blood 
withdrawal but does not otherwise limit when ru1 officer 'may request that a defendant 
peacefully submit to a blood withdrawal."' Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 742 
(quoting Halen, 136 Idaho at 834, 41 P.3d at 262 (emphasis supplied)). 
Despite the fact that "[n]othing in Idaho Code§ 18-8002 limits the officer's 
authority to require a defendant to submit to-a blood draw[,]" the recent United States 
Supreme Court Case Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._ (2013), places new limits on the 
ability of law enforcement to conduct a blood test without a warrant. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 
303, 160 P.3d at 742. In McNeely, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "fi]n those drunk-
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driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a 
blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, 
the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so." 569 U.S._. 
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that there may be some circumstances that 
would "make obtaining a warrant impractical such that the dissipation of alcohol from U1e 
blood stream will support an exigency justifying a properly conducted warrantless blood 
test[,]" but the Court rejected the risk of dissipation of alcohol as a per se exception to the 
warrant requirement. Id Instead, the Court emphasized that "[ wjheilier a warrantless 
blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case 
based on the totality of the circumstances." Id ( emphasis added). 
It.is not disputed that Deputy Larsen had probable cause to believe that Defendant 
was driving under the influence. Probable cause is infonnation that "would lead a man of 
ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that 
such person is guilty." State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449, 776 P.2d 458, 461 (1989). In 
passing on the question of probable cause, the expertise and experience of the officer may 
be taken into account. State v. Ramirez, 121 Idaho 319, 323, 824 P.2d 894, 898 
(Ct.App.1991). 
Deputy Larsen allegedly observed Defendant operating a vehicle at a speed 25 to 
35 miles per hour over the posted speed limit, that the odor of alcohol was emanating 
from Defendant's person, that Defendant performed poorly on field sobriety evaluations., 
and that Defendant admitted to consuming alcohol prior to driving that night. (Mot. to 
Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen; State's Br. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Suppress; 
Incident Report). Based upon these observations, it was reasonable for Deputy Larsen to 
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believe that Defendant had committed the offense of Driving Under the Influence. 
Deputy Larsen transported Defendant to the Public Safety Building where 
Defendant subsequently refused to submit to the breathalyzcr test. (State's Br. in Opp 'n 
to Def. 's Mot. to Suppress). After Defendant refused the breath test, Deputy Larsen 
transferred him to KMC for a blood draw; Deputy Larsen did not obtain a warrant prior 
to the blood draw. (State's Br. in Opp'n to Def. 's Mot. to Suppress). When it appeared 
the Defendant may attempt to block the nurse and physically refuse the blood draw, two 
additional security personnel entered the room. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. 
Larsen). Ultimately, no force was used against Defendant and Defendant complied with 
the blood draw. However, there is no evidence or allegation that Defendant gave his 
consent to the blood draw, only that with the implied threat of force he succumbed to the 
test. Id. 
a. Whether Idaho's Implied Consent Statute Voids the Requirement that 
Police Must Obtain a Warrant Prior to Conducting an :Evidcntiary Blood 
Draw Where There are No Exigent Circumstances 
The State argues that the warrantless blood draw was proper under Idaho's 
Implied Consent Statute, I.C. § 18-8002. The State argues that, pursuant to the Idaho 
Statute, Defendant impliedly consented to evidentiary testing of his blood.1 (State's Br. in 
Opp'n to Def. 's Mot. to Suppress). The State further argues that once tmplied consent 
has been given by an individual who has "taken advantage of the privilege of driving on 
Idaho roads" that individual cannot withdraw the implied consent. Id. 
The State alleges that in the case at bar, "at the time [Defendant] was taken to the 
1 It should be observ~d, however, the statute itself provides negative ramifications for a refusal to submit to 
evidentiarf testing; specifically an individual accepts the risk that his driver's license will be suspended. lf 
all drivers impliedly consented, it seems that a refusal could never truly occur as any evidentiary testing 
could be forced. 
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hospital for the blood draw, the Defendant for all intents and purposes had consented to 
the blood draw." Id. The State fi..rrther argues that the U.S. Supreme Court did not "delve 
or decide the constitutionality of'' implied consent statutes in its McNeely decision. Id 
The State notes that any discussion by the U.S. Supreme Court in McNeely was dicta and 
"does not change the status of implied consent law in Idaho." Id 
The State's logic, however, is contradictory to a reasonable interpretation of the 
implied consent statute, J.C.§ 18-8002, and to the recent U.S. Supreme Court McNeely 
decision. In McNeely, the U.S. Supreme Court specifically stated that "[w]hether a 
warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case 
by case based on the totality of the circumstances." .McNeely, 569 U.S._ (emphasis 
added). Adopting the State's view, implied consent statutes would, in essence, act as a 
per se exception to the warrant requirement. In turn, implied consent statutes would have 
the effect of making the McNeely decision oflittle or no consequence. 
The State points out that McNeely did not explicitly address implied consent 
statutes. While this is correct, it would be antithetical to interpret the McNeely opinion as 
pennitting warrantless blood draws simply because a state has Jegislation that allows such 
action. Under the State's logic, states could circumvent the McNeely decision by simply 
relying on implied consent statutes. In other words, the State's position is that states can 
bypass the U.S. Supreme Court's announcement that, absent exigent circumstances, the 
Fourth Amendment mandates that an officer obtain a warrant prior to conducting a blood 
draw by simply arguing implied consent. Therefore, despite the fact that the U.S. 
Supreme Court did not directly discuss implied consent statutes, interpreting the McNeely 
opinion as pennitting forced blood draws simply because a state has legislation that 
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b. Whether There Were Exigent Circumstances Which Justified the 
Warrantless Blood Draw? 
In McNeely, the U.S. Supreme Court cited several factors that may Jead to 
circumstances where a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect may be 
appropriate. Id. Factors that may contribute to exigent circumstances may include: (1) 
time must be spent investigating the scene of the accident and transporting an injured 
suspect to the hospital to receive treatment; (2) the availability of a magistrate and 
procedures in place for obtaining a warrant; (3) "metabolization of alcohol in the 
bloodstream and the ensuing loss of evidence[;]" and ( 4) other "practical problems of 
obtaining a warrant within a timeframe that still preserves the opportunity to obtain 
reliable evidence[.]" Id. 
The State's alternative argument is that there were exigent circwnstanccs 
sufficient to justify the warrantless withdrawal of Defendant's blood. Specific exigent 
circumstances the State alleges were present in this case include: (1) that retrograde · 
extrapolation is not available in the state of Idaho, and therefore "the legal environment 
in Idaho should be seen as one of the 'special facts' supporting a finding of exigency"2 
(State's Br. in Opp'n to Def. 's Mot. to Suppress); (2) that obtaining a warrant requires 
time, "f aJt best, the process currently takes several hours[,]" and therefore even assuming 
2 The State cites no authority for this broad a~sertion that "in Jdaho retrograde extrapolation is not 
permitted" and this statement is only in part correct. The State is correct that where an individual's 
evidentlary testing results reveal that the individual's BAC is below the legal limit the State cannot use 
retrograde extrapolation to prosecute him. LC. 1 S-8004(2); State v. Daniel, 132 Idaho 701, 979 P.2d I 03 
( 1998). However, that limited exception does not equivalate to a rule that retrograde extrapolation is never 
allowed in Idaho. Jn fact, several Idaho cases have insinuated that retrograde extrapolation may be 
allowable. Slate v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 106 P .3d 436 (2004); State v. Stutlijf, 97 Idaho 523, 547 P 2d 
1128 (1976). (applying a repealed statute, lhe court stated "Th.is section entitles either party to produce a 
witness capable of extrapolating the results to a prior period of time. The burden, however, is on the party 
who seeks to introduce this evidence."); State v. Knoll, 110 Idaho 678, 718 P.2d 589 (Ct.App. 1986). 
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Deputy Larsen had taken steps to obtain a warrant it would have taken several hours to 
acquire3 (State's Br. in Opp'n to Det: 's Mot to Suppress); and (3) that the State is "in the 
untenable position of having an ethical obligation to preserve evidence that could be 
exculpatory while that evidence is in the body of an adversarial party." (State's Br. in 
Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Suppress). 
Similar to the State's primary argument, its alternative exigent circumstances 
argument suggests that in Idaho, or at least in Kootenai County, there should be a per se 
exception to the warrant requirement. Like the State's primary argument, these assertions 
go against the tenor of the McNeely opinion. As noted above, in McNeely, the U.S. 
Supreme Court specifically stated that "[wJhether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-
driving suspect is reasonable must be detennincd case by case based on the totality of the 
circumstances." McNeely, 569 U.S.-·--· (emphasis added). 
In the case at bar, the State has not alleged any unique facts, which under the 
totality of the circumstances, would result in an exigency justifying a warrantless blood 
draw. The State argues that "it took Deputy Larsen some time to catch up to and stop the 
vehicle driven by the Defendantf.l"(State's Br. in Opp'n to Def 's Mot. to Suppress). 
However, Deputy Larsen did not testify as to the specific amount of time it took for him 
to catch Defendant, and there is no evidence that a significant amount of time elapsed 
between Deputy Larsen's initial sighting of the vehicle and the execution of the traffic 
stop. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen). 
'lbe State also argues that Deputy Larsen bad to transfer Defendant to the jail 
3 The State later mentions in its Brief, however, that due to Defendant's excessive BAC (.217) "he would 
have still been over the legal limit 6 hours after the initial call was made." (State's Br. in Opp'n to Def. 's 
Mot to Suppress). This statement by the State discredits the alleged exigent circumstance that would result 
from waiting for a warrant. 
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first, following Defendant's refusal to the breath test., Deputy Larsen had to transport 
Defendant to the hospital. (State's Br. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Suppress). Deputy 
Larsen estimated that approximately one hour and twenty five minutes elapsed from the 
arrest to the time of the blood draw. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen). 
However, other than the dissipation of Defendant's blood alcohol content, the State has 
made no argument of exigency unique to this case which would justify the warrantless 
blood draw, and, more importantly, no attempt to secure a warrant was ever made. 
2. Whether Exclusion is the Proper Remedy? 
Finally, the State asserts "that the defendant is not deserving of a remedy." 
(State's Br. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Suppress). The State cites to Defendant's BAC of 
.217 and also the officer's "good faith" and reliance on I 8-8002, State v. Wheeler, 149 
Idaho 364,233 P.3d 1286 (Ct.App. 2010), and State v. Diaz, 144 ldaho 300, 160 P.3d 
739 (2007). (State's Br. in Opp'n to Def. 's Mot. to Suppress). The State asks the Court to 
consider a parallel between this case and the reasoning of the inevitable discovery 
doctrine, and to determine that the exclusionary rule is not the proper remedy in this case. 
Id The State asserts that if the officer had known a warrant was required, he would have 
obtained one, and therefore there was not misconduct on his part. 
Both the Idaho Courts and Federal Comis have noted that "[tJhe primary 
justification for the exclusionary rule ... is the deterrence of police conduct t.hat violates 
Fourth Amendment rights." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 
1067 (1976); State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511,514,272 P.3d 483, 486 (2012). In United 
States v. leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), the U.S. Supreme 
Court adopted the Leon "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule under the Fourth 
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Amendment; essentially the Leon Rule is that exclusion is not the appropriate remedy 
where police have acted in good faith when conducting their search. Koivu, 152 Idaho at 
514, 272 P.3d at 486; Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677. The leon 
Ru.le "has since expanded the good-faith exception to include a search conducted in 
reasonable re[iance upon a subsequently invalidated statute because legislators, tike 
judges, are not the focus of the rule[.]" Id at 515, 272 P.3d at 487. The Idaho Supreme 
Court, however, has rejected the Leon rule, most recently in the 20 I 2 Koivu case. There 
the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy for searches and seizures that 
violate the Constitution .... [C]ourts have disagreed over the years as to whether 
there should be any remedy for such constitutional violations and, if so, whether it 
should focus upon redressing the wrong committed against the victim of the 
unconstitutional search or seizure or only upon deterring future violations of such 
constitutional rights by law enforcemen1 officials. 
This Court's rejection of the Leon good-faith exception in [ State v.] Guzman[, 122 
Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992).) was supported by an independent exclusionary 
rule announced eighty-five years ago in [State v. J Arregui[, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 
788 (! 927). In Arregui, there was no claim oflaw enforcement misconduct. ... 
When Gmman was decided. "Idaho had clearly developed an exclusionary rule as 
a constitutionally mandated remedy for il1egal searches and seizures in addition to 
other purposes behind the rule such as recognizing the exclusionary rule as a 
deterrent for police misconduct." Donato, 135 Idaho at 472, 20 P.3d at 8. In some 
instances, we have construed Article I, section 17, to provide greater protection 
than is provided by the United States Supreme Court's construction of the Fourth 
Amendment. "[W]e provided greater protection to Idaho citizens based on the 
uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our long-standing jurisprudence." 
Id To overrule Guzman and hold that the exclusionary rule's sole purpose is to 
deter police misconduct, we would also have to overrule Arregui, which adopted 
the exclusionary rule in Idaho in a case in which there was no police misconduct. 
Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 519, 272 P.3d 483,491 (2012). 
Therefore, under the current Idaho law there is no recognized good faith 
exception, and thus exclusion is the appropriate remedy. 
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ORDER: 
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HERBY ORDERED, that: 
1. The warrantless blood draw was not justified by exigent circumstances, 
and therefore violated Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights under the 
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. McNeely; Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress is GRANTED. 
2. Because Idaho has declined to follow the Leon Good Faith Exception, 
evidence of the warrantless blood draw is excluded. 
DA TED: This /.Bday of June, 2013 
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IAN W. GEE, ISB # 4813 
JAY F. ROSENTHAL, ISB # 2722 
Boise County Prosecuting Attorney/ 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
406 Montgomery Street 
P.O. Box 186 
Idaho City, Idaho 83631 
Tel: (208) 392-4485 
Fax: (208) 392-3760 
DISTRICT COURT BOISE COUNTY, IDAHO 
F1ecorded in 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, 
Defendant. 
) CASE NO. CR 2013-00458 
) 
) 
) STATES OBJECTION TO 
) DEFENDANTS MOTION TO 
) SUPPRESS 
) 
) 
) 
The defense moves to suppress the blood drawn in this case citing Missouri v. McNeely. 
569 U.S._; 133 S. Ct. 1552(2013). The States objects. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The testimony adduced at the Preliminary Hearing as well as that anticipated during the 
suppression hearing will show that Deputy Tatilian came in contact with the Defendant and a 
male friend at the Wander Inn in Crouch, Idaho at approximately 8:32 p.m. Deputy Tatilian had 
received information through his dispatch center that employees of the Longhorn Saloon in 
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Crouch had reported an intoxicated driver of a red Ford pickup truck. The Deputy observed the 
vehicle at the Wander Inn, and though did not see either the Defendant or her companion 
driving, made contact with them outside of their room and determined that they were very 
intoxicated. The Deputy warned them not to drive the vehicle since they were in his opinion, 
extremely intoxicated. Deputy Tatilian was in Ada County at approximately 10:12 p.m. when he 
was dispatched to an accident at milepost 5.7 on Banks Lowman Road in Boise County. The 
Deputy testified that it took him approximately 45 minutes to reach the scene of the accident, a 
distance estimated at 40 miles. The Deputy testified that he recognized the vehicle described in 
his dispatch call as "probably" being the one he had the complaint about approximately one and 
a half hours prior. At that time the Deputy will testify, that he had no idea who the driver of the 
vehicle was, or what the circumstances of the accident were. The Deputy arrived at the scene of 
the crash at 10:47 p.m. When he arrived the Deputy spoke to Garden Valley Fire Chief Delvalle 
who advised him that the driver and only occupant of the vehicle was Defendant Franklin, that 
she appeared to be under the influence of alcohol and that she had been transported to the 
landing pad for pick up by the Life Flight Medical Helicopter for transport to St. Alphonsus 
Hospital. The Deputy will testify that he began his accident investigation immediately, dealing 
with on scene witnesses, measuring the accident area, inventorying the vehicle prior to its being 
towed and searching for any other individual who might have been in the wrecked vehicle. The 
Deputy also assisted in traffic control as the west bound lane of the highway was closed because 
of the fuel spill from the wreckage. Deputy Tatilian notified dispatch that he needed a 
phlebotomist to go to St. Alphonsus Hospital for a blood draw at 11: 17 p.m. At 11 :53 p.m. 
Deputy Tatilian was at the Wander Inn in Crouch to advise the Defendant's companion that she 
had wrecked the pickup and was enroute to St. Alphonsus Hospital, and further, to confirm that 
STATES OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS-Page 2 
he had not been the driver of the wrecked vehicle. 
The evidence adduced at the Motion Hearing will clearly show that a trained phlebotomist 
Defendant's blood properly; and thereafter turned the blood sample kit over to Deputy 
Dale Rogers who placed it into evidence. 
The testimony of Deputy Tatilian will show that until he reached the scene he had no 
effective way to communicate with his department since he was driving at speeds of 80 to 100 
miles per hour. Further, until he had contact with Fire Chief Delvalle, he was not sure who was 
driving the wrecked vehicle, and in fact was not positive of the identity of the driver until he 
contacted the Defendant's companion, asleep at 12:00 a.m. in room 14 of the Wander Inn in 
Crouch, some four miles from the crash scene. Deputy Tatilian will testify there is no cell phone 
coverage in the area of the crash at milepost 5. 7 on Banks Lowman Road. 
It is not disputed that the Defendant objected to her blood being drawn. She was obviously 
intoxicated, profane and combative with all she came in contact with at St. Alphonsus Hospital, 
stating that she had four prior DUI' s and hated all men. 
Deputies Tatilian and Rogers will testify that on February 6, 2013 the Boise County 
Sheriffs Department relied upon the direction of the Idaho Supreme Court in State vs. Diaz, 144 
Id 300, 160 P3d 739 (2007) in drawing blood of licensed drivers thought to be under the 
influence of alcohol. In this case, there is no question that the Defendant was a licensed Idaho 
driver. Further, the Deputies will testify that they had no procedure established to interface with 
Magistrates for blood draws on DUI cases. 
LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE BLOOD ORA W 
Legal Standard 
Drawing blood from a driver in a driving under the influence case is a seizure. It is well 
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settled that to do so, the State must either have a warrant, or the facts surrounding a blood draw 
must fall within an exception to the warrant requirement. 
The administration of a blood alcohol test constitutes a seizure of the person and a 
search for evidence within the purview of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1834, 16 L.Ed.2d 
908, 917 (1966); State v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470, 472, 65P.3d 211, 213 
(Ct.App.2002). Searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are presumptively 
unreasonable. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. at 1835, 16 L.Ed.2d at 919; State v. 
Curtis, 106 Idaho 483, 488, 680 P.2d 1383, 1388 (Ct.App.1984). To overcome the 
presumption, the state bears the burden of establishing two prerequisites. First, the state 
must prove that a warrantless search fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P3d 739, 741 (2007). Second, the state 
must show that even if the search is permissible under an exception to the warrant 
requirement, it must still be reasonable in light of all other surrounding circumstances. Id. 
State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711-12, 184 P.3d 215, 217-18 (Ct. App. 2008). 
There are a number of possible exceptions to the warrant requirements. "Such an 
exception exists when the search or seizure is conducted with proper consent. Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 142 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973): State v. Whiteley, 124 Idaho 
261, 264, 858P.2d 800, 803 (Ct.App.1993); State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho 556, 558, 560, 716 P.2d 
1328, 1330, 1332 (Ct.App.1986)." State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 410, 973 P2d 758, 762 
(Ct.App. 1999). Exigent circumstances are another well settled exception to the warrant 
requirement. State v. Robinson, 144 Idaho 496,499, 163 P.3d 1208, 1211 (Ct.App.2007). 
The state submits that each of these exceptions applies in these circumstances. 
CONSENT 
Consent is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Wheeler, 149 
Idaho 364, 370, 233 P.3d 1286, 1292 (Ct.App.2010) citing Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 
742. In Idaho, by driving on the public roadways, drivers demonstrate that they have consented 
to evidentiary testing pursuant to LC. 18-8002. 
By terms of this statue, anyone who accepts the privilege of operating a motor 
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vehicle upon Idaho's highway has thereby consented in advance to admit to a BAC test. 
McNeely v. State, 119 Idaho 182, 187, 804 P2d 911, 916 (Ct.App.1990). By implying 
consent, the statute removes the right of a driver to refuse an evidentiary test. Goering v. 
State. 121 Idaho 26, 29. 822 P2dd 545, 548 (Ct.App.1992). Hence, although an individual 
has the physical ability to prevent a test, there is no legal right to withdraw the statutorily 
implied consent. Woolery, 116 Idaho at 372, 775 P.2d at 1214; State v. Burris. 125 Idaho 
289,291, 869 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Ct.App.1994). 
State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406,410, 973 P.2d 758, 762 (Ct.App.199) 
In Diaz, The Idaho Supreme Court found that the blood draw at issue in the case "fell 
within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement," because Diaz had given his 
implied consent to the testing. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 303, 160 P.3d 739 (2007). The 
Court also performed the second step in the analysis by reviewing whether the search was 
"reasonable" in light of the circumstances. The Court examined whether the blood draw was 
done in a medically acceptable manner. The Court discussed the administration of the test at a 
hospital by a qualified hospital technician, among other facts, and concluded that under the 
totality of the circumstances, the test was reasonable. Id. See also State v. Worthington, 138 
Idaho 470, 65 P.3d 211 (Ct.App.2002). In the case at bar, Ms. Franklin's blood was drawn by a 
trained phlebotomist in a medically acceptable manner. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Wheeler found, that: 
Consent is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Diaz, 144 Idaho 
at 303, 160 P.3d at 742. "Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle" in Idaho consents to be tested for alcohol at the request of a peace officer with 
reasonable grounds to believe the person drove under the influence. LC. § 18-8002(1); 
Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741. In Diaz, Court found that the defendant gave his 
consent to a blood draw by driving in Idaho, despite his repeated protests. Id. At 302-03, 
160 P.3d at 741-42. In view of the Supreme Court's decision in Diaz, we concluded that a 
protest to a blood draw does not invalidate consent created by a person's actions and statue. 
State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 370, 233 P.3d 1286, 1292 (Ct.App.2010). Thus, any purported 
protests to the blood draw in the current case do not invalidate the consent. Such an analysis 
contemplates that the driver had already taken advantage of the privilege of driving on the public 
STATES OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 5 
roadways prior to being stopped. Having gotten the benefit of the bargain of implied consent, 
the driver may not void consent already given. 
In Missouri v. McNeely, the Supreme Court identified the sole issue they examined as, 
"whether the natural metabolization [sic] of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se 
exigency that justifies an exception the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for 
nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases." Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 
_,_; 133 S. Ct. 1552,1556 (2013). Neither the statement of the issue under analysis in 
McNeely, nor the Court's holding implicated the consent exception to the warrant requirement. 
There may be some argument that because the Supreme Court identified certain states as 
having implied consent laws with certain restrictions, the Court thereby endorsed those 
restrictions. However, the existence of implied consent laws at the state level was used by the 
Supreme Court to document certain findings: 
wide-spread state restrictions on nonconsensual blood testing provide further support 
for our recognition that compelled blood draws implicate a significant privacy interest. 
They also strongly suggest that our ruling today will not "severely hamper effective law 
enforcement." Garner, 471 U.S., at 19, 105 S.Ct. 1694. 
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._, __ ; 133 S.Ct.1552, 1567 (2013). Identifying these statues 
for such a limited purpose does not amount to a binding opinion of the Court on the restrictions 
listed in those various statutes. Missouri does have an implied consent statute, however the 
Supreme Court did not examine that statue as a possible exception to the warrant requirement in 
this case. Further, Missouri's implied consent law has not historically provided for forced tests. 
Due to a recent statutory change, the question of whether it does now is a matter yet to be 
decided in the Missouri courts. (See Missouri v. McNeely, 2011 WL 2455571 (Missouri Court 
of Appeals, 2011).) The United States Supreme Court opinion in McNeely did not comment on 
the validity of the Idaho implied consent law or one like it. Thus, the dicta in McNeely does not 
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change the status of the implied consent law in Idaho. 
The blood draw in the instant case is admissible under this analysis. It was taken from a 
driver who was driving on the public roadways and who had therefore given consent. The blood 
draw was taken in a medically acceptable manner and was reasonable under the totality of the 
circumstances. 
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
Another well-established exception to the warrant requirement is the presence of exigent 
circumstances. 
"[W]arrants are generally required to search a person's home or his person 
unless 'the exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so compelling 
unless the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." 
Brigham City, 547 U.S. at ----, 126 S.Ct. 1947, 164 L.Ed.2d at 657 (quoting Mincey v. 
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2414, 57 L.Ed.2d. 290, 301 (1978)). A 
warrantless search under this exception must be strictly circumscribed by the nature of the 
exigency that justifies the intrusion. State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 99, 57 P.3d 807, 
810 (Ct.App.2002). 
State v. Robinson, 144 Idaho 496, 499, 163 P.3d 1208, 1211 (Ct.App.2007). Exigent 
circumstances may justify warrantless search of the body through a blood draw. See, Schmerber 
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1835-36, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). 
It is important to note that in McNeely, the Supreme Court did not rule that blood draws 
are constitutionally impermissible. The Supreme Court merely concluded that the elimination of 
alcohol does not alone create a per se rule of exigency in Driving Under the Influence cases. The 
Court maintained that to evaluate whether a blood draw was permissible pursuant to the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, a trial court must analyze the totality of the 
circumstances. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._,_; 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). Such analysis 
will reflect that the collection of blood in this case was done in exigent circumstances sufficient 
to serve as an exception to the warrant requirement. 
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The Supreme Court opinion in McNeely, is premised on the idea that blood alcohol is not a 
"now or never" proposition, because the rate of alcohol elimination can be determined to within 
a reasonable range. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._,_; 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1561 (2013). The 
Supreme Court assumes that retrograde extrapolation is available to the State.1 The Majority 
opinion presumes that so long as some alcohol is in the defendant's system when the test in 
administered, there is a formulaic method through which the actual blood alcohol concentration 
at the time the defendant was driving can be determined. It is largely based on this premise that 
the Supreme Court concludes that "special facts" in addition to inevitable elimination of alcohol 
must be necessary to create an exigency. See, Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._,_; 133 S. 
Ct. 1552, 1557 (2013). 
However, in the State of Idaho, retrograde extrapolation is not permitted. In the event that 
an evidentiary test for blood alcohol reveals a result that is under .08, even if it is substantially 
after the defendant last drove, that person cannot generally be prosecuted.2 Idaho Code Section 
18-8004(2) provides that ,"[a]ny person having an alcohol concentration of less than 0.08, as 
defined in subsection (4) of this section, as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, by a 
test requested by a police officer shall not be prosecuted for driving under the influence of 
alcohol except as provided in subsection (3)[drug, dui], subsection (l)(b) [commercial vehicle 
dui] or subsection (l)(d) [underage dui] of this section" Thus the laws of the State of Idaho 
create a need for a much quicker process that the circumstances contemplated by the Supreme 
Court. That is to say, that the elimination of alcohol at even the rate of .015 to .02, even if 
1 This ignores the fact that intoxicants other than alcohol may be at issue as well. 
2 There is an exception of cases where the defendant fails to provide a valid sample on a breath tests. "A shallow 
breath sample testing at below .08 does not inherently show that the individual's true breath alcohol concentration is 
less than .08. Consequently, it does not ipso facto bar prosecution by the terms of Section 18-8004(2)." 
State v. Turbyfill, 38579, 2012 WL 4465773 (Idaho Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2012), review denied (Nov. 29, 2012) 
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accurate, as suggested by the Supreme Court, is enough that the State's evidence can be lost in 
short order. See, Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._,_; 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1575 (2013). Thus, 
the legal environment in Idaho should be seen as one of the "special facts" supporting a finding 
of exigency. 
There are certain factual elements of this stop that contribute to the totality of the 
circumstances analysis as well. The stop occurred in Boise County at mile post 5.7 of Banks 
Lowman Road. Deputy Tatilian will testify that he faced the unique situation of having no cell 
phone coverage from the location of the stop making it more difficult to have direct contact with 
a prosecutor or a judge for purposes of a warrant request. Deputy Tatilian was required to 
conduct an accident investigation and interview other witnesses, deal with a partial road closure 
as well as confirm that Ms. Franklin's companion was safe as well as confirming that he had not 
been driving. While Ms. Franklin was being transported to a Boise hospital, Deputy Tatilian was 
completing the accident investigation. Deputy Tatilian will testify that he believes it would have 
taken several hours to get a search warrant in either Boise or Ada County. This situation was 
further complicated by the fact that the accident was in Boise County, and the phlebotomist was 
located in Ada County. Accordingly, a search warrant would most likely have required issuance 
by an Ada County Magistrate Judge. Both Tatilian and Rogers will testify that on February 6, 
2013 there were no procedures to accomplish that. Further, Deputy Tatilian will testify that he 
was more than one hour away from Ada County when he completed his investigation in Crouch 
after contacting the defendant's companion. 
The U.S. Supreme Court believes that, "in addition to technology-based developments, 
jurisdictions have found other ways to streamline the warrant process, such as by using standard-
form warrant applications for drunk driving investigations. :Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 
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_,_; 133 S. Ct. 1552,1562 (2013). The Supreme Court notes that such forms were available 
in the relevant jurisdiction when McNeely was arrested. Id. FN 5. However, such forms were 
not available in Boise County on the date of Ms. Franklin's arrest, nor to his knowledge available 
in Ada County. Thus, we have to assume that had Deputy Tatilian chosen to seek a warrant in 
the current case after normal court/business hours (i.e. approximately 12:00 midnight), it would 
have taken at least an additional several hours to complete. This estimate is based upon the 
following logistical requirements: the officer would have to find a location for reliable cell phone 
coverage within proximity to the accident scene (a difficult and sometimes impossible task in 
Boise County), a prosecutor would have to be located, the officer and prosecutor would need to 
review the facts telephonically, the prosecutor would then need to call either the Boise County 
Magistrate or the on call Ada County Prosecutor to be able to make contact with the on call Ada 
County Judge, the judge would need to call the prosecutor and officer back for phone 
conferencing purposes, the call would need to be conducted and the warrant approved and 
issued; the officer would then need to obtain the warrant and deliver it, in this case, to the 
hospital. Again with estimated time lapse and travel distances involved, this process would likely 
take at least three hours, and likely more. 
The State is also in the untenable position of having an ethical obligation to preserve 
evidence that could be exculpatory while that evidence is in the body of an adversarial party. 
The State should avail itself of every opportunity to take a sample of the evidence for the benefit 
of accurate testing, regardless of which party the outcome benefits. 
Taking the totality of the circumstances into consideration, the needs of law enforcement 
were sufficiently compelling and the "exigencies of the situation" great enough that the 
warrantless search of Ms. Franklin was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
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REMEDY 
Even if the Court finds that there is not an applicable exception to the warrant requirement, 
the State submits that the defendant is not deserving of a remedy. The defendant was a .236 blood 
alcohol content at the time her blood was drawn. At the time of she was actually operating her 
vehicle her blood alcohol level was significantly higher thereby placing the general public at 
significant risk. The officer acted in a good faith and in reliance on Idaho Codel8-8002, Diaz and 
\Vheeler when he made the decision to have the defendant's blood drawn. The public interest 
supports admission of the results, especially with a defendant who openly stated to hospital 
personnel that she had four prior DUI' s. 
CONCLUSION 
The State submits that the Court's inquiry need go no further than the implied consent 
statute in order to establish the legality of the blood draw. Ms. Franklin had, by driving on the 
public roadways, consented to evidentiary testing. That testing was completed in a medically 
sound manner and the results of the blood draw should be deemed as admissible. The blood 
draws results would also be admissible due to the exigent circumstances surrounding this 
investigation. The factual and legal environment of this case created an exigency for the officer. 
Because retrograde extrapolation is not available to the State, the evidence that Ms. Franklin was 
above the legal limit of alcohol was being eliminated as time passed. To get a warrant would 
require significant time. That period would permit significant blood alcohol to be eliminated and 
the State could potentially be barred from prosecution if the driver fell below a .08 before the 
administration of the test. Given the totality of the circumstances, the situation fell within the 
exigency exception to the warrant requirement as well. 
In the event that the Court finds that neither of these exceptions to the warra_nt requirement 
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are satisfied, the State submits that the blood draw results should still be seen as admissible. To 
rule otherwise is to invite a manifest injustice. This event and countless others like it involved a 
driver putting the public at great risk and the officer responding with the explicit authorization of 
the Courts and the legislature. Not only did the officer act in good faith, the public policy and 
community protection interests at issue lean heavily in favor of admitting the evidence. The 
exclusionary rule does not require exclusion in these circumstances, where the officer was acting 
under the well settled law of the State at the time he had the defendant's blood drawn. 
The motion to suppress evidence sh~d be denied. 
i 
Respectfully Submitted on the fl!.- ay of December, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and accmat% of the above and foregoing document was 
served upon counsel for the Defendant on the day of December, 2013, at: 
Philip Gordon 
Attorney at Law 
623 West Hays St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
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2: 13: 54 PM Personal : State Attorney 
............................................... JAttorneY .......... ...l ..................................................................................................... ............................ ......... ...................... ................................. .. ........................  
2:13:56 PM i i 
2:14:41 PM !State ! 
!Attorney l 
2:1 6:55 PM fJudge /December 26 at 2:00p 
!Owen i 
12/23/2013 1 of 1 
District Court, Thursday, D mber 26, 2013. Judge Patrick H Ow , , pres ii6B-COURTROOM 
Time Speaker Note 
2:02: 19 PM ! Motion to Suppress CR- ! Rosenthal, Gordon present w/o defendant 
!2013-458 State v Tricia : 
! Frankl in - Judge Patrick ! i H Owen - Chief Dpty ' 
i Prosecutor Jay 
! Rosenthal - Defense 
!Atty Philip Gordon -
: REPORTER Christie 
jValcich - Clerk Lisa 
!London 
i i i 
.................................................................................. .......... ................................. , ................. ................................................ .......... .................................................................................................................... ! 
2:02:42 PM /Honorable Patrick Owen \CALL OF CASE. this is a continuation from Dec. 23 · 
: /hearing started in Ada County. Def was not feelilng well 
jat that time and I had agreed to continue this hearing to 
jtoday. Any word from your client? 
2:03:37 PM !Phillip Gordon !she called me and asked if l wanted a ride up with her and 
! :her dad 
........................................... · ..........................................................................•...... · ............................................................... .................. .. ...... .................... ................................................................................. . 
2:03:53 PM 'Honorable Patrick Owen jok. lets continue hrg now 
2:04:00 PM fJay Rosenthal )call Rob Tatillian 
... 2:04:2.0 .. PMJclerk .............. ...................................... .. ...... .. J swears .. in .. state's .. witness .. #1., .. officer .. Rob.Tati llian ............................ 11 2:05:26 PM ]Jay Rosenthal \Direct examination . 
... ;rof:·i's .. rfvf'H::fr,·ri·or.ahie ... Pafri'ck .. ci'wen\ v\'sh .. 'fo ... n.ote .. thai"'fvfs· .... Fr·a·nkii'n .. hiis ... iii'rrivecL ......... .............................. .............. , 
: : ~ 
2:07:34 PM :Jay Rosenthal !continues Direct examination 
2:12:23 PM JPhillip Gordon JDon't know what wit is referring to 
2: 12:36 PM !Honorable Patrick Owen !what looking at? 
2:12:39 PM iwit #1 inotes 
2: 12:46 PM jJay Rosenthal !clarifies with wit for defense's edification . continues Direct 
/examination 
2:14:51 PM !Phillip Gordon Jobjection-hearsay. move to strike 
...2 :1.4:57 .. PM .. jJay .. Rosenthal ................................ Jnot .. for .. truth .. of .it ........ ............................................................................................ ................................... .. 
2: 15:03 PM i Honorable Patrick Owen jThe Court overrules the objection 
. . . . . .. ... . ... . . ..... . ... . ............. .. . . ~ ... . ........ .... .. . ... .. .. . . . . ... . . . ..... . .... ... ..... ...... . .. ......... .. .. .... . 1,,, ........... ........ . ...... . . . ..... .......... ........ . ..... ...... .. .... .. ........ .. ........... .. . . . .. ...... .. . . ..... .. .. . . . . ... .. . .. . .... .... ....... ... . ..... ........... . . . . .. . . . . . ......... . 
2: 15:25 PM :wit #1 :finishes answering question 
2: 16:30 PM 1Jay Rosenthal icontinues Direct examination 
2: 19: 19 PM 1 Phillip Gordon j Cross examination. Planned to call this wit as one of my 
' !own. May I question him now or do I have to wait until 
jlater? [Judge approves questioning] Direct examination 
2:47:46 PM jJay Rosenthal jRe-direct examination 
2:50:00 PM !Nothing further and the ! 
!witness steps down and : 
lis dismissed ' 
_____________________ _, 
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2:50: 13 PM )ay Rosenthal !call Dale Rogers 
2:50:36 PM fc1erk [ Swears in State's witness #2, Chief Dpty Dale Rogers I :rso 54 rM· b·ayRosenthai - --- -/orrecrexamrnatron· - - - -- - - -- -- - -- -
2:51 :40 PM jPhillip Gordon Jneed to speak up 
2:51 :43 PM /wit #2 jresponse 
2:51 :54 PM ,,!Jay Rosenthal )continues Direct examination. phlebotomist was Marge 
1Shot? 
2:52:30 PM !Phillip Gordon !Marge Shot was former owner of Cincinnati Reds 
2:52:41 PM Iros /excuse me. was phlebotomist JanetShrop? . 
2:52:47 PM fwit #2 · Jresponse 
~~~:: :~ 1~~11:0~~~!:~ 1:::i~~~:s~i:::~~::i~:~~r:ct examine at same time? 
2:56:55 PM jHonorable Patrick Owen jgo ahead 
3:21: 11 PM jJay Rosenthal jno questions 
3:21 :15 PM jPhillip Gordon Jquestions wit #2 based on judge's questions 
3:21 :29 PM !Nothing further and the ! 
/witness steps down / 
3:21 :34 PM /Jay Rosenthal /nothing further 
3:21 :40 PM !Phillip Gordon !served subpoena on dispatcher but, don't need him 
3:22:01 PM Ic1erk !swears in defendant 
3:22:17 PM IPhillip Gordon !Direct examination 
-~.; ~. !~ ·· :~ i ~::n:~:~:~::rick Owen t ~~:;:s:a ·questions -- - - - - --- ---- ----
1 1 
3:25:45 PM !Nothing further and the ! 
!witness steps down and ! 
lis dismissed j 
... 3:25.:48 .. PMjPhillip __ Gordon ................................ Jrest .................................................................................................................................................................................  
3:25:54 PM )Jay Rosenthal !no rebuttal 
3:26:00 PM iPhillip Gordon !closing argument 
3:37:38 PM }Jay Rosenthal jclosing argument 
3:38:47 PM f Honorable Patrick Owenlwill issue formal ruling. have had this issue in other 
l !cases. this case has some things that I need to look inot. 
· !will have clerk contact you when i have decision ... w/i 10 
idays 
3:40:32 PM jPhillip Gordon j1eaving jan 1-19. · 
12/26/2013 2 of 3 
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1 Time . -: Speaker · : -. · ·. : : :1~_9te · ·. 
3:40:50 PM !Honorable Patrick Owen !asking me to cont trial. not inclined to do that. 
3:41:12 PM jend I 
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Filed JAN 1 7 2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-2013-458 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
The Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol ("DUI") charge in 
this case involves, in part, a blood draw showing an alcohol concentration above the legal limit; 
to wit: .236. Law enforcement obtained the blood evidence without a search warrant, and over 
objections from the Defendant, Tricia M. Franklin ("Franklin"). Franklin seeks to suppress 
evidence of the test results from the blood. 1 
Background and Prior Proceedings 
In an Information filed on July 30, 2013, the State ofldaho charged Franklin with a 
felony charge of DUI, Idaho Code§ 18-8004 and a misdemeanor charge Driving Without 
1 Franklin also seeks to suppress statements made to Jaw enforcement. However, Franklin has failed to identify any 
specific statement. This aspect of the motion to suppress will be denied at this time because the Court is unable to 
determine which, if any statements, are challenged. 
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, II
Privileges, Idaho Code § 18-8001. Franklin was arraigned on October 10, 2013; she pleaded not 
guilty and the matter was set for a jury trial. 
On October 22, 2013, Franklin filed this Motion to Suppress. The State's opposition was 
filed on December 9, 2013. An evidentiary hearing was held at the Ada County Courthouse on 
December 23, 2013, and continued at the Boise County Courthouse on December 26, 2013. 
Franklin was represented by her attorney, Phillip Gordon. The State was represented by Deputy 
Boise County Prosecuting Attorney Jay F. Rosenthal. The State elicited testimony from Janet 
Schadt, a contract phlebotomist, John Devalle ("Devalle"), Garden Valley Fire Chief, Robert 
Dale Rogers "Rogers"), Boise County Sheriff Chief Deputy and Boise County Sheriff Deputy 
Robert Tatilian ("Tatilian"). Franklin also testified at the hearing. At the close of evidence, 
counsel made closing arguments. The Court took the matter under advisement. 
On February 6, 2013, Devalle was dispatched to the scene of a single vehicle injury 
accident at milepost 5.7 of the Banks Lowman Road.2 He arrived at about 10:29 p.m. Other 
responders were treating Franklin, who was injured. He could detect alcohol coming from 
Franklin. Devalle was not aware of any other person who had been in the vehicle at the time of 
the accident. 
At about 10:12 p.m., Tatilian received a call from dispatch to respond to the scene. When 
he got the call, Tatillian was at home in Boise, and off duty. He left immediately for the scene of 
the accident, arriving at about 10:4 7 p.m. He saw a red Ford pickup truck teetering on a guard 
rail. Tatilian recognized the vehicle from a contact earlier in the evening. Tatilian testified that 
while he was on normal patrol duty at about 8:30 p.m., he received a call from dispatch regarding 
2 There is no transcript of the hearing. The facts are based upon the Court's review of the preliminary hearing 
transcript, and the Court's recollection of the witness testimony and arguments and from review of the Court's 
handwritten notes taken during the hearing. 
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a report of a suspected intoxicated driver that had just left Longhorn Saloon in Crouch in a red 
Ford pickup truck. Tatilian found the vehicle parked at the Wander Inn in Crouch. Tatilian 
contacted Tricia Franklin and Jason Snowball who were in one of the rooms. Both were 
intoxicated. Tatilian warned them not to drive again that night, or they would be arrested for 
DUL Tatilian testified he remembered Franklin because he had encountered her about 30 - 45 
minutes before the 8:30 p.m. call from dispatch. Tatilian had seen Franklin walking towards the 
Longhorn Saloon in Crouch. Franklin said she was looking for her boyfriend. Tatilian testified 
he could detect the strong odor of alcohol and she seemed intoxicated. 
At the scene of the accident, Tatilian was told by fire department personnel that the 
injured female at the scene had been transported by Crouch Ambulance to the Crouch landing 
zone for helicopter transportation to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center in Boise. Tatilian 
conducted an investigation into the accident. Tatilian testified he was informed by the fire chief 
that Franklin was the only occupant of the vehicle. However, Tatilian testified he found Jason 
Snowball's wallet at the scene and he was concerned that Snowball may have been in the vehicle 
at the time of the accident. Tatilian also wanted to determine who was driving the vehicle at the 
time of the accident. After searching for another victim, and conducting the accident 
investigation, Tatilian returned to the Wander Inn. He contacted Mr. Snowball, who had to be 
awakened. Based upon his contact with Mr. Snowball, Tatilian concluded that Franklin was the 
driver. Tatilian then requested dispatch to send another officer and a phlebotomist to the hospital 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
to draw blood for testing from Franklin. 
Tatilian was not certain at what time he asked for the officer to assist with a blood draw. 
Rogers testified he received the call at his home in Boise at about 12:20 a.m. to 12:30 a.m. in the 
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early morning hours of February 7, 2013. Rogers was asked to respond to the hospital to retrieve 
a blood sample kit from the phlebotomist. Rogers got to the hospital in about 10 minutes. 
Tatilian did not seek or even consider seeking a search warrant. At the time, his agency 
believed that law enforcement had the right to a warrantless blood draw for testing under Idaho's 
implied consent statute. 
Shadt testified she received a call at about midnight. On cross, referring to notes, she 
testified that she got called at about 11: 15 p.m. and got to the hospital at about 11 :30 p.m.. On 
cross, she testified the blood was obtained by the nurse at 12:40 a.m. 
There is some inconsistency in the evidence about when Tatilian requested a blood draw. 
The Court finds that Rogers account is credible and consistent with Tatilian's account that the 
request was not made until about midnight. Devalle testified that the fire personnel and Tatilian 
left the accident scene at 11 :55 p.m. This is consistent with Tatilian' s recollection and with 
Rogers' testimony. 
Rogers met with the phlebotomist at the hospital. Rogers contacted Franklin who was 
uncooperative and objected to the blood draw. For medical reasons, and unrelated to any request 
by law enforcement, hospital personnel were going to draw blood from Franklin. Rogers handed 
the phlebotomist a standard law enforcement blood draw kit. The phlebotomist handed the two 
tubes to the hospital nurse who was drawing Franklin's blood. The hospital nurse filled the tubes 
with Franklin's blood and returned the tubes to the phlebotomist. The phlebotomist put the tubes 
in the kit and returned the kit to Rogers. Rogers sealed the kit. 
Discussion 
The Fourt.h Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 oft.he Idaho 
Constitution protect persons from "unreasonable searches and seizures." "The administration of 
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a blood alcohol test constitutes a seizure of the person and a search within the purview of the 
Fourth Amendment to United States Constitution. State v. LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905, 907, 
24 3 P .3d 1093, 1095 (Ct. App. 2010) ( citations omitted). A search conducted without a warrant 
is presumptively unreasonable. Id (citing State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300,302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 
(2007); State v. Dewitt, 145 Idaho 709, 712, 184 P.3d 215,218). 
To overcome the presumption, the State bears the burden of establishing two 
prerequisites. First, the State must prove that a warrantless search fell within a 
well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Second, the State must 
show that even if the search is permissible under an exception to the warrant 
requirement, it must still be reasonable in light of all of the other surrounding 
circumstances. 
Id (Internal citations omitted). Since the State did not obtain a search warrant in this case, the 
State has the burden of demonstrating that there is a well-recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement, and that the search was reasonable in light of all the other surrounding 
circumstances. The State argues that Idaho's implied consent statute provides an exception to the 
warrant requirement in this case. The Court agrees. 
Idaho's implied consent statute is found at Idaho Code§ 18-8002(1), which provides as 
follows: 
Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this 
state shall be deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for 
concentration of alcohol as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and to have 
given his consent to evidentiary testing for the presence of drugs or other 
intoxicating substances, provided that such testing is administered at the request 
of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that person has been 
driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the 
provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, or section 18-8006, Idaho Code. 
Idaho Code § 18-8002(1 ). Under this provision, "anyone driving on Idaho roads is deemed to 
2 4 / have impliedly consented to evidentia.i.7 testing for the presence of alcohol or drugs when a 
25 police officer has reasonable cause to believe the person was driving under the influence." 
26 MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS- PAGE 5 
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DeWitt, 145 Idaho at 712, 184 PJd at 218. By driving on an Idaho road, every driver has given 
advance consent to submit to a test alcohol concentration. Id. (citing State v. Rodriguez, 128 
Idaho 521, 523, 915 P.2d 1379, 1381 (Ct. App. 1996). Moreover, even though a driver can 
object and may have the physical ability to prevent a test, in Idaho "there is no legal right to 
withdraw the statutorily implied consent." State v. Nickerson, '132 Idaho 406,410,973 P.2d 758, 
762 (Ct. App. 1999) (citations omitted). See also State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364,370,233 P.3d 
1286, 1292 (Ct. App. 2010) ("In view of the Supreme Court's decision in Diaz, we conclude that 
a protest to a blood draw does not invalidate consent created by a person's actions and statute."); 
LeC!ercq, 149 Idaho at 909 . Finally, if an officer has the right to require an evidentiary test, the 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
officer can choose either a breath or a blood test. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741. 
The Court concludes the consent issue here is controlled by the Idaho Supreme Court's 
decision in State v. Diaz. Id. In Diaz, an officer had reasonable grounds to suspect that a driver 
was impaired. The driver refused a breath test. The officer transported the driver to a hospital 
where blood was drawn by a hospital technician. The driver did not physically resist, but 
protested the blood draw. Independent of the exception for exigent circumstances, the Supreme 
Court found the seizure of blood did not require a search warrant because the blood draw was 
consensual pursuant to Idaho's implied consent law, Idaho Code§ 18-8002(1). The Supreme 
Court also found that, under Idaho's implied consent law, the officer had the choice to require a 
blood sample as long as the procedure was done in. a medically acceptable manner and without 
unreasonable force. 
In this case, the Court will find that the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect that 
Franklin was the driver and was impaired. As a result, the Court will find that there is a consent 
exception to the warrant requirement under Idaho Code § 18-8002( 1 ). Under controlling Idaho 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS-PAGE 6 
25 
!I 
II 
1 
/ precedent, this Court is obliged to rule that the officer had the right to obtain a blood sample over 
Franklin's protests.5 
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Even where there is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the 
State must also show that "the search is reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances." 
Wheeler, 149 Idaho at 370,233 P.3d at 1292. This has been interpreted to require "the blood 
draw to be done in a medically acceptable manner and without unreasonable force." Id. at 371, 
233 P.3d at 1293. Under the circumstances detailed above, the Court finds that the blood was 
drawn in a medically acceptable manner and without unreasonable force. For these reasons, the 
Court will deny the motion to suppress. 
Citing to a recent United States Supreme Court Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 
(2013), Franklin argues that that a warrant for the extraction of blood was required in this case. 
In McNeely, the Supreme Court addressed a narrow issue; to wit: whether the bodies natural 
metabolization of alcohol alone, without the consideration of other factors, constitutes exigent 
circumstances for purposes of the warrant exception .. Id. at 15 56. The Court ruled as follows: 
The question presented here is whether the natural metabolization of alcohol in 
the bloodstream presents a per se exigency that justifies an exception to the 
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for noncbnsen_sual blood testing in all 
drunk-driving cases. We conclude that it does not, and we hold, consistent with 
general Fourth Amendment principles, that exigency in this context must be 
determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances. 
Id. In the Court's view, the decision in .McNeely does not address, much less overrule, settled 
Idaho law that law enforcement is not required to obtain a search warrant to obtain a blood 
sample over the objections of a driver based on the implied consent warrant where, as here, there 
5 The Court's decision in State v. Diaz has been criticized as inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court case law because 
the Idaho's statutory implied consent is neither voluntary nor revocable. Seamon, Richard, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
SlDETRACKS lDAHO IMPLIED CONSENT LAW, published in Volume 57, No. 1 The Advocate (January 2014). However, 
as a trial court, this Court does not have the authority to overrule or ignore controlling precedent. 
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1 are reasonable grounds to believe that the motorist was impaired while driving. Cf Reeder v. 
2 State, 06-13-00126-CR, 2014 WL 60162 (Tex. App. Jan. 8, 2014) and Smith v. State, No. 1 
3 11-00694-CR, 2013 WL 5970400, at *l (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi Oct. 31, 2013, no pet. h.) 
4 (finding that McNeely did not invalidate Texas statutory implied consent law.) (These opinions 
5 have not been released for publication in the permanent law reports and may be subject to 
6 revision or withdrawal.); State v. Flonnory, 2013 WL 4567874 (Del. Super. July 17, 2013) 
7 (finding that McNeely did not invalidate Delaware statutory implied consent law); In re Hart, 
s 2013 WI App 94, 349 Wis. 2d 528, 835 N.W.2d 292 (McNeely does not impact Wisconsin 
9 implied consent law); State v. Brennick, COA13-627, 2013 WL 6234650 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 
10 2013) (unpublished) (citing State v. Dahlquist, -N.C.App. --, S.E.2d-- (Ct. App. 2013) 
11 (COAI3-276) for the proposition that McNeely did not invalidate statutory implied consent law). 
12 The State also argues that the blood draw in this case did not require a search warrant 
13 because, under the totality of the circumstances, there were exigencies sufficient to excuse the 
14 requirement of a warrant. The State points out that in Idaho, if the measured alcohol 
15 concentration is below 0.08 at the time of the test, the State cannot present retrograde 
16 extrapolation to demonstrate that the alcohol concentration would have been above the legal 
17 limit at the time of driving. State v. Daniel, 132 Idaho 701, 979 P.2d 103 (1999) abrogated in 
1s part on other grounds by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,265 P.3d 
19 502 (2011 ). Although McNeely holds that natural metabolization does not constitute exigent 
2 o circumstances per se, the Court acknowledged that it may be a factor in determining whether 
21 exigent circumstances existed in a particular case. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1568. 
22 The State argues that there are exigent circumstances associated with obtaining an after 
23 hours search warrant in Boise County. In the Court's view, this argument by itself is not 
24 I convincing. As noted above, at the time of this incident, the Boise County Sherriffs Office did 
25 not seek a warrant based upon its view that under the implied consent law, as construed by the 
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Idaho courts, there was no need for a search warrant. As a result, there was no attempt to obtain 
an after hours warrant for a blood draw in a DUI investigation. The State's argument that there 
would have been difficulties in obtaining a search warrant in a timely fashion is based upon 
largely speculative concerns. Here, law enforcement did not make any effort to secure a warrant 
and the State has not presented facts that would have demonstrated that the effort would have 
resulted in a sufficient delay as to adversely affect the test results. There is a full-time magistrate 
in Boise County. The County has an elected prosecuting attorney who is a resident of the 
county. The Sheriffs office certainly knows where the magistrate and prosecutor reside, and 
how to contact each in the event of an emergency. Deputies in the field can contact dispatch and 
other officers by radio. The magistrate can be contacted personally, or by phone, either by the 
officer, or through assistance of dispatch. The Sheriff's office was also aware that there is 
always an on call prosecutor and magistrate in Ada County for after hours warrant applications. 
The State has failed to demonstrate that efforts to obtain a search warrant would have resulted in 
delays that could have adversely affected the investigation. 
Notwithstanding that the State made no effort to obtain a warrant, considering all the 
circumstances, the Court does conclude that there are exigent circumstances excusing a warrant 
in this case. The accident was reported just prior to 10: 12 p.m. The officer did not complete his 
investigation and conclude that Franklin was the driver until about midnight, almost two (2) 
hours after the accident. Because of this, the Court concludes that the additional time it would 
have taken to obtain a warrant would likely have resulted in such a delay as to potentially 
deprive the state of important evidence of alcohol concentration. The Court will find that the 
delay occasioned by the time necessary to conclude the investigation and determine that 
Franklin was the driver constitutes exigent circumstances. The process to obtain a warrant could 
not have begun until about midnight. The further delay in obtaining a warrant meant that there 
would have been a total delay of at least two (2) to three (3) hours. Such a delay would have 
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1560, 185 L.Ed. 2d 696 (2013), the Court noted that: 
Testimony before the trial court in this case indicated that the percentage of 
alcohol in an individual's blood typically decreases by approximately 0.015 
percent to 0.02 percent per hour once the alcohol has been fully absorbed. App. 
47. 
Id. The Court concludes that there are exigent circumstances where, as here, law enforcement 
cannot obtain a blood sample in a DUI investigation for between two (2) and three (3) hours after 
developing probable cause to secure a warrant. Moreover, due to Franklin's injuries, there was 
no other reasonable means of determining alcohol concentration. 
Even though the Court has determined to deny the motion to suppress, the Court finds it 
necessary to address an additional argument made by the State. The State also argues that even 
if there was no available exception to the warrant requirement, the Court should nonetheless 
deny the motion to suppress because Franklin's constitutional rights do not merit protection. The 
State argues that Franklin's rights should not be recognized because Franklin is guilty of driving 
while significantly impaired, she placed the public at risk, and admitted four prior DUis. The 
State argues that the public interest would be served by ignoring Franklin's constitutional rights. 
In all candor, this argument from the State's attorney is shocking to this Court. Franklin 
is presumed innocent and whether Franklin is guilty of any offense is for the jury to decide. 
Under our law and system of justice, even a person charged with heinous crimes has important 
constitutional rights and protections, and it is the solemn obligation of the courts to recognize 
and enforce these rights. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS-PAGE 10 
1 
2 
3 
4 
s 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
In summarizing the unique role a prosecutor, Justice Sutherland has made the 
often quoted and apt observations: 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a 
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as 
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in. a 
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. 
As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the 
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may 
prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may 
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to 
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it 
is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). All 
prosecutors would benefit from periodically reviewing Comment [1] to Rule 3.8 of the Idaho 
Rules of Professional Conduct which explains that a prosecutor has the responsibility of "a 
minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate." 
' The Court will decline the invitation to ignore Franklin's constitutional rights to 
facilitate the State's ability to convict. 
Conclusion 
As explained above, the Court will deny the motion to suppress. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this _/_7_ day of January, 2014. 
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CASE NO. CR 2013-0000458 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
COMES NOW, Philip Gordon, Attorney of Record for the Defend.ant herein, and hereby 
moves this Court for an Order reconsidering its MEMORANDilltf DECISION AND ORDER 
RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS, made and entered herein on the 17th day of January, 2014, in the 
follo'wing particulars and for the following reasons: 
1. IM:PLIED CONSENT: The court's reliance on Idaho case law for the proposition 
that the defendant impliedly consented to allow her blood to be drawn over her objection has 
been called into question by a very recent decision of the United States Supreme Court 
('"SCOTUS"). 
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A1.issouri v. _McNeely, 569 S. __ (2013) was issued by SCOTUS in the 
2013, Courts Idaho and the United have a plethora of Fourth 
Amendment and State Constitutional challenges to the drawing of DUI suspects' blood in the 
absence of a warrant. These challenges generally take the form of Motions to Suppress the 
results of the tests of the drawn blood for alcohol concentration. 
These challenges, and the State's responses to them, exhibit certain established patterns. 
Almost invariably the Defendant seeking suppression relies largely on McNeely, supra, and seeks 
to develop facts which demonstrate the absence of particularized exigent circumstances. In tum, 
counsel for the State typically counters by citing, inter alia, State v. Diaz, State v Rodriguez, 
State v Nickerson, State v. Wheeler and/or State v. LeClercq (all citations omitted). The thrust 
of the State's argument is generally two-fold: 
a. McNeely, supra, did not specifically address the role of implied consent statutes. 
More importantly, Justice Sotomayor did not specifically rule that, for purposes of 
constitutional analysis, the existence of an implied consent statute was, in and of 
itself insufficient to establish the existence of a "consent exception" to the Fourth 
Amendment's requirement of a warrant. And 
b. Consent having impliedly been given, under controlling Idaho precedent, it cannot 
be withdravm. Hence, the reasoning continues, there is a per se consent exception 
to the warrant requirement. 
Indeed, in the case at bar, these very arguments were made by Counsel for the State, and 
they appear to have prevailed in this Court's MEMORANDUM DECISION: 
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In this case, the Court will find that the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect 
that Franklin was the driver and was impaired. As a result, the Court will find 
that there is a consent exception to the warrant requirement under Idaho Code § 
18-8002(1). Under controlling Idaho precedent, this Court is obliged to rule that 
the officer had the right to obtain a blood sample over Franklin's protests. 6, 1. 
23 - P. 7, 1. 2. 
The force of the State's formulaic response to McNeely Motions, and, by extension, the 
Court's ruling was seriously undercut by a very recent action on the part of SCOTUS. On 
January 13th of this year, the high Court granted certiorari to a decision of the Court of Appeals of 
Texas and vacated the judgment of conviction which had been entered therein. See "Exhibit A", 
attached hereto. As is apparent from the Opinion of the Texas Court attached hereto as "Exhibit 
B", Aviles' was arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated, and a sample of his blood was 
drawn without a warrant and over Aviles' objection. Exhibit B, P. 4, and P. 7. The Texas Court 
of Appeals rebuffed Aviles' constitutionally grounded objection to the warrantless seizure, and 
based its ruling in the Texas "implied consent" law: 
... .Aviles's case deals with an offense while operating a vehicle in a public place, 
and is thus governed by Chapter 724 of the Texas Transportation Code. The 
Texas Transportation Code expands the State's ability to search and seize without 
a warrant, providing implied consent to obtain blood samples from person 
suspected of driving while intoxicated, in certain circumstances even without a 
search warrant. As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held in Beeman v. State: 
[t]he implied consent law .... expands on the State's search 
capabilities by providing a framework for drawing DVv1 suspects' 
blood in the absence of a search warrant. It gives officers and 
additional weapon in their investigative arsenal, enabling therm to 
draw blood in certain limited circumstances even without a search 
warrant. 86 S. W 3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Exhibit B, 
P. 7 
The Texas law found to conflict with J...1cNeely in the Aviles case is substantially more 
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restrictive than the Idaho analogue, applying only to situations where "the suspect refuses to 
provide a specimen voluntarily and the anesting officer has credible information that the suspect 
has been previously convicted twice of DWI. .. ". Idaho law contains no such restriction, and the 
blood of Dill suspects is routinely dravm without their consent and indeed over their objections, 
regardless of whether or not the individual has any prior convictions for driving under the 
influence of alcohol and/or other intoxicating substances. Inferentially, then, if SCOTUS applied 
McNeely to vacate a conviction based on the results of blood drawn without a warrant but 
pursuant to a statute significantly more circumscribed than the Idaho equivalent, it seems clear 
that our substantially more generally applicable law will face similar treatment. While there may 
previously have been a plausible argument that McNeely did not specifically address the role of, 
and therefore did not supercede State "implied consent" laws, the Aviles decision appears to have 
addressed that issue and mooted the position uniformly contended for by Prosecutors throughout 
the State, including in the instant action. 
Thus, should Ms. Franklin be convicted after a trial in which the results of the test of her 
blood for alcohol concentration are admitted into evidence, the likelihood is great that such a 
conviction will eventually be vacated on the strength of McNeely. Rather than allowing this 
cause to go forward to trial, this Court should instead reconsider its prior Memorandum Decision, 
and issue a new decision granting Franklin's Motion to Suppress. 
2. EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES: The Court concludes "that there are exigent 
circumstances excusing a warrant in this case." Defendant contends that this finding is clearly 
enoneous and is made in derogation of the controlling facts. 
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Court observes that: 
Accident was reported just prior to 10: 12 p.m. The officer did not complete his 
investigation and conclude that Franklin was the driver until about midnight, almost rn'o 
(2) hours after the accident. Because of this, the Court concludes that the additional time 
it would have taken to obtain a warrant would likely have resulted in such a delay as to 
potentially deprive the state of important evidence of alcohol concentration. The Court 
will find that the delay occasioned by the time it would have taken to obtain a warrant 
would likely have resulted in such a delay as to potentially deprive the state of important 
evidence of alcohol concentration." Memorandum Decision, P. 9, 11. 17-21. 
Consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances, an exercise mandated by 
McNeely, supra, compels a contrary conclusion. 
A listing of the uncontested facts, adduced at the hearing on Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress and/or at the Preliminary Hearing held before Judge Cockerille, which demonstrates 
decisively that a warrant could easily have been obtained in a timely manner, and certainly 
prior to the time that Ms. Franklin's blood was actuaUy drawn without a warrant, and 
over her clearly stated objection includes the following: 
1. Deputy Tatillian (hereafter "Tatillian") testified that, at approximately 10: 12 p.m. 
he received word that the accident had occurred, from Boise County Sheriff's 
Dispatch (hereafter "Dispatch"). 
2. Tatillian testified that, at all times thereafter, he had access to Dispatch both 
through the "hand held" radio in his car, and through a mobile unit on his person. 
Thus, he could, at anytime between 10:12 p.m. and 12:10 or 12:20 p.m. (The time 
at which Chief Deputy Rogers -hereafter "Rogers" - received a call from Dispatch 
asking him to travel to St. Alphonsus to assist in drawing Ms. Franklin's blood.) 
have, through Dispatch, initiated the process of obtaining a warrant, either by 
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utilizing the services of the resident Boise Magistrate, or by 
obtain a warrant in Ada 
3. Tatillian testified that by the time he got to the scene of the accident, Ms. Franklin 
had already been transported, and, while he learned that it was she who was 
driving, he did not accompany her to the hospital. 
4. Tatillian testified that Chief Delvalle told him, within minutes after his arrival at 
the accident scene, that he believed Ms. Franklin had a strong odor of alcohol 
about her person. 
5. Tatillian testified that several of the other "first responders" at the scene were able 
to assist in traffic control and other phases of clearing the accident scene. Their 
presence, and participation meant, inter alia, that Tatillian could have taken a few 
minutes to initiate the process of obtaining a warrant. While cellular service may 
not have been available in the immediate area of the accident, clearly Dispatch 
could have facilitated the process. Alternatively, Dispatch could, at any time 
after Tatillian arrived on the scene, have sought the assistance of Rogers -who 
testified that he was at home in Meridian all that evening- in obtaining a warrant 
in Ada County. 
6. Rogers had served as a Boise City Police Officer for 30 years. He testified that: 
a. He was aware that there was always an on-call Magistrate in Ada County. 
b. He was aware that there was always an on-call Prosecutor in Ada County. 
c. He had on many occasions while working in Boise, obtained warrants after 
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hours utilizing the services of the on-call Magistrate and Prosecutor. 
d. He still knew to obtain a warrant after court hours. 
e. He knew some of the sitting Magistrates, and some Deputy Ada County 
Prosecutors. 
f. He still had many friends on the Boise City Police Depa.rtment who could 
have helped him obtain a warrant if problems arose. 
g. He had an official Boise County Sheriffs Office vehicle at his home, and 
it had a hand held link to Dispatch. 
h. Dispatch had his cell number and could reach him at any time, and, in fact, 
did reach him to ask him to travel to the hospital to oversee the drawing of 
Ms. Franklin's blood. 
1. He was aware that he could obtain a warrant by having telephone contact 
with the on_-call Magistrate. 
7. The strongest and most controvertible evidence of the fact that Tatillian could 
have obtained a warrant -without in a timely manner and without delay was 
provided by the testimony of the phlebotomist. The Court will recall that her 
records, produced contemporaneously with the events in question, demonstrated 
that she arrived at the hospital at approximately 11: 15 p.m. 1, and waited there 
approximately 1 1/2 hours before Rogers arrived on the scene to witness and 
1. Given that it took Ms. Schadt some time to drive to the hospital, she necessarily would have been contacted by 
Dispatch and sent there at or prior to 11 :00 p.m., i.e. no later than approximately 13 minutes after Tatillian arrived 
on the scene of the accident. 
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q 
oversee the warrantless drawing of Ms. Franklin's blood sample. Her arrival at 
the hospital for the very specific purpose of obtaining a sample of Ms. 
blood, 45 minutes prior to the time that the Comi assigned as the moment when 
Tatillian "completed[ d] his investigation and conclude[ d] that Franklin was the 
driver" Memorandum, P. 9, 11. 17-18, is significant. Tatillian testified that, almost 
immediately upon arrival at the accident scene, he learned from DelV alle that Ms. 
Franklin had been transported to Banks by ambulance to then be helicoptered to 
St. Alphonsus. The very early involvement of the Phlebotomist for the very 
specific purpose of drawing blood from this very specific individual who, 
Tatillian knew, had been transported to this very specific location, conclusively 
establishes that, Tatillian had concluded within minutes after his arrival on the 
scene that Franklin was the driver of the vehicle, that she was probably driving 
under the influence of alcohol, and that he wanted to obtain evidence to be used 
against her in a subsequent prosecution. Having determined, so soon after his 
arrival that the Phlebotomist needed to be dispatched to St. Alphonsus to obtain a 
sample of not "some blood" but rather Ms. Franldin's blood, nothing prevented 
him from simultaneously asking Dispatch to commence the process of obtaining a 
warrant to draw that blood. Upon receiving such a request, Dispatch could, in 
turn, have contacted the always reachable Rogers and requested him to seek the 
warrant. Indeed, Rogers could have been contacted at the same time or even 
before the services of the Phlebotomist were sought, i.e. at about 11 :00 p.m., 1 
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hour and 40 minutes before Ms. Franklin's blood was actually drawn. 
Ms. Schadt who was, as the Court noted, a "contract phlebotomist" 
Memorandum, P. 2, 1. 8, testified that she was "dispatched" there, by none other 
than Boise County Dispatch. Clearly the order to contact her could only have 
been initiated by the only law enforcement officer at the scene, i.e. Tatillian, and 
that order had to have been made at or prior to 11 :00 p.m. Plainly this suggests 
that Tatillian not only did not need to but also did in fact not wait until midnight 
to "complete his investigation and conclude that Franklin was the driver" 
Memorandum, P. 9, 11. 17-18. Rather the facts demonstrate beyond cavil that 
Tatillian had not only concluded that Franklin was the driver but also took steps to 
obtain evidence from her, at or before 11 p.m., i.e 1 hour and 45 minutes before 
the blood draw occurred. 
In sum, careful examination of the totality of the facts surrounding this case, demonstrate 
the total absence of exigent circumstances of a type and kind sufficient to excuse the officers 
from obtaining a warrant to draw Ms. Franklin's blood. The real, indeed the only reason that no 
efforts whatsoever were made to obtain a warrant was the officers' mistaken belief that no 
warrant was needed. Both officers testified to this belief. Neither officer offered any testimony 
suggesting that it would have been difficult to obtain a warrant in the one hour and fifty minute 
interval between the time that Tatillian arrived on the scene and confirmed that Franklin was 
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probably the driver of the vehicle, the time when her blood was actually dravm. 
Philip Gordon \ 
Certificate of service 
I hereby certify that on January 22nd, 2014, I caused the within and foregoing document, 
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CERTIORARI -- SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS 
NEWBOLD, JOSEPH K. V. UNITED STATES 
The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma 
pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. 
The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for further 
consideration in light of that court's opinion in 
Mi17er v. United States, 735 F. 3d 141 (CA4 2013). 
UNITED STATES V. NEVADA PARTNERS FUND, ET AL. 
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The 
judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further 
consideration in light of United States v. Woods, 571 U. S. 
(2013). 
NEATHERY, LARRY N. V. STEPHENS, DIR., TX DCJ 
The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed rn forma 
pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. 
The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further 
consideration in light of Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U. S. ~ 
(2013). 
AVILES, ANTONIO V. TEXAS 
The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma 
pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. 
1 
EXHIBIT A_ 
/0 I 
13M54 
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126, ORIG. 
The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Court 
of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District, for further consideration 
in light of Missouri v. McNee7y, 569 U.S._ (2013). 
ORDERS IN PENDING CASES 
NAT. COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. V. KELLER, SAMUEL M., ET AL. 
The motion of A&E Television Networks, et al. for leave to 
file a brief as amici curiae is denied. The motion of 
National Collegiate Athletic Association for leave to intervene 
to file a petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. 
DOE, J. V. CLC, ET AL. 
The motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of 
certiorari under seal with redacted copies for the public record 
is denied. 
BROWN, MAURICE L. V. LOPEZ, WARDEN 
COLEMAN, JEFFERSON V. GAETZ, WARDEN 
MELOT, BILLY R., ET UX. V. UNITED STATES 
The motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs 
of certiorari out of time are denied. 
ZOPATTI, KARAN L. V. RANCHO DORADO HOMEOWNERS, ET AL. 
The motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of 
certiorari with the supplemental appendix under seal is granted. 
KANSAS V. NEBRASKA AND COLORADO 
The Report of the Special Master is received and ordered 
filed. Exceptions to the Report, with supporting briefs, may be 
filed within 45 days. Replies, if any, with supporting briefs, 
may be filed within 30 days. Sur-replies, if any, with 
supporting briefs, may be filed within 30 days. 
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Aviles v. State 
Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District, San Antonio 
September 26, 2012, Delivered; September 26, 2012, Filed 
No. 04-11-00877 -CR 
Reporter: 385 S.W.3d 110; 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 8069; 2012 WL 4373509 
Antonio AVILES, Appellant v. The STATE of 
Texas, Appellee 
Notice: PUBLISH 
Subsequent History: Released for Publication 
January 04, 2013. 
Petition for discretionary review refused by In 
re Aviles, 2013 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 770 
(Tex. Crim. App., May 8, 2013) 
Rehearing denied by In re Aviles, 2013 Tex. 
Crim. App. LEXIS 893 (Tex. Crim. App., June 
12, 2013) 
Vacated by, Remanded by, Motion granted by 
Aviles v. Texas, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 563 (U.S., Jan. 
13, 2014) 
Prior History: [**1] From the 226th Judicial 
District Court, Bexar County, Texas. Trial 
Court No. 2011-CR-7244. Honorable Sid L. 
Harle, Judge Presiding. 
Disposition: AFFIRMED. 
I Core Terms 
blood, arrest, waiTant, specimen, person, 
search, require, trial, draw, suspect, trial court, 
evidence, consent, seizure, motion to suppress, 
testified, probable, burden, stop, law, driving 
while intoxicated, transport, totality, breath, 
review, drive, search warrant, intoxicate, 
initiate, vehicle 
I Case Summary 
Procedural Posture 
Defendant was charged with felony driving 
while intoxicated. After the 226th Judicial Dis-
trict Court, Bexar County, Texas, denied his 
motion to suppress, defendant entered a plea of 
nolo contendere and was sentenced to two 
years confinement in the Texas Department of 
Criminal Justice - Institutional Division. Defen-
dant appealed. 
Overview 
A police officer had probable cause to arrest de-
fendant for driving while intoxicated, based 
on his erratic driving, slurred speech, blood-
shot eyes, and performance during the field-
sobriety tests. The officer requested a specimen 
of defendant's breath and read him the statu-
tory warning allowing defendant to refuse the 
breath and blood draws. When defendant re-
fused, the officer required a mandatory blood 
draw from defendant based on Tex. Transp. Code 
Ann. § 724.0 l 2(b )(3 )(B) (2011) because there 
was evidence that defendant had two prior driv-
ing while intoxicated convictions. That situa-
tion, as outlined in Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 
724.012, was one of the circumstances where 
blood could be drawn without a search war-
rant. Thus, the warrantless seizure of def en-
dant' s blood was conducted according to the pre-
scriptions of the Texas Transportation Code, 
and without violating defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights. Therefore, the trial court 
did not err in denying defendant's motion to sup-
press or in admitting defendant's blood speci-
men into evidence. 
Outcome 
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's 
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385 S.W.3d 110, *110; 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 8069, **l 
judgment. 
I Le:idsNexis® Headnotes 
Criminal Law & Procedure> ... > Blood Alcohol & 
Field Sobriety Testing > Implied Consent > General 
Overview 
HNI See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 
724.0 72(b )(3 )(B> (2011). 
Criminal Law & Procedure> Preliminary Proceed-
ings > Pretrial Motions & Procedures > Suppression 
of Evidence 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Standards of Re-
view > De Novo Review > Motions to Suppress 
Criminal Law & Procedure> ... > Standards of Re-
view > Deferential Review > General Overview 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Standards of Re-
view > Substantial Evidence > Motions to Suppress 
HN2 An appellate court reviews the trial court's 
denial of a motion to suppress under a bifur-
cated standard of review. A trial court's determi-
nation of historical facts will be given almost 
total deference, while the trial court's applica-
tion of the law will be reviewed de nova. 
When the trial court does not issue findings of 
fact and none are requested, the appellate 
court implies findings that support the trial 
court's ruling if the evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the ruling, supports those 
findings. The trial judge is the sole trier of fact 
and judge of credibility of the witnesses and 
the weight to be given to their testimony. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceed-
ings > Pretrial Motions & Procedures > Suppression 
of Evidence 
HN3 A trial court's ruling on a motion to sup-
press will be upheld if there is any valid 
theory of law applicable to the case, even if 
the trial court did not base its decision on that 
theory. 
Constitutional Law> ... > Fundamental Rights> Search 
& Seizure > Scope of Protection 
Criminal Law & Procedure> Preliminary Proceed-
ings > Pretrial Motions & Procedures > Suppression 
of Evidence 
HN4 A defendant seeking to suppress evidence 
on the basis of an alleged Fourth Amendment 
violation bears the initial burden of rebutting 
the presumption of proper police conduct. A de-
fendant meets that burden by demonstrating 
that the challenged search or seizure occurred 
without a warrant. The burden then shifts to the 
State to prove that the search or seizure was 
reasonable under the totality of the circum-
stances. That burden may be satisfied by a show-
ing that one of the statutory exceptions to the 
warrant requirement is met. 
Constitutional Law> ... > Fundamental Rights> Search 
& Seizure > Probable Cause 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Sei-
zure > General Overview 
Criminal Law & Procedure> Preliminary Proceed-
ings > Pretrial Motions & Procedures > Suppression 
of Evidence 
Criminal Law & Procedure> ... > Standards of Re-
view > De Novo Review > Motions to Suppress 
HNS For purposes of a motion to suppress, 
whether a specific search or seizure is reason-
able or supported by probable cause is a ques-
tion of law subject to de novo review. 
Constitutional Law> ... > Fundamental Rights > Search 
& Seizure > Scope of Protection 
Criminal Law & Procedure> Search & Sei-
zure> Warrantless Searches > Investigative Stops 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Warrantless 
Searches > Stop & Frisk> Reasonable Suspicion 
HN6 Law enforcement officers may stop and 
briefly detain persons suspected of criminal ac-
tivity on less information than is constitution-
ally required for probable cause to arrest. To ini-
tiate an investigative stop, the officer must 
possess a reasonable suspicion based on spe-
cific, articulable facts that, in light of the offi-
cer's experience and general knowledge, would 
lead the officer to reasonably conclude that 
the person detained actually is, has been, or soon 
will be engaged in criminal activity. Whether 
the officer's suspicion was reasonable is evalu-
ated based on the totality of the circum-
stances. 
Criminal Law & Procedure> ... > Vehicular 
Crimes > Traffic Regulation 'Violations > General Over-
view 
Transportation Law > Private Vehicles > Traffic Regu-
lation > General Overview 
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HN7 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.060(b) 
(2011) requires drivers to remain in a single 
lane unless movement outside of the lane can 
be made safely. 
Constitutional Law> ... > Fundamental Rights > Search 
& Seizure > Probable Cause 
Criminal Law & Procedure> Commencement of Crimi-
nal Proceedings > Arrests > Probable Cause 
Criminal Law & Procedure> Commencement of Crimi-
nal Proceedings > Arrests > Vv'anantless Arrests 
HN8 Whether probable cause exists to justify 
a warrantless an-est must be considered under the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
anest. 
Constitutional Law> ... > Fundamental Rights > Search 
& Seizure > Scope of Protection 
Criminal Law & Procedure> Search & Sei-
zure > General Overview 
HN9 The withdrawal of a blood specimen 
from a person is considered a search and sei-
zure under the Fourth Amendment. 
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights > Search 
& Seizure > Scope of Protection 
HNIO The Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Tex. Const. art. I, § 9 as-
sure the right to be free from unreasonable 
searches. 
Constitutional Law> ... > Fundamental Rights > Search 
& Seizure > Scope of Protection 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Sei-
zure > Warrantless Searches > General Overview 
HNll A search or seizure conducted without a 
warrant is per se unreasonable absent a recog-
nized exception to the wanant requirement. 
Criminal Law & Procedure> ... > Blood Alcohol & 
Field Sobriety Testing > Implied Consent > General 
Overview 
HN12 The Texas Transportation Code expands 
the State's ability to search and seize without 
a warrant, providing implied consent to obtain 
blood samples from persons suspected of driv-
ing while intoxicated, in certain circumstances, 
even without a search warrant. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Blood Alcohol & 
Field Sobriety Testing > Implied Consent > General 
Overview 
HN13 The implied consent law codified in 
Tex. Transo. Code Ann. § 724.011 expands on 
the State's search capabilities by providing a 
framework for drawing driving while intoxi-
cated suspects' blood in the absence of a search 
warrant. It gives officers an additional 
weapon in their investigative arsenal, enabling 
them to draw blood in certain limited circum-
stances even without a search warrant. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Blood Alcohol & 
Field Sobriety Testing > Implied Consent > Refusals to 
Submit 
HNI 4 The Texas Transportation Code provides 
that a person who has been arrested for the of-
fense of operating a motor vehicle while intoxi-
cated and in a public place is deemed to have 
consented to the taking of one or more speci-
mens of blood or breath to analyze the alco-
hol concentration amount or presence of a con-
trolled substance. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 
724.011 (2011). The person retains the right, 
subject to automatic suspension of his license, 
to refuse to give a specimen. Tex. Transp. Code 
Ann. § 724.013. However, if the suspect re-
fuses to provide a specimen voluntarily and the 
arresting officer has credible information that 
the suspect has been previously convicted twice 
of driving while intoxicated, then the officer 
shall require the taking of a specimen of the per-
son's breath or blood. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. 
§ 724.012(b)(3)(B). 
Criminal Law & Procedure> Appeals > Procedural 
Matters > Briefs 
HN15 Tex. R. App. P 38.](i) states that a brief 
must contain clear and concise argument for 
contentions made with appropriate citations to 
the record and authorities. 
Counsel: For APPELLANT: Victor Manuel 
Valdes, Attorney At Law, San Antonio, TX. 
For APPELLEE: Nathan Morey, San Antonio, 
TX. 
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Karen Angelini, Justice, Marialyn Barnard, Jus-
tice. 
Opinion by: Marialyn Barnard 
I Opinion 
[*111] AFFIRlvfED 
Appellant Antonio Aviles was charged with 
felony driving while intoxicated. After [*112] 
the trial c.ourt denied his motion to suppress, 
Aviles entered a plea of nolo contendere and was 
sentenced to two years confinement in the 
Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Insti-
tutional Division. 1 On appeal, Aviles chal-
lenges the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress, arguing the court erred by admitting 
into evidence his blood specimen because he 
was arrested without a warrant, and his blood 
sample was obtained without consent and with-
out a waffant. We affirm the trial court's judg-
ment. 
BACKGROUND 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Offi-
cer Joe Rios testified that on June 2, 2011, he 
was patrolling the streets of San Antonio as part 
of the DWI ("Driving While Intoxicated") en-
forcement program. Officer Rios was driving 
northbound on Zarzamora at approximately 
2:20 a.m. when he saw a Mazda pickup veer-
ing across lane markers. As Officer Rios ap-
proached the vehicle, it crossed the lane mark-
ers again and veered into his lane. Based on this 
erratic driving, Officer Rios suspected the 
driver was intoxicated and initiated a traffic 
stop to check on the driver's condition. 
Officer Rios testified that after he pulled the ve-
hicle over, he noticed the driver, later identi-
fied as Aviles, had bloodshot eyes and slurred 
speech. Aviles was unsteady on his feet when Of-
ficer Rios asked him to exit the vehicle. 
Then, when Officer Rios asked Aviles to per-
form three standardized field sobriety tests-
the horizontal gaze nystagmus ("HGN"), the 
walk-and-turn, and the one-leg-stand-Officer 
Rios testified Aviles exhibited signs of intoxica-
tion on each test. Based onAviles's erratic diiv-
ing, physical appearance, [**3] and perfor-
mance on the field sobriety tests, Officer Rios 
placed Aviles under arrest for DWI. 
Following the arrest, Officer Rios checked 
Aviles's criminal history on his mobile laptop 
and discovered Aviles had two prior DWI con-· 
victions. Officer Rios testified he believed 
the database he accessed via his mobile laptop 
was reliable. Officer Rios requested a speci-
men of Aviles's breath or blood and read him 
the DWI statutory warning in Spanish.2 When 
Aviles refused to produce either specimen, Of-
ficer Rios required a blood draw from Aviles 
based upon section 724.012 of the Texas 
Transportation Code. HNI Section. 724.012 
states: "[a] peace officer shall require the tak-
ing of a specimen of the person's breath or blood 
under any of the following circumstances ... 
[for example, if] at the time of the arrest, the of-
ficer possesses or receives reliable informa-
tion from a credible source that the person, on 
two or more occasions, has been previously 
convicted of or placed on community supervi-
sion for an offense under Section 49.04 [DWI] . 
.. Penal Code." TEX. TRANSP. CoDE ANN . ...§. 
724.012(b)(3)(B) (West 2011). Officer Rios 
took Aviles to the nurse's infirmary for the blood 
draw, and filled out a THP-51 [**4] statutory 
authorization form,3 a mandatory blood draw 
checklist, and a chain of custody form. Offi-
cer Rios took [*113] Aviles to nurse Eliza-
1 Despite his plea, Aviles has a right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2 (noting that in plea 
bargain cases, defendant may appeal matters raised on written motion filed [**2] and ruled on before trial, or after getting trial 
court's permission to appeal). 
2 Aviles is a Spanish speaker. 
3 The THP-51 fonn contains the same language as section 724.012-"[i]f at the time of the suspect's a.'Test, [the police officer] pos-
sessed or received reliable information from a credible source that on two or more occasions the suspect had previously been con-
victed of [ . . . ] DWI," the officer may require the suspect to give a specimen of blood. 
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beth Arguello who drew Aviles' s blood. Officer 
Rios testified he saw the nurse draw Aviles's 
blood into a vial, put the vial in an envelope, and 
put it a locked container inside a refrigera-
tor. 
On cross-examination, Officer Rios testified 
his patrol car did not have onboard video, and 
that Aviles did not resist or attempt to flee 
once he initiated the traffic stop. Officer Rios 
also testified he was certified to administer field 
sobriety tests, and he took a refresher course 
on the subject within the last twelve to eigh-
teen months. 
Elizabeth Arguello testified she is a registered 
nurse with University Hospital and assigned to 
the City of San Antonio magistrate's office. Ar-
guello detailed [**5] the procedures she fol-
lowed when she drew Aviles's blood follow-
ing his arrest. On cross-examination, Arguello 
admitted she did not have a direct recollection of 
Aviles, and was basing her testimony on the 
written affidavit she signed at the time of 
Aviles's blood draw. 
After hearing the evidence and argument, the 
trial court denied Aviles's motion to suppress. 
Thereafter, Aviles pled nolo contendere to 
the charge of driving while intoxicated and 
was sentenced to two years confinement. Aviles 
now appeals, contending the trial court erred 
in denying his motion to suppress. 
ANALYSIS 
On appeal, Aviles argues the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress because: (1) 
he was arrested without a warrant, (2) his blood 
sample was obtained without consent and with-
out a warrant,4 and (3) the blood was admit-
ted into evidence in violation of his rights un-
der the Sixth., F(fth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
Standard of Review 
HN2 We review the trial court's denial of a mo-
tion to suppress under a bifurcated standard 
of review. Valtierra v. State. 310 S .W.3d 442. 
447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A trial court's de-
termination of historical facts will be given al-
most total deference, while the trial court's ap-
plication of the law will be reviewed de 
nova. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323. 328 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000). When the trial court 
does not issue findings of fact and none are re-
quested, as in this case, we imply findings 
that support the trial court's ruling if the evi-
dence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
ruling, supports those findings. See Valtierra. 
310 S. W.3d. at 449. "[T]he trial judge is the sole 
trier of fact and judge of credibility of the wit-
nesses and the weight to be given to their tes-
timony." St. George v. State. 237 S.W.3d 720, 
725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). HN3 A trial 
court's ruling on a motion to [**7] suppress 
will be upheld if there is any valid theory oflaw 
applicable to the case, even if the trial court 
did not base its decision on that theory. State v. 
Steelman. 93 S.W.3d 102, 107 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2002). 
Warrantless Arrest 
Aviles first contends the trial court erred in de-
nying his motion to suppress because he was 
arrested without a warrant. HN4 A defendant 
seeking to suppress evidence on the basis of an 
alleged Fourth [*114] Amendment violation 
bears the initial burden of rebutting the presump-
tion of proper police conduct. Young v. State, 
283 S.W.3d 854. 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A 
defendant meets this burden by demonstrating 
that the challenged search or seizure occurred 
without a warrant. Id. The burden then shifts 
to the State to prove that the search or seizure 
was reasonable under the totality of the circum-
stances. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 
672-73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). This burden 
may be satisfied by a showing that one of the 
statutory exceptions to the warrant requirement 
4 Notably, Aviles fails to address the Texas Transportation Code, specifically section 724.012, which governs the issue he 
brings on appeal-the blood draw following his D'\VI arrest. Other than stating at oral argument that the statute must comply 
with the dictates of the state and federal constitutions, [**6} Aviles also fails to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. See 
Smith v. State. 721 S.W.2d 844. 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (holding that even constitutional claims can be waived by failing 
to object); Smith v. State. 256 S.W.3d 341. 343 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007) (same). 
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is met. See Torres v. State: 182 S.W.3d 899. 
902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 
this case, it is undisputed no warrant 
was issued for Aviles' s arrest. As a result, the 
State bore the burden of establishing [**8] the 
reasonableness of Aviles' s detention and ar-
rest. See Young, 283 S.W.3d at 872; Amador. 
221 S.W.3d at 672-73. HNS Whether a spe-
cific search or seizure is reasonable or sup-
ported by probable cause is a question of law 
subject to de novo review. Dixon v. State, 206 
S.W.3d 613. 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 
HN6 Law enforcement officers may stop and 
briefly detain persons suspected of criminal ac-
tivity on less information than is constitution-
ally required for probable cause to arrest. Teny 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. L 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. 
Ed. 2d 889 (1968). To initiate an investigative 
stop, the officer must possess a reasonable sus-
picion based on specific, articulable facts that, in 
light of the officer's experience and general 
knowledge, would lead the officer to reason-
ably conclude that the person detained actually 
is, has been, or soon will be engaged in crimi-
nal activity. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 
1, 10, 109 S. Ct. 1581. 104 L. Ed. 2d 1 
(1989); Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Whether the officer's 
suspicion was reasonable is evaluated based on 
the totality of the circumstances. See Derichs-
weiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2011). 
At the suppression hearing, Officer Rios testi-
fied Aviles' s conduct attracted [**9] his atten-
tion "at 2:20 AM at night" because he was 
"veering across lane markers" and "veered into 
his lane." We hold this erratic driving gave Of-
ficer Rios reasonable suspicion to initiate a traf-
fic stop to check on the driver's condition. 
See Curtis v. State, 238 S.W.3d 376, 377, 381 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ( concluding officer had 
reasonable suspicion that defendant was driv-
ing while intoxicated and was justified in mak-
ing investigatory stop when officer saw defen-
dant weave at least three times out of his lane 
over short distance around 1 :00 a.m.). 
Aviles's driving also constituted a traffic viola-
tion, which authorized Officer Rios to make 
the traffic stop. See HN7 TEX. TRANSP. CooE 
ANN. 9 545.060(b) (West 2011) (requiring driv-
ers to remain in single lane unless movement 
outside of lane can be made safely). 
When Officer Rios approached Aviles, he 
found Aviles had bloodshot eyes and slurred 
speech. When asked to exit the vehicle, Aviles 
was extremely unsteady on his feet. Officer 
Rios asked Aviles to perform three standard-
ized field sobriety tests-the HGN, walk-and-
turn, and the one-leg-stand. Officer Rios testi-
fied Aviles exhibited signs of intoxication on 
each test. 
HN8 Whether probable cause [**10] exists to 
justify a warrantless arrest must be consid-
ered under the totality of the circumstances sur-
rounding the arrest. Amador v. State, 275 
S.W.3d 872. 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We 
find the facts described above gave Officer Rios 
probable cause to arrest Aviles for driving 
while intoxicated, based on his erratic driving, 
slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and perfor-
mance [*115] during the field-sobriety tests. 
See Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 901-02 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (allowing officer to 
make warrantless arrest based on his observa-
tions and personal knowledge that offense was 
or is being committed); State v. Stevenson, 
958 S.W.2d 824, 829 n. 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1997) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty. 468 U.S. 
420, 423, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 
(1984 )) (holding appellant's failure of field 
sobriety test provided probable cause for ar-
rest); see also State v. Garrett, 22 S.W.3d 650, 
654 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000) (noting that 
smell of alcohol, watery eyes, and unsteadiness 
are all classic signs that suggest suspect's men-
tal and physical faculties might be impaired and 
help establish probable cause to arrest defen-
dant for driving while intoxicated). Therefore, 
we overrule Aviles's point of error regarding an 
improper [**11] warrantless arrest. 
Blood Draw 
HN9 The withdrawal of a blood specimen 
from a person is considered a search and sei-
zure under the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber v. 
Cal{fornia, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S. Ct. 
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1826. 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966). HNIO The 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution a..nd Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Con-
stitution assure the right to be free from un-
reasonable searches. U.S. Const. Amend. Iv; TEx. 
CONST. art. L & 9. HNll A search or seizure 
conducted without a warrant is per se unreason-
able absent a recognized exception to the war-
rant requirement. Katz v. United States, 3 89 
U.S. 347, 357. 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 
(1967); Walter v. State. 28 S.W.3d 538. 541 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 
Aviles contends the trial court erred in admit-
ting his blood specimen into evidence because 
the sample was taken without his consent 
and without a warrant. Aviles cites case law for 
the proposition that absent consent, taking a 
blood sample from a defendant in custody re-
quires a validly-obtained warrant. See Davis v. 
State, 831 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. App.-Austin 
1992. pet. ref d.); see also McBride v. State, 
840 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, pet. 
ref d.). He also cites Article 18.01 of the 
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. arguing 
that a blood draw is an evidentiary 
[**12] search requiring a warrant. However, 
Davis and McBride do not apply to this case be-
cause they dealt with murder and sexual as-
sault, respectively, whereas Aviles's case deals 
with an offense while operating a vehicle in 
a public place, and is thus governed by Chap-
ter 724 of the Texas Transportation Code. 
HN12 The Texas Transportation Code expands 
the State's ability to search and seize without 
a wan·ant, providing implied consent to obtain 
blood samples from persons suspected of driv-
ing while intoxicated, in certain circumstances, 
even without a search warrant. As the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals held in Beeman v. 
State, 
HN13 "[t]he implied consent law 
[codified in TEx. TRANSP. CODE ANN._§. 
724.011] expands on the State's 
search capabilities by providing a 
framework for drawing DWI sus-
pects' blood in the absence of a search 
warrant. It gives officers an addi-
tional weapon in their investigative ar-
senal, enabling them to draw blood 
in certain limited circumstances even 
without a search warrant." 
86 S. W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2002). 
HN14 The Texas Transportation Code provides 
that a person who has been arrested for the of-
fense of operating a motor vehicle while intoxi-
cated and in a public place [**13] is deemed 
to have consented to the taking of one or more 
specimens of blood or breath to analyze the al-
cohol concentration amount or presence of a 
controlled substance. TEX. TRANSP. CoDE ANN. 
§ 724.011 (West 2011). The person retains the 
right, [*116] subject to automatic suspension of 
his license, to refuse to give a specimen. Id. §. 
724.013. However, if the suspect refuses to pro-
vide a specimen voluntarily and the arresting 
officer has credible information that the sus-
pect has been previously convicted twice of 
DWI, then the officer "shall require the tak-
ing of a specimen of the person's breath or blood 
.... " Id. § 724.0l 2(b )(3 )(B ). 
Officer Rios requested a specimen of Aviles's 
breath and read him the statutory warning allow-
ing Aviles to refuse the breath and blood 
draws. When Aviles refused, Officer Rios re-
quired a mandatory blood draw from Aviles 
based on section 724.012(b)(3)(B). There is evi-
dence that Officer Rios possessed credible in-
formation from a reliable source-his mobile 
laptop-that Aviles had two prior DWI convic-
tions. This situation, as outlined in section 
724.012, is one of the "circumstances" the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held where 
blood may be drawn without a [**14] search 
warrant. See Beeman. 86 S.W.3d at 616. Thus, 
the wmTantless seizure of Aviles' s blood was 
conducted according to the prescriptions of the 
Transportation Code, and without violating 
Aviles's Fourth Amendment rights. 
Aviles argues there was no physical impossibil-
ity for Officer Rios to obtain a warrant from 
the magistrate because his blood was drawn at 
the infirmary in the magistrate's office. This 
is immaterial given the mandate of section 
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724.012(b)(3){B). Aviles finally argues that by 
admitting the blood into evidence, the court vio-
lated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Four-
teenth Amendments. Although Ai1iles pres-
ents this contention as his third point of error, 
he fails to address this point in the substantive 
portion of his brief. Thus, he has waived his 
last point of en-or. See HN15 TEX. R. APP. P. 
38. Hi) (stating brief must contain clear and con-
cise argument for contentions made with appro-
priate citations to record and authorities). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we hold the trial court 
did not err in denying Aviles' s motion to sup-
press or in admitting his blood specimen 
evidence. There was probable cause for 
Aviles' s arrest. Furthermore, according to the 
Texas Transportation Code section 724.012, 
[**15] Officer Rios was authorized to require 
the mandatory blood draw from Aviles with-
out express consent and without a warrant, given 
Aviles's two prior DWI convictions. Accord-
ingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment. 
Marialyn Barnard, Justice 
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I Case Summary 
Procedural Posture 
Defendant was charged with felony driving 
while intoxicated. After the 226th Judicial Dis-
trict Court, Bexar County, Texas, denied his 
motion to suppress, defendant entered a plea of 
nolo contendere and was sentenced to two 
years confinement in the Texas Department of 
Criminal Justice - Institutional Division. Defen-
dant appealed. 
Overview 
A police officer had probable cause to arrest de-
fendant for driving while intoxicated, based 
on his e1rntic driving, slurred speech, blood-
shot eyes, and performance during the field-
sobriety tests. The officer requested a specimen 
of defendant's breath and read him the statu-
tory warning allowing defendant to refuse the 
breath and blood draws. When defendant re-
fused, the officer required a mandatory blood 
draw from defendant based on Tex. Transp. Code 
Ann. § 724.012(b)(3)(B) (2011) because there 
was evidence that defendant had two prior driv-
ing while intoxicated convictions. That situa-
tion, as outlined in Tex. Transv. Code Ann. § 
724.012, was one of the circumstances where 
blood could be drawn without a search war-
rant. Thus, the warrantless seizure of defen-
dant's blood was conducted according to the pre-
scriptions of t.1-:ie Texas Transportation Code, 
and without violating defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights. Therefore, the trial court 
did not err in denying defendant's motion to sup-
press or in admitting defendant's blood speci-
men into evidence. 
Outcome 
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's 
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lead the officer to reasonably conclude that 
the person detained actually is, has been, or soon 
will be engaged in criminal activity. Whether 
the officer's suspicion was reasonable is evalu-
ated based on the totality of the circum-
stances. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Vehicular 
Crimes > Traffic Regulation Violations> General Over-
view 
Transportation Law > Private Vehicles > Traffic Regu-
lation > General Overview 
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Tex. Transp. Code Ann. S 545. 060(b) 
(2011) requires drivers to remain in a single 
lane unless movement outside of the lane can 
be made 
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights > Search 
& Seizure > Probable Cause 
Criminal Law & Procedure> Commencement of Crimi-
nal Proceedings > Arrests > Probable Cause 
Criminal Law & Procedure> Commencement of Crimi-
nal Proceedings > Arrests > Warrantless Arrests 
HN8 Whether probable cause exists to justify 
a warrantless arrest must be considered under the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
arrest. 
Constitutional Law> ... > Fundamental Rights > Search 
& Seizure > Scope of Protection 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Sei-
zure > General Overview 
HN9 The withdrawal of a blood specimen 
from a person is considered a search and sei-
zure under the Fourth Amendment. 
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights> Search 
& Seizure > Scope of Protection 
HNlO The Fow1h Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Tex. Const. art. I, § 9 as-
sure the right to be free from unreasonable 
searches. 
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights > Search 
& Seizure > Scope of Protection 
Criminal Law & Procedure> Search & Sei-
zure > Warrantless Searches > General Overview 
HNll A search or seizure conducted without a 
wa.1Tant is per se unreasonable absent a recog-
nized exception to the wmTant requirement. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Blood Alcohol & 
Field Sobriety Testing > Implied Consent > General 
Overview 
HN12 The Texas Transportation Code expands 
the State's ability to search and seize without 
a warrant, providing implied consent to obtain 
blood samples from persons suspected of driv-
ing while intoxicated, in certain circumstances, 
even without a search warrant. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Blood Alcohol & 
Field Sobriety Testing > Implied Consent > General 
Overview 
HNI 3 The implied consent law codified in 
Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.011 expands on 
the State's search capabilities by providing a 
framework for drawing driving while intoxi-
cated suspects' blood in the absence of a search 
warrant. It gives officers an additional 
weapon in their investigative arsenal, enabling 
them to draw biood in certain limited circum-
stances even without a search warrant. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Blood Alcohol & 
Field Sobriety Testing > Implied Consent> Refusals to 
Submit 
HN14 The Texas Transportation Code provides 
that a person who has been arrested for the of-
fense of operating a motor vehicle while intoxi-
cated and in a public place is deemed to have 
consented to the taking of one or more speci-
mens of blood or breath to analyze the alco-
hol concentration amount or presence of a con-
trolled substance. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 
724.011 (2011). The person retains the right, 
subject to automatic suspension of his license, 
to refuse to give a specimen. Tex. Transp. Code 
Ann. § 724.013. However, if the suspect re-
fuses to provide a specimen voluntalily and the 
arresting officer has credible information that 
the suspect has been previously convicted twice 
of driving while intoxicated, then the officer 
shall require the taking of a specimen of the per-
son's breath or blood. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. 
§ 724.012(b )(3 )(B ). 
Criminal Law & Procedure> Appeals > Procedural 
Matters > Briefs 
HNI 5 Tex. R. App. P 38.1 (i) states that a brief 
must contain clear and concise argument for 
contentions made with appropriate citations to 
the record and authorities. 
Counsel: For APPELLANT: Victor Manuel 
Valdes, Attorney At Law, San Antonio, TX. 
For APPELLEE: Nathan Morey, San Antonio, 
TX. 
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Judges: Opinion by: Marialyn Barnard, Jus-
tice. Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice, 
Karen Angelini, Justice, Marialyn Barnard, Jus-
tice. 
j Opinion 
[*111] AFFIRMED 
Appellant Antonio Aviles was charged with 
felony driving while intoxicated. After [*112] 
the trial court denied his motion to suppress, 
Aviles entered a plea of nolo contendere and was 
sentenced to two years confinement in the 
Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Insti-
tutional Division. 1 On appeal, Aviles chal-
lenges the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress, arguing the court erred by admitting 
into evidence his blood specimen because he 
was arrested without a wanant, and his blood 
sample was obtained without consent and with-
out a warrant. We affirm the trial court's judg-
ment. 
BACKGROUND 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Offi-
cer Joe Rios testified that on June 2, 2011, he 
was patrolling the streets of San Antonio as part 
of the DW1 ("Driving While Intoxicated") en-
forcement program. Officer Rios was driving 
northbound on Zarzamora at approximately 
2:20 a.m. when he saw a Mazda pickup veer-
ing across lane markers. As Officer Rios ap-
proached the vehicle, it crossed the lane mark-
ers again and veered into his lane. Based on this 
erratic driving, Officer Rios suspected the 
driver was intoxicated and initiated a traffic 
stop to check on the driver's condition. 
Officer Rios testified that after he pulled the ve-
hicle over, he noticed the driver, later identi-
fied as Aviles, had bloodshot eyes and slurred 
speech. Aviles was unsteady on his feet when Of-
ficer Rios asked him to exit the vehicle. 
Then, when Officer Rios asked Aviles to per-
form three standardized field sobriety tests-
the horizontal gaze nystagmus ("HGN"), the 
walk-and-tum, and the one-leg-stand-Officer 
Rios testified Aviles exhibited signs of intoxica-
tion on each test. Based on Aviles' s erratic driv-
ing, physical appearance, [**3] and perfor-
mance on the field sobriety tests, Officer Rios 
placed Aviles under arrest for DWI. 
Following the arrest, Officer Rios checked 
Aviles' s criminal history on his mobile laptop 
and discovered Aviles had two prior DWI con-
victions. Officer Rios testified he believed 
the database he accessed via his mobile laptop 
was reliable. Officer Rios requested a speci-
men of Aviles's breath or blood and read him 
the DWI statutory warning in Spanish.2 When 
Aviles refused to produce either specimen, Of-
ficer Rios required a blood draw from Aviles 
based upon section 724.012 of the Texas 
Transportation Code. HNI Section 724.012 
states: "[a] peace officer shall require the tak-
ing of a specimen of the person's breath or blood 
under any of the following circumstances ... 
[for example, if] at the time of the arrest, the of-
ficer possesses or receives reliable informa-
tion from a credible source that the person, on 
two or more occasions, has been previously 
convicted of or placed on community supervi-
sion for an offense under Section 49.04 [DWI] . 
.. Penal Code." TEx. TRANSP. CODE ANN._§_ 
724.012(b)(3)(B) (West 2011). Officer Rios 
took Aviles to the nurse's infirmary for the blood 
draw, and filled out a THP-51 [**4] statutory 
authorization form, 3 a mandatory blood draw 
checklist, and a chain of custody form. Offi-
cer Rios took [*113] Aviles to nurse Eliza-
1 Despite his plea, Aviles has a right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. See TEx. R. APP. P. 25.2 (noting that in plea 
bargain cases, defendant may appeal matters raised on written motion filed [**2] and ruled on before trial, or after getting trial 
court's permission to appeal). 
2 Aviles is a Spanish speaker. 
3 The THP-51 form contains the same language as section 724.012~"[i]f at the time of the suspect's arrest, [the police officer] pos-
sessed or received reliable information from a credible source that on two or more occasions the suspect had previously been con-
victed of[ ... ) DWI," the officer may require the suspect to give a specimen of blood. 
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beth Arguello who drew Aviles' s blood. Officer 
testified he saw the nurse draw Aviles' s 
into a vial, put the vial in an envelope, 
put it in a locked container inside a refrigera-
tor. 
On cross-examination, Officer Rios testified 
his patrol car did not have onboard video, and 
that Aviles did not resist or attempt to flee 
once he initiated the traffic stop. Officer Rios 
also testified he was certified to administer field 
sobriety tests, and he took a refresher course 
on the subject within the last twelve to eigh-
teen months. 
Elizabeth Arguello testified she is a registered 
nurse with University Hospital and assigned to 
the City of San Antonio magistrate's office. Ar-
guello detailed [**5] the procedures she fol-
lowed when she drew Aviles's blood follow-
ing his arrest. On cross-examination, Arguello 
admitted she did not have a direct recollection of 
Aviles, and was basing her testimony on the 
written affidavit she signed at the time of 
Aviles's blood draw. 
After hearing the evidence and argument, the 
trial court denied Aviles' s motion to suppress. 
Thereafter, Aviles pled nolo contendere to 
the charge of driving while intoxicated and 
was sentenced to two years confinement. Aviles 
now appeals, contending the trial court erred 
in denying his motion to suppress. 
ANALYSIS 
On appeal, Aviles argues the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress because: (1) 
he was arrested without a warrant, (2) his blood 
sample was obtained without consent and with-
out a warrant,4 and (3) the blood was admit-
ted into evidence in violation of his rights un-
der the Sixth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
Standard of Review 
HN2 We review the trial court's denial of a mo-
tion to suppress under a bifurcated standard 
of review. Valtierra v. State. 310 S.W.3d 442, 
447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A trial court's de-
termination of historical facts will be given al-
most total deference, while the trial court's ap-
plication of the law will be reviewed de 
novo. Cannouche v. State, IO S.W.3d 323, 328 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000). When the trial court 
does not issue findings of fact and none are re-
quested, as in this case, we imply findings 
that support the trial court's ruling if the evi-
dence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
ruling, supports those findings. See Valtierra, 
310 S.W.3d. at 449. "[T]he trial judge is the sole 
trier of fact and judge of credibility of the wit-
nesses and the weight to be given to their tes-
timony." St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 
725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). HN3 A trial 
court's ruling on a motion to [**7] suppress 
will be upheld if there is any valid theory of law 
applicable to the case, even if the trial court 
did not base its decision on that theory. State v. 
Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102, 107 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2002). 
Warrantless Arrest 
Aviles first contends the trial court erred in de-
nying his motion to suppress because he was 
arrested without a warrant. HN4 A defendant 
seeking to suppress evidence on the basis of an 
alleged Fourth [*114] Amendment violation 
bears the initial burden of rebutting the presump-
tion of proper police conduct. Young v. State, 
283 S.W.3d 854, 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A 
defendant meets this burden by demonstrating 
that the challenged search or seizure occurred 
without a warrant. Id. The burden then shifts 
to the State to prove that the search or seizure 
was reasonable under the totality of the circum-
stances. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 
672-73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). This burden 
may be satisfied by a showing that one of the 
statutory exceptions to the warrant requirement 
4 Notably, Aviles fails to address the Texas Transportation Code, specifically section 724.012, which governs the issue he 
brings on appeal-the blood draw following his DWI arrest. Other than stating at oral argument that the statute must comply 
with the dictates of the state and federal constitutions, [**6] Aviles also fails to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. See 
Smith v. State. 721 S.W.2d 844. 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (holding that even constitutional claims can be waived by failing 
to object); Smith 1, State. 256 S.W.3d 341. 343 (Tex. Aop.-San Antonio 2007) (same). 
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is met. See Torres v. State. 182 S.W.3d 899. 
902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 
In this case, it is undisputed that no warrant 
was issued for Aviles' s arrest. As a result, the 
State bore the burden of establishing [**8] the 
reasonableness of Aviles' s detention and ar-
rest. See Young. 283 S.W.3d at 872; Amador. 
221 S.W.3d at 672-73. HNS Whether a spe-
cific search or seizure is reasonable or sup-
ported by probable cause is a question of law 
subject to de novo review. Dixon v. State, 206 
S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. C1im. App. 2006). 
HN6 Law enforcement officers may stop and 
briefly detain persons suspected of criminal ac-
tivity on less information than is constitution-
ally required for probable cause to arrest. Teny 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868. 20 L. 
Ed. 2d 889 (1968). To initiate an investigative 
stop, the officer must possess a reasonable sus-
picion based on specific, articulable facts that, in 
light of the officer's experience and general 
knowledge, would lead the officer to reason-
ably conclude that the person detained actually 
is, has been, or soon will be engaged in crimi-
nal activity. United States v. Solwlow, 490 U.S. 
1. 10, 109 S. Ct. 1581. 104 L. Ed. 2d 1 
(1989); Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527. 530 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Whether the officer's 
suspicion was reasonable is evaluated based on 
the totality of the circumstances. See Derichs-
weiler v. State. 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2011). 
At the suppression hearing, Officer Rios testi-
fied Aviles' s conduct attracted [**9] his atten-
tion "at 2:20 AM at night" because he was 
"veering across lane markers" and "veered into 
his lane." We hold this erratic driving gave Of-
ficer Rios reasonable suspicion to initiate a traf-
fic stop to check on the driver's condition. 
See Curtis v. State, 238 S.W.3d 376. 377, 381 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (concluding officer had 
reasonable suspicion that defendant was driv-
ing while intoxicated and was justified in mak-
ing investigatory stop when officer saw defen-
dant weave at least three times out of his lane 
over short distance around 1:00 a.m.). 
Aviles's driving also constituted a traffic viola-
tion, which authorized Officer Rios to make 
the traffic stop. See HN7 TEx. TRANSP. CoDE 
ANN. § 545.060(b) (West 2011) (requiring driv-
ers to remain in single lane unless movement 
outside of lane can be made safely). 
When Officer Rios approached Aviles, he 
found Aviles had bloodshot eyes and slurred 
speech. When asked to exit the vehicle, Aviles 
was extremely unsteady on his feet. Officer 
Rios asked Aviles to perform three standard-
ized field sobriety tests-the HGN, walk-and-
turn, and the one-leg-stand. Officer Rios testi-
fied Aviles exhibited signs of intoxication on 
each test. 
HN8 Whether probable cause [**10] exists to 
justify a warrantless arrest must be consid-
ered under the totality of the circumstances sur-
rounding the arrest. Amador v. State, 275 
S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We 
find the facts described above gave Officer Rios 
probable cause to arrest Aviles for driving 
while intoxicated, based on his erratic driving, 
slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and perfor-
mance [*115] during the field-sobriety tests. 
See Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 901-02 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (allowing officer to 
make warrantless arrest based on his observa-
tions and personal knowledge that offense was 
or is being committed); State v. Stevenson, 
958 S.W.2d 824, 829 n. 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1997) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty. 468 U.S. 
420, 423, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 
(1984)) (holding appellant's failure of field 
sobriety test provided probable cause for ar-
rest); see also State v. Garrett, 22 S.W.3d 650, 
654 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000) (noting that 
smell of alcohol, watery eyes, and unsteadiness 
are all classic signs that suggest suspect' s men-
tal and physical faculties might be impaired and 
help establish probable cause to arrest defen-
dant for driving while intoxicated). Therefore, 
we overrule Aviles's point of error regarding an 
improper [**11] warrantless arrest. 
Blood Draw 
HN9 The withdrawal of a blood specimen 
from a person is considered a search and sei-
zure under the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber v. 
California. 384 U.S. 757, 767. 86 S. Ct. 
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1826. 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966). HNlO The 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution and Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Con-
stitution assure the right to be free from un-
reasonable searches. U.S. Const. Am.end. Iv; 
CoNST. art. L § 9. HNll A search or seizure 
conducted without a warrant is per se unreason-
able absent a recognized exception to the war-
rant requirement. Katz v. United States, 3 89 
U.S. 347. 357. 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 
0967); Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 541 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 
Aviles contends the trial court erred in admit-
ting his blood specimen into evidence because 
the sample was taken without his consent 
and without a warrant. Aviles cites case law for 
the proposition that absent consent, taking a 
blood sample from a defendant in custody re-
quires a validly-obtained warrant. See Davis v. 
State, 831 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. App.-Austin 
1992, pet. ref'd.); see also McBride v. State, 
840 S .W.2d 111 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, pet. 
ref'd.). He also cites Article 18.01 of the 
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. arguing 
that a blood draw is an evidentiary 
[**12] search requiring a warrant. However, 
Davis and McBride do not apply to this case be-
cause they dealt with murder and sexual as-
sault, respectively, whereas Aviles' s case deals 
with an offense while operating a vehicle in 
a public place, and is thus governed by Chap-
ter 724 of the Texas Transportation Code. 
HN12 The Texas Transp01iation Code expands 
the State's ability to search and seize without 
a warrant, providing implied consent to obtain 
blood samples from persons suspected of driv-
ing while intoxicated, in certain circumstances, 
even without a search warrant. As the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals held in Beeman v. 
State, 
HN13 "[t]he implied consent law 
[codified in TEx. TRANSP. CoDE ANN._§_ 
724.011] expands on the State's 
search capabilities by providing a 
framework for drawing DWI sus-
pects' blood in the absence of a search 
warrant. It gives officers.an addi-
tional weapon in their investigative ar-
senal, enabling them to draw blood 
in certain limited circumstances even 
without a search warrant." 
86 S. W3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2002). 
HN14 The Texas Transportation Code provides 
that a person who has been arrested for the of-
fense of operating a motor vehicle while intoxi-
cated and in a public place [**13] is deemed 
lo have consented to the taking of one or more 
specimens of blood or breath to analyze the al-
cohol concentration amount or presence of a 
controlled substance. TEx. TRANSP. CODE ANN. 
§ 724.011 (West 2011). The person retains the 
right, [*116] subject to automatic suspension of 
his license, to refuse to give a specimen. Id. §. 
724.013. However, if the suspect refuses to pro-
vide a specimen voluntarily and the arresting 
officer has credible information that the sus-
pect has been previously convicted twice of 
DWI, then the officer "shall require the tak-
ing of a specimen of the person's breath or blood 
.... " Id. § 724. 0 l 2(b )(3 )(B ). 
Officer Rios requested a specimen of Aviles's 
breath and read him the statutory warning allow-
ing Aviles to refuse the breath and blood 
draws. When Aviles refused, Officer Rios re-
quired a mandatory blood draw from Aviles 
based on section 724.012(b)(3)(B). There is evi-
dence that Officer Rios possessed credible in-
formation from a reliable source-his mobile 
laptop-that Aviles had two prior DWI convic-
tions. This situation, as outlined in section 
724.012, is one of the "circumstances" the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held where 
blood may be drawn without a [**14] search 
warrant. See Beeman. 86 S.W.3d at 616. Thus, 
the warrantless seizure of Aviles' s blood was 
conducted according to the prescriptions of the 
Transpo1iation Code, and without violating 
Aviles' s Fourth Amendment rights. 
Aviles argues there was no physical impossibil-
ity for Officer Rios to obtain a warrant from 
the magistrate because his blood was drawn at 
the infirmary in the magistrate's office. This 
is immaterial given the mandate of section 
CARTER WTh1TERS 
118 
724.012(b )(3 )(B). Aviles finally argues that by 
admitting the blood into evidence, the court 
lated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Four-
teenth Amendments. Although Aviles pres-
ents this contention as his third point of error, 
fails to address this point in the substantive 
portion of his brief. Thus, he has waived his 
last point of en-or. See HNIS TEx. R. APP. P. 
3 8 .1 (i) ( stating brief must contain clear and con-
cise argument for contentions made with appro-
priate citations to record and authorities). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we hold the trial court 
A 
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did not en- in denying Aviles's motion to sup-
press or admitting his blood specimen into 
evidence. There was probable cause for 
Aviles' s an-est. Furthermore, according to the 
Texas Transportation Code section 724.012, 
[**15] Officer Rios was authmized to require 
the mandatory blood draw from Aviles with-
out express consent and without a warrant, given 
Aviles's two prior DWI convictions. Accord-
ingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment. 
Marialyn Barnard, Justice 
Publish 
CARTER WINTERS 
l /'1 
Owen012914 A Hunt K Red1iv1. Courtroom504 
Time Speaker Note 
8:26: 15 AM i jTricia Franklin CR 2013 458 
8:44:57 AM !State Attorney :Jay Rosenthal 
8:45:00 AM jPersonal jPhil Gordon 
!Attorney ! 
8:45:04 AM f Defendant [ present in custody 
8:46:21 AM jJudge Owen jreviews; discloses telephone conference calls 
8:46:46 AM jJudge Owen jDENIES MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
8:46:57 AM jJudge Owen jnotes change of plea is conditional reserving right to appeal 
! 1 motion to suppress 
8:47:26 AM jPersonal [ GG - cnt 1; dism remainder; subjeci to appeal on pre-trial order 
!Attorney : 
8:48:02 AM jJudge Owen [discussion with defendant 
.... 8.:48.:.29.AM ... iJudge .. owen ............. iq.uestions .. counsel························································································································································ 
8:49:09 AM !Personal ! j 
!Attorney ! 
8:49:52 AM joefendant jsworn and questioned by the Court 
.... 9.:04.:.os .. AM.JJudge .. Owen ......... ...J accepts .. guiltyylea; .. PSI/SH .. -.AprH .. 10 .. at.rn:oo .. a ... m ............................................... , 
9:06:09 AM !Adjourn. ! . 
........................................................................................................ , ......................... .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 
9:06:09 AM i I l 
1/29/2014 1 of 1 
J, )_JJ) 
Date: I /7-!f ./1 4= 
Pleading Guilty to: Charge(s): 
Fe-:!j J)cce-
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' 
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS & EXPLANATION OF WAIVERS BY PLEA OF GUILTY 
(PLEASE INITIAL EACH RESPONSE) 
I. You have the right to remain silent. You do not have to say anything about the crime(s) you are 
accused of committing. If you have a trial, the state could not call you as a witness or ask you 
any questions. However, anything you do say can be used as evidence against you in court. 
I un~ that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to remain silent before and during 
trial. . 
II. The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of g.uilty to the crime(s) in this 
case. Even after pleading guilty, you will still have the right to refuse to answer any question or 
to provide any information that might tend to show you committed some other crime(s). You can 
also refuse to answer or provide any information that might tend to increase the punishment for 
the crime(s) to which you are pleading guilty. 
I understand that by pleading guilty to the crime(s) in this case, I still have the right to remain 
silent with respect to any other crime(s) an~spect to answering questions or providing 
information that may increase my sentence. . 
Ill. You have the right to be represented by an attorney. If you want an attorney and cannot pay for 
one, you ca!!-sk the judge for an attorney who will be paid by the county. I 
understand ~ . 
rv. You are presumed to be innocenLXou would be found guilty if: 1) you plead guilty in front of the 
judge, or 2) you are found guilty at a jury tdat. 
- 1 - Owen July 1, 2013 
I ~ta~d that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to be presumed innocent 
You have the right to a speedy and public jury trial. A jury trial is a court hearing to determine 
whether you are guilty or not guilty of the charge(s) brought against you. In a jury trial, you have 
the right to present evidence in your defense and to testify in your own defense. The state must 
convince each and every one of the jurors of your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
I ~stan.d that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to a speedy and public jury trial. 
VI. You have the right to confront the witnesses against you. This occurs during a jury trial where 
the state must prove its case by calling witnesses to testify under oath in front of you, the jury, 
and your attorney. Your attorney could then cross-examine (question) each witness. You could 
also call your own witnesses of your choosing to testify concerning your guilt or innocence. If 
you do not have the funds to bring those witnesses to court, the state will pay the cost of 
bringing your witnesses to court. 
l understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my rightjo _.f.Onfront the witnesses against me, 
and to present witnesses and evidence in my defense. (;)f/f~ . 
QUESTIONS REGARDING PLEA 
(Please answer every question. If you do not understand a question consult your attorney 
before answering.) 
PLEASE CIRCLE ONE 
1. Do you read and write the English language? 
If not, have you been provided with an interpreter to 
help you fill out this form? 
2. What is your age? ?/7 
YES NO NIA 
C. 
.. I ..----, .It IA fl 
3. What is your true and legal name? ~( (J (L, M , :tl(~ ll I\_, 
4. What was the highest grade you completed in school? _C~o--...... l~l~~'---1<----------
If you did not complete high school, have you received 
either a general education diploma or high school 
equivalency diploma? 
5. Are you currently under the care of a mental health 
professional? 
- 2 -
(i;) NO NIA 
YES 6) 
Owen July 1, 2013 
6. Have you ever been diagnosed with a mental health 
disorder? 
~ 
~NO 
If so, what was the diagnosis and when was it made? ___ :t?J;.-,..<'-'---, yf)--(,__AY,=-..---CX-"--"'0__,f'--0_ (9 NO 7. Are you currently prescribed any medication? 
If so, have you taken your prescription medication 
during the past 24 hours? 
8. in the last 24 hours, have you taken any medications or 
drugs, or drank any alcoholic beverages which you 
believe affect your ability to make a reasoned and 
informed decision in this case? 
9. ls there any other reason that you would be unable to 
€)No NIA 
YES 8 
make a reasoned and informed decision in this case? YES 
10. Is your guilty plea the result of a plea agreement? YES 
If so, what are the terms of that plea agreement? 
(If available, a written plea agreement should be 
attached hereto as "Addendum 'A"') 
11. There are two types of plea agreements. Please initial 
the one paragraph below which describes the type 
of plea you are entering: 
a. I understand that my plea agreement is a binding plea agreement. 
This means that if the district court does not impose the specific 
sentence as recommended by both parties, l will be allowed to 
withdraw my plea of guilty and proceed to a jury trial. ___ _ 
b. I understand that my plea agreement is a non-binding plea 
agreement. This means that the court is not bound by the agreement 
or any sentencing recommendations, and may impose any sentence 
authorized by law, including the maximum sentence stated above. 
Because the court is not bound by the agreement, if the district court 
chooses not to follow the agreement, I will not have the right to 
withdraw my guilty plea. ___ _ 
- 3 - Owen July 1, 2013 
As a term of your plea agreement, are you pleading 
guilty more than one crime? 
If so, do you understand that your sentences for 
crime could be ordered to be served either concurrently 
(at the same time) or consecutively (one after the other)? 
13. Is this a conditional guilty plea in which you are 
reserving your right to appeal any pre-trial issues? 
If so, what issue are you reserving the right to appeal? 
cA;{ ( cfl"l!±Vi 'ttf ~A fl/ ru5 
14. Have you waived your right to appeal your judgment 
of conviction and sentence as part of your plea 
agreement? 
15. Have any other promises been made to you which have 
influenced your decision to plead guilty? 
If so, what are those promises? 
16. Have you had sufficient time to discuss 
your case with your attorney? 
17. Have you told your attorney everything you know about 
the crime(s) to which you are pleading guilty? 
18. Is there anything you have requested your attorney 
to do that has not been done? 
If yes, please explain. 
19. Your attorney can get various items from the 
prosecutor relating to your case. These may include 
police reports, witness statements, tape recordings, 
photographs, reports of scientific testing, etc. This is 
called discovery. Have you reviewed the evidence 
provided to your attorney in discovery? 
- 4 -
J:Jf 
YES NO N/A 
YES (!§I 
YES 8 
& NO 
@No 
YES€) 
(9 NO 
Owen July 1, 2013 
Are there any witnesses whose testimony would show 
that you are innocent? 
. Do you understand that by pleading guilty you will waive 
any defenses, both factual and legal, that you believe 
you may have in this case? 
22. Are there any motions or other requests for relief that 
you believe should still be filed in this case? 
If so, what motions or requests? 
23. Do you understand that if you enter an unconditional 
guilty plea in this case you will not be able to challenge 
any rulings that came before the guilty plea including: 
1) any searches or seizures that occurred in your case; 
YES Q 
NO 
YES@ 
2) any issues concerning the method or manner of your 
Arrest; and 3) any issues about any statements you may ~YE 
have made to law enforcement officers? ((7 NO 
24. Do you understand that when you plead guilty, you are 
admitting the truth of each and every allegation contained 
in the charge(s) to which you plead guilty? 
25. Are you currently on probation or parole? 
If so, do you understand that a plea of guilty in this case 
could be the basis of a violation of that probation or parole? YES NO NIA 
26. If you are not a citizen of the United States, the entry 
of a plea or making of factual admissions could have 
consequences of deportation or removal, inability to 
obtain legal status in the United States, or denial of 
an application for United States citizenship. Do you 
understand? 
27. Is the crime to which you will plead guilty one which 
will require you to register as a sex offender? 
(I.C. § 18-8304) 
28. Are you aware that if you plead guilty you may be 
required to pay restitution to the victims in this case? 
(1.C. § 19-5304) 
- 5 -
1d-£ 
@No 
YES e) 
(t)NO 
Owen July 1, 2013 
Have you agreed to pay restitution in another case as 
a condition of your plea agreement in this case? 
If so, to whom? ____________________ _ 
30. Do you understand that if the Court orders a presentence 
Investigation report you shall be ordered to pay an amount (J 
to be determined by the Department of Correction · 
not to exceed $100? (I.C. § 19-2516) ~ NO 
31. Is there a mandatory driver's license suspension as a tt:;;) 
result of a guilty plea in this case? V, NO 
If so, for how long must your license be suspended? up::h f-2y {2...$ · 
32. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which a mandatory 
domestic violence, substance abuse, or psychosexual b 
evaluation is required? YES t:V 
(1.C. §§ 18-918(7)(a),-8005(9),-8317) 
33. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which you may be 
required to pay the costs of prosecution and 
investigation? (I.C. § 37-2732A(K)) 
34. Do you understand that by pleading guilty to a felony 
YES e 
you will be required to comply with the Idaho DNA Databas~ 
Testing Act and that failure to do so is a felony offense? ~ NO 
35. Are you pleading guilty to a crime of violence for which 
the court could impose a civil penalty of up to $5,000, L) 
payable to the victim of the crime? (I.C. § 19-5307) YES ~ 
36. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony, 
during the period of your sentence, you will lose your /v:) 
right to vote in Idaho? (ID. CONST. art. 6, § 3) I/ NO 
37. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony, 
during the period of your sentence, you will lose your right a 
to hold public office in Idaho? (ID. CONST. art. 6, § 3) ~ NO 
38. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony, 
during the period of your sentence, you will lose your right n 
to perform jury service in Idaho? (ID. CONST. art. 6, § 3) ~ NO 
39. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony 
you wili lose your right to purchase, possess, or carry 
firearms? (I.C. § 18-310) 
- 6 -
/ollp, 
eNO 
Owen July 1, 2013 
40. Do you understand that no one, including your attorney, 
can force you to plead guilty in this case? 
41. Are you entering your plea freely and voluntarily? 
NO 
NO 
Are you pleading guilty because you did commit the acts L:) 
alleged in the information or indictment? lc:..v NO 
43. If you were provided with an interpreter to help you fill out 
this form, have you had any trouble understanding your £) 
interpreter? YES NO l r:!;f 
44. Have you had any trouble answering any of the questions 
in this form which you could not resolve by discussion with fl:;:;\ 
your attorney? YES ~ 
have answered the questions on pages 1-7 of this Guilty Plea Advisory form truthfully, 
understand all of the questions and answers herein, have discussed each question and 
answer with my attorney, and have completed this form freely and voluntarily. Furthermore, no 
one has threatened me to do so. 
Datedthis ,Q,q~ dayof~J~ ,-W13.- /2.0{i.J, 
~v:.-.fk~~ 
DEFENDANT 
ve discussed, in detail, the foregoing questions and answers 
/ 
- 7 - Owen July 1, 2013 
J;i., 1 
District Court April 10, 2 Judge Patrick H Owen Court Repo 
Time Speaker Note 
11 :07:51 AM/Sentencing )Defendant present with Counsel 
jCR2013-458 State 
lv Tricia Franklin -
!Judge Patrick H 
!Owen - Chief Dpty 
!Prosecutor Jay 
/Rosenthal Jay 
! Rosenthal -
! Defense Atty Phillip i 
/Gordon - COURT i 
l REPORTER Kasey i 
i Redlich - Clerk Lisa l 
/London i 
asey 6B-COURTROOM 
11 :07:59 AM/Honorable Patrick H !CALL OF THE CASE. not inclined to grant request to wait on 
!Owen !this case until appellate court comes down with decision on 
1 I another similar case. states reasons. setting this in june 
11 : 10: 53 AM! no objections ' 
11 :10:57 AMfHonorable Patrick Hjwill set sentencing to 6/12. warns def of drinking while out 
!Owen I 
11:11:51 AMiend i 
4/10/2014 1 of 1 
District Court June 11, 2014 H rable Patrick H Owen, presiding B-COURTROOM 
Time Speaker Note 
10:29:28 AMJSentencing CR-2013-458 j0efendant present with Counsel 
/State v TRICIA : 
!FRANKLIN - Judge ! 
i Patrick H Owen - Chief : 
/ Dpty Prosecutor Jay i 
l Rosenthal - Defense Atty i 
!Phillip Gordon - COURT / 
/ REPORTER Kasey . 
i Redlich - Clerk Lisa 
/London 
10:29:31 AMfHonorable Patrick H tcALL OF THE CASE. 
/Owen i 
10:30:03 AM iDefense Attorney iask reconsider to stay sentencing. discusses implied 
............ ... ..... .. ...... .. ... . 1 ......................... ....... .............................. .. ........ ..  ..1.?.?..~.~:~~ .................... ............ .. .. .. .. : ...... .... ...... ..... ............. ..... ........................... ............... ...... .... ... ...... . I 
10:33:48 AM 1Honorable Patrick H /decline to reconsider. Will proceed to sentencing . 
........................................... !Owen ................................................................ i ................ .................... ..... .... ....... ........... ............... ................. ..... .. ........ .............. .... ............................... ............ · 
10:36:56 AMjJay Rosenthal jNo additions or corrections to psi 
10:36:59 AM jDefense Attorney jno additions or corrections to psi 
10:37:03 AMjd [have read psi. doesn't need more time 
10:37:21 AM!Jay Rosenthal !statement. same as Tussing . Recommends CAPP rider I 
i :or severe sentence. I 
• • • • •• • • • •••• • •••O OO OO•• o ooo ,o OOOOOO•OOOOOOlOO<•oO• OOoOoOOOO•oO OO O•OO•oOOoOOoo OooOo o > ooO H Oo o ooooOooO o o ·O•••• • • - • o ••••• • ••• • O • • J••o•• o•• •o••• • •• •••••••••o • • o •••• o • • .• o •o••••••••• ••••••••• • •• • -• • > o Ooo O<O-OooOoO oooO o oO o o Oo oOo O O oo o o o OO o o oO O OOoOOOO o Oo <OOoO O OoO OOoO O•oOoooO,O OoOOoOooOOooOO-oOOO-OoO o oOOo o OoOooOOo Oo Oo o O 
10:40:31 AM JDefense Attorney /statement. asks for 1 yr fixed suspend sentence and put. 
i /on probation. I 
·{o":·si:·4·9 ..AM·l~t~~·afi"ie···Paii:rck·R·················1·························································································································································-····-·········-················1 
10:52:54 AMfd !statement 
10:54:58 AM f Honorable Patrick H !find guilty. will stay executin of this sentence pending 
/Owen /appeal. warns of alcohol consumption, will vacate stay 
/ /and impose sentence 
10:56:06 AMfd !agrees 
10:56:09 AM1Honorable Patrick H las serious as can be. I will impose sentence if you drink. 
/Owen /joc, 1 +5=6 recommend CAPP rider, susp di for 2yrs, 1yr 
/absolute. Can apply for driving priv. in second yr. No 
/credit. no fine. I will stay the execution of this sentence 
i pending the appeal currently in front of the supreme 
jcourt. 
11 :04:16 AMjd j 
11 :04:31 AM iHonorable Patrick H /giving you an opportunity to take advantage 
iOwen ! 
11 :04:45 AM~',.! end . . . . ·1REPa°RTER k "asey Redlich ·~ .EST COST $100.00 - Clerk · 
i Lisa London 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, 
DOB:
SSN: 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-2013-00458 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION 
AND ORDER RETAINING 
JURISDICTION 
On June 12, 2014, Jay F. Rosenthal, Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Boise, State 
of Idaho, and the defendant, TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, with her attorney, Philip H. Gordon, 
appeared before this Court for sentencing. The defendant was duly informed of the Information 
filed against her for the crimes of COUNT I: OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WI-ULE 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR OTHER DRUGS (THIRD OFFENSE 
WITHIN TEN YEARS), FELONY, LC. §18-8004, §18-8005(6), and COUNT II: DRIVING 
WITHOUT PRIVILEGES (SECOND WITHIN FIVE YEARS), MISDEMEANOR, LC. §18-
8001(4), committed on or about February 6, 2013, and her plea of guilty to Count I thereto on 
January 29, 2014. 
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The defendant, and defendant's counsel, were then asked if they had any legal cause or 
reason to offer why judgment and sentence should not be pronounced against the defendant, and 
if the defendant, or defendant's counsel, wished to offer any evidence or to make a statement on 
behalf of the defendant, or to present any information to the Court in mitigation of punishment; 
and the Court, having accepted such statements, and having found no legal cause or reason why 
judgment and sentence should not be pronounced against the defendant at this time; does render 
its judgment of conviction as follows, to-wit: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant is 
guilty of the crime of COUNT I: OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR OTHER DRUGS (THIRD OFFENSE WITHIN TEN 
YEARS), FELONY, I.C. §18-8004, §18-8005(6), and that she be sentenced pursuant to the 
Uniform Sentence Law of the State of Idaho, Idaho Code § 19-2513, to the custody of the State 
ofldaho Board of Correction for an aggregate term of six ( 6) years: with the first one (1) year of 
said term to be FIXED, and with the remaining five (5) years of said term to be 
INDETERMINATE, with such sentence to commence immediately. 
Count II of the Information is hereby dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. 
The Court will retain jurisdiction for an indeterminate period of time not to exceed three 
hundred sixty-five (365) days pursuant to LC.§ 19-2601(4). 
The Court recommends the Department of Correction place the defendant in the CAPP 
rider program. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code section 31-320 I A(b) the defendant shaB pay court costs in the 
amount of $17.50; County Administrative Surcharge Fee in the amount of $10.00 pursuant to 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND ORDER RETAI.NING JURISDICTION - Page 2 
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LC. § 31-4502; P.O.S.T. Academy fees in the amount of $10.00 pursuant to LC. § 3 l-3201B; 
£STARS technology fee in the amount of $10.00 pursuant to LC. § 31-3201(5); $75.00 
reimbursement, to the Victims Compensation Fund pursuant to LC. § 72-1025; Peace Officer 
Temporary Disability Fund in the amount of $3.00 pursuant to LC. § 72-1105; $30.00 domestic 
violence fee; Victim Notification Fee (VINE) in the amount of $10.00 pursuant to LC. § 31-
3204; Emergency Surcharge Fee in the amount of $100.00 pursuant to LC. § 31-3201H; and 
$15.00 surcharge required by LC. § 18-8010 for interlock ignition and electronic monitoring 
devices. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's driver's license or permit is suspended 
for a period of two (2) years. The first year of the suspension is an absolute suspension pursuant 
to LC. § 18-8005, to commence on the date of defendant's release from incarceration and 
consecutive to any current driver's license suspensions. Thereafter, the defendant's driver's 
license is suspended on a further period of one ( 1) year. The def end ant can apply to the Court for 
restricted privileges during this further period. 
The defendant shall be remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Boise County, to be 
delivered FORTHWITH by him into the custody of the State of Idaho Board of Correction. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk deliver a certified copy of this Judgment to 
the said Sheriff, which shall serve as the commitment of the defendant. 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 
You, TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, are hereby notified that you have the right to appeal this 
order to the Idaho Supreme Court. Any notice of appeal must be filed within forty-two ( 42) days 
from the entry ofthis judgment. 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND ORDER RETAINING JURISDICTION - Page 3 
are further notified that you have the right to be represented by an attorney in any 
appeal, that if you cannot afford to retain an attorney, one may be appointed at public expense. 
Further, if you are a needy person, the costs of the appeal may be paid for by the State of Idaho. 
If you have questions about your appeal rights, you should consult your present la\\yer. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this lih day of June, 2014. 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDA. H. 0 } SS COUNTY OF BOISE · 
I hereby certify that the foregoing instrument is a 
full, true and correct ~opy of the orJg1nal on file in 
the office of the und1>rs!gned Clerk. 
0-- - l 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the j£'J_ day of June, 2014, I mailed (served) a true and correct 
copy of the within instrument to: 
JAY ROSENTHAL 
BOISE COUNTY PROSECUTil-JG ATTORNEY 
406 MONTGOMERY STREET 
POST OFFICE BOX 186 
IDAHO CITY, IDAHO 83631 
PHILIP H. GORDON 
GORDON LAW OFFICES, CHARTERED 
623 WHAYS ST 
BOISE, ID 83702-5512 
ADA COUNTY JAIL 
VIA: EMAIL 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT 
VIA: EMAIL 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
VIA: EMAIL 
DRIVER SERVICES 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
PO BOX 7129 
BOISE ID 83707 
MARY T. PRISCO 
JUDGMENT OF C01''VICTION AND ORDER RETAINING JURISDICTION - Page 5 
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By~___,~;;;;;;·.;...J!..t.~-,:~~·IG....;-:....0~,C~le~rk~~~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TRIC N, 
DOB
SSN: 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-2013-00458 
ORDER STA YING EXECUTION 
OF JUDGMENT 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 13( c )(7), as an exercise of discretion, the Court will stay execution of the 
judgment upon Defendant's appeal of the suppression ruling to the Idaho Supreme Court. The stay 
of execution is conditioned upon the defendant filing and pursuing such an appeal, or unless as 
otherwise ordered by the Court. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this f] day of June, 2014. 
trick H. Owen 
District Judge 
ORDER STAYING EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT-PAGE-1 
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DEPUTY 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 hereby certify on day of June, 2014, I mailed (served) a true and correct 
copy of the within instrument to: 
JAY ROSENTHAL 
BOISE COUNTY PROSECUTING A TTORh1EY 
406 MONTGOMERY STREET 
POST OFFICE BOX 186 
IDAHO CITY, IDAHO 83631 
PHILIP H. GORDON 
GORDON LAW OFFICES, CHARTERED 
623 WHAYS ST 
BOISE, ID 83702-5512 
ADA COUNTY JAIL 
VIA: EMAIL 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT 
VIA: EMAIL 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
VIA: EMAIL 
DRIVER SERVICES 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
PO BOX 7129 
BOISE ID 83707 
MARY T. PRISCO 
ORDER STA YING EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT- PAGE-2 
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RfCT COURT BOISE COUNTY, IDAHO 
ded in Book __ P.age, __ 
Fited JUL 3 0 2014 _ 
No. 
Philip Gordon, ISB #1996 
GORDON LAW OFFICES, 
623 W, Hays Street 
~ARY PRISCO, Clerk 
By . J.it:41-s0· DEPUTY 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 345~7100 
Facsimile: (208) 345-0050 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
TRICIA FRANKLIN, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CR 2013-0000458 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE 
ATTORNEYS FOR THE RESPONDENT, NAMELY JAY ROSENTHAL, BOISE COUNTY 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY,406 MONTGOMERY STREET, P.O. BOX 186, 
IDAHO CITY, ID 83631, AND TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GNEN THAT the above named appellant, Trioia Franklin, hereby 
appeals against the above named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment of 
Conviction filed herein on the 19th day of June, 2014, and from any and all pre~trial decisions, 
including the Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion to Suppress filed on Januazy 17u\ 
NOTICE OF APPEALw Page 1 
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2014, and any written denial of a Motion fo:r Reconsideration of that Decision and Order. 
In conformance with Rule 11 (c) of the above entitled court, Appellant, states as follows: 
1. The title of the action and the case number assigned to it in the District Court are 
as set forth above, 
2. The Court which heard the proceeding is the District Court for the Fourth Judicial 
District of the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Boise, Honorable Patrick 
H. Owen, District Judge. 
3, The party making and filing this appeal is the Defendant, Tricia Franklin, and her 
attorney is the undersigned, whose address, phone number and email address are 
as set forth above. The respondent in this matter is the State of Idaho, which was 
represented in the trial Court by the Prosecuting Attorney for Boise, County, 
Idaho. The respondent will be represented on appeal by the Office of the Attorney 
General ofidaho. 
4. What is being appealed from is the Judgment of Conviction filed herein on the 
19th day of June, 2014, and from any and all pre-trial decisions1 including the 
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion to Suppress filed on January 171\ 
2014, and any written denial of a Motion for Reconsideration of that Decision and 
Order. 
5. The principal issue on appeal is the Defendant's contention that the results of the 
test of a sample of her blood, which was drawn without a warrant and over her 
objection, should have been suppressed. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- Page 2 
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6. This appealis taken as a matter of right, pursuant to Rule 11 (c)(l) or (6) 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, in that it is an appeal either from a final 
judgment of conviction or a judgment imposing (but staying) sentence 
after conviction. 
7. Defenda..11t requests a standard transcript, as the same is defined in Rule 25 
(d) of the Idaho Appellate Rules. The transcript of the hearing on the 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress has already been prepared, and it should 
be included in the record. That latter transcript has already been provided 
to counsel in hard copy. Defendant requests that the transcript of the 
sentencing hearing be prepared compressed format, as described in Rule 
26(m), I.A.R. 
8. At present it is the intention of the Defendant to designate, for inclusion in 
the clerk's record, only such matters as are included in the standard record, 
as set forth Rule 28(b)(2), I.A.R. and such other matters as, after due 
inspection to be hereafter conducted, appear necessary to the proper 
appellate resolution of this cause. 
9. As the attorney of record for the appellant, I hereby certify as follows: 
a.) Concurrently with the filing of this Notice of Appeal1 a copy thereofis 
being served upon the Court Reporter, who transcribed the sentencing 
· hearing held in this matter. 
b.) As soon as the clerk of the district court provides the undersigned with an 
NOTICE OF APPEAL= Page 3 
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estimated cost to prepare the reporter's transcript, the appellant will pay 
the same. 
c.) As soon as the clerk of the district court provides the undersigned with an 
estimated cost to prepare t'fie clerk's record, the appellant will pay the 
same. 
d.) There are no appellate filing fees given that this is a criminal appeal. 
e.) That service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant to 
(1 )1 Idaho Code. 
Dated: July 301h, 2014. 
Jay Rosenthal 
Boise County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
406 Montgomery Street 
P.O. Box 186 
Idaho City, Id 83631 
State ofidaho 
Office of Attorney General 
700 W. State Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720w0010 
NOTICE OF APPEAL· Page 4 
e within and foregoing document, 
o indicated below: 
__ hand delivery 
U.S. mail 
__ overnight mail 
_,.K. facsimile: 392-3760 
In the Supreme Court of the State Olrl~1sEcouNrY,10 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
V. 
TRICIA FRANKLIN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
Recorded in Book_. _Page._.-
) ORDER CONDITIONALLY 
) DISMISSING APPEAL 
) 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 42390-2014 
) Boise County No. 2013-458 
) 
) 
The Appellant having failed to pay the necessary fee for preparation of the Clerk's 
Record on appeal as required by Idaho Appellate Rule 27(c) and the fee for preparation of the 
Reporter's Transcript on appeal as required by Idaho Appellate Rule 24(c). In addition., the Notice 
of Appeal is not in compliance with Idaho Appellate Rule 17 for the reason neither the Notice of 
Appeal nor the Certificate of Services shows service on the reporter of whom a transcript is 
requested; therefore, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that this appeal be, and hereby is, CONDITIONALLY 
DISMISSED unless the required fees for preparation of the Cierk's Record and Reporter's 
Transcript are paid to the District Court Clerk or an Order is obtained from the District Court 
providing for payment at county expense within twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Order. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that in the event this appeal continues, this appeal is 
SUSPENDED in order for Appellant to file an AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL in compliance 
with Idaho Appellate Rule 17. The Amended Notice of Appeal shall be filed ,;vith the District Court 
Clerk v..rithin fourteen (14) days of the reinstatement. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED lliat this appeal is SUSPENDED until further notice. 
(If-: . . 
DATED this _fL_ day of August, 2014. . 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Court Judge 
.For the Supreme Court 
"nieiyhw'- ¥~~'\-
Stephen W. Kenyon,~ 
ORDER CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING APPEAL- Docket No. 42390-2014 
/Lf/ 
g. 2 8. 2014 1 : 11 PM Go r J, 0 Law Off i ee s 
Philip Gordon, ISB # 1996 
GORDON LAW OFFICES, 
623 W. Hays Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 345-7100 
Facsimile: (208) 345-0050 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
TRlCIA FRANKLIN, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CR 2013-0000458 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE 
ATTORNEYS FOR THE RESPONDENT, NAMELY JAY ROSENTHAL, BOISE COUNTY 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY)406 MONTGOMERY STREET, P.O. BOX 186, 
IDAHO CITY, ID 83631, AND TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT the above named appellant, Tricia Franklin, hereby 
appeals against the above named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment of 
Conviction filed herein on the 19th day of June, 2014, and from any and all pre-trial decisions, 
including the Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion to Suppress filed on January 17fu, 
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2014, and any written denial of a Motion for Reconsideration of that Decision and Order. 
In conforma..nce with Rule 11 (c) of the above entitled court, Appellant, states as follows: 
1. The title of the action and the case number assigned to it in the District Court are 
as set forth above, 
2. The Court which heard the proceeding is the District Court for the Fourth Judicial 
District of the State ofidaho, in and for the County of Boise, Honorable Patrick 
H. Owen, District Judge. 
3. The party making and filing this appeal is the Defendant, Tricia Franklin, and her 
attorney is the undersigned, whose address, phone number and email address are 
as set forth above. The respondent in this matter is the State of Idahoi which was 
represented in the trial Court by the Prosecuting Attorney for Boise, County, 
Idaho. The respondent will be represented on appeal by the Office of the Attorney 
General ofidaho. 
4. \\lhat is being appealed ftorn is the Judgment of Conviction filed herein on the 
19th day of June, 2014, and from any and all pre-trial decisions, including the 
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion to Suppress filed on January 17\ 
2014, and any Mitten denial of a Motion for Reconsideration of that Decision and 
Order. 
5. The principal issue on appeal is the Defendant's contention that the results of the 
test of a sample of her blood, which was drawn vvi.thout a warrant and over her 
objection, should have been suppressed. 
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6. This appeal is taken as a matter of right, pursuant to 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, in that it is an appeal 
11 (c)(l) or (6) 
a final 
judgment of conviction or a judgment imposing (but staying) sentence 
after conviction. 
7. Defenda.'11.t requests a standard transcript, as the same is defined in Rule 25 
(d) of the Idaho Appellate Rules. The transcript of the hearing on the 
Defendanf s Motion to Suppress has already been prepared, and it should 
be included in the record. That latter transcript has already been provided 
to counsel in hard copy. Defendant requests that the transcript of the 
sentencing hearing be prepared com.pressed format, as described in Rule 
26(m), I.A.R. 
8, At present it is the intention of the Defendant to designate, for inclusion in 
the clerk's record, only such matters as are included in the standard record1 
as set forth Rule 28(b )(2), l.A.R. and such other matters as, after due 
inspection to be hereafter conducted) appear necessary to the proper 
appellate resolution of this cause. 
9. As the attorney ofrecord for the appellant; I hereby certify as follows: 
a,) Concurrently with the filing of this Amended Notice of Appeal, a copy 
thereof is being hand served upon the Court Reporter, who transcribed the 
sentencing hearing held in this matter. 
b.) A check in the amount of the estimated cost of preparing a transcript of the 
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requested hearing is being hand delivered to the Court Reporter, 
together with a copy of this Amended Notice of Appeal. As soon as the 
clerk of the district court provides the undersigned with an estimated cost 
to prepare the reporter's transcript, the appellai.i.t will pay the same. 
c.) A check in the a.mount of one hu..1").dred dollars ($100.00) was mailed to the 
clerk of the district court on Wednesday, August 27t\ 20141 to cover tfie 
estimated cost to prepare the clerk's record. 
d.) There are no appellate filing fees given that this is a criminal appeal. 
e.) Service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20 and the Attorney General ofidaho, pursuant to Section 67-1401 
(1 )) Idaho Code. 
Dated: August 28111 , 2014. 
I hereby certify that on Augus 8th, 2014, I caused within and foregoing document, 
to be served on the following person by the methods in · ted below: 
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FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO } 
COUNTY OF BOISE SS. 
I hereby certify that the foregoing instrument is a 
full, true and correct copy of the oriainal on file in 
the office of the under · · V 
Da -) 
DEPUTY CLERK 
Jay Rosenthal 
Boise County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
406 Montgomery Street 
P.O. Box 186 
Idaho City, Id 83631 
State ofidaho 
Office of Attorney General 
700 W. State Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Kasey Redlich 
Court Reporter for 
the Honorable Patrick Owen, District Judge 
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__ hand delivery 
·U.S. mail 
__ overnight mail 
facsimile: 
__ hand delivery 
U.S. mail 
__ overnight mail 
-Jt2 facsimile: 854-8074 
_){,_ hand delivery 
__ U.S.mail 
__ overnight mail 
facsimile: 854-8074 
the S ourt of the State of Idaho 
DISTRICT COURT BOISE COUNTY, IDAHO 
Recorded in Book ___ Page __ 
STATE OF IDA.HO. 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
\'. 
TRICIA FRANKLIN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Filed OCT I 4 
ORDER DISlvfISSING APPEAL 
Supreme Court Dock.et No. 42390-2014 
Boise Cou..11ty No. 2013-458 
No. 
An ORDER CONDITJONALLY DIS.MISSING APPEAL v,ras entered August 8~ 
2014, because the fees for preparation of the Clerk1s Record and Reporter1s Transcript had not paid. 
Appellant having failed to comply with this Court1s order of August 8, 2014; therefore, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED the ORDER CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING 
APPEAL is AFFIRlvfED and tliattp.is appeal be, and hereby is, DISivllSSED. 
DATED this~ day of October, 2014. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Court Judge 
For the Supreme Court 
ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL-Do~ket No. 42390-2014 
/ 
In the Supreme Court f the State of Idaho 
OF IDAHO. 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
V. 
TRICIA FRAN:Uil'1, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
MAGISTRATE'S DIVISION 
,--, DISTRICT COURT 
,uURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BOISE COUNTY, IDAHO 
OCT 1 7 2014 
) ORDER WfTHDRA '\VING DISMISSAL 
) 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 42390-2014 
) Boise County No. 2013-458 
) 
) 
) 
An ORDER CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING APPEAL for failure to pay the fees 
for preparation of the Clerk's Record and the Reporter's Transcript and the Notice of Appeal \Vas 
not in compliance with Idaho Appellate RuJe 17 for the reason no service is shown on the reporter 
of whom a transcript is requested was issued August 8, 2014. On October 16, 2014, the District 
Court infom1ed the Court that the fees have been paid; therefore, 
The ORDER CONDrTlONALLY DISMISSING APPEAL entered August 8, 2014 
be, and hereby is, WITHDRAWN and the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript will be due on 
or before December 22, 2014. 
DATED this Jl day of October, 20l4. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Court Reporter 
District Court Judge 
For the Supreme Court 
ORDER WITHDR.t-\ WING DISMISSAL-Docket No. 42390-2014 
P.b.ilip Gordon, ISB #1996 
Bruce S. Bistline, ISB #1988 
GORDON LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83702-5512 
Telephone: 208-345-7100 
Facsimile: 208-345-0050 
Attorney for PlaintifjlAppellant 
MMISTFIATE'S DIVISION 
DISTRICT COURT 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BOISE COUNTY, IDAHO 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
TRICIA FRANKLIN, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. CR 2013-0000458 
Docket No. 42390 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS 
ATTORNEY OF RECO LED . ORIGINAL 
CO:rv1ES NOW Philip Gordon, of the firm Gordon Law Offices, Chtd., and pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule 45, hereby moves this Court for an order allowing the firm of Gordon Law 
Offices, Chtd., to withdraw as attorneys of record for the Appellant Tricia Franklin in the above-
captioned matter. 
This Motion is made and based upon the fact that the Appellant is indigent, a.rid unable to 
afford the services of private counsel to pursue this appeal on her behalf. The undersigned 
attorney did represent the Appellant qua Defendant in the Court below, but the Appellant was 
unable to pay for all of the work performed by the undersigned in the District Court, and a very 
substantial balance remains owing for work done and performed in the District Court. 
Further, the principal issue in this appeal is one which was the subject of State of Idaho v. 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS ATTORNEY OF RECORD Page I 
ORIGINAL 
Aficah Wulff, in which case the Court issued its opinion on October 29th, 2014. In that matter, 
Wulff was represented by office of the State Appellate Public Defender, and it is certain 
members of that office have already done the great majority of the research and 
which would be necessary in order to successfully prosecute the appeal in the instant action. 
In the event that this Motion is granted, and the undersigned is given leave to withdraw as 
attorney of record for the Defendant/ AppeUa_nt herein, the UI1dersigned intends to immediately 
thereafter file a Motion in the District CoUt-t, asking that the office of the State Appellate Public 
Defender be appointed to represent her i~urt. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this~;:f October, 20 I 4. 
----
ricia Franklin 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on e __ day of Octob , 2014, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing Motion to With aw a.s Attorney of cord by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to each of the following: 
Jay Rosenthal 
Boise County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
406 Montgomery Street 
P.O. Box 1&6 
Idaho City, Id 83631 
State of Idaho 
Office of Attorney General 
700 W. State Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83 720-00 I 0 
__ hand delivery 
U.S. mail 
__ overnight mail 
_,&_ facsimile: 392-3760 
__ hand delivery 
U.S. mail 
overnight mail 
~ facsimile: 854-8074 
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\ 0 
Tricia FranlJ.in 
Defendant/ Appellant 
4007 Taft St 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
hand delivery 
~U.S.mail 
__ overnight mail 
:fi i ·1e: 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS ATTORNEY OF RECORD Page 3 
the Supreme Court of the State QJ;JJiUfii~;:r 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
V. 
TRICIA FRANKLIN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW AND SUSPEND 
BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
Supreme Court Docket No. 42390-2014 
Boise County No. 2013-458 
Ref 14-520 
A MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS ATTORNEY OF RECORD was filed by counsel for 
Appellant on October 30, 2014. Therefore, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS ATTORNEY 
be, and hereby is, GRANTED on the condition counsel for Appellant shall serve a copy of this 
Order upon Appellant ON OR BEFORE SEVEN (7) DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS ORDER and 
shall file proof of service of this Order on or before seven (7) days thereafter. Furthermore, 
Appellant Tricia Franklin shall have twenty-one (21) days upon receipt of this Court's Order to 
submit a Notice of Appearance of new counsel. If no such notice is filed, it will be assumed that 
Appellant Tricia Franklin is appearing prose for further proceedings in this appeal. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that this appeal shall be SUSPENDED for a period of 
THIRTY-FIVE .(35) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS ORDER at which time the due date for 
the filing of APPELLANT'S BRIEF shall be reset. 
DATED this Jo day of November, 2014. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION - Docket No. 42390-2014 
\52.. 
j 
I 
Judge Owen, court Report ristine Rhodes 
Time Speaker Note 
10:08:51 AM jMotion Hearing ',!', ,·call of case; Def not pres 
/CR-201 3-0458 
i State v Tricia 
/ Franklin - Judge / 
i Patrick H Owen - i 
/Dpty Prosecutor I 
[Jay Rosenthal -
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jREPORTER 
: Kasey Redlich -
!Clerk Brenda 
1wood . 
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DISTRICT COURT BOISE COUNTY, IDAHO 
Recorded in uvv"---· "i:l"·--
Tricia Franklin 
4007 Taft Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Defendant Appearing Pro Se 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) CASE NO. CR 2013-0000458 
) 
) 
TRICIA FRANKLIN 
) MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
) STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC 
) DEFENDER 
Defendant. ) 
) 
COMES NOW Defendant, Tricia Franklin, appearing pro se, and hereby moves this 
Court for its order as follows: 
1. Granting leave to Philip Gordon, who has been her attorney of record both in this 
Court, and before the Idaho Supreme Court, but who has been granted leave to 
withdraw as attorney by the said Supreme Court, to withdraw as attorney of record 
before this Court. 
2. Appointing the office of the State Appellate Public Defender to represent the 
Defendant, qua appellant, in all further proceedings before the Supreme Court of 
Idaho. 
This motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that the Philip Gordon, prior 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER- Page 1 
counsel for the Defendant, filed a Motion in the Idaho Supreme Court, pursuant to IAR 45 and 
45 .1, "'-''"''U"J'f', leave to withdraw as Attorney of Record for the Defendant/ Appellant. This Motion 
was based on the fact that the Defendant/ Appellant was no longer able to afford the services of 
private counsel, and also on the fact that the principal issue before the Supreme Court had 
already been briefed, argued and submitted to the Court. 
The Idaho Supreme Court thereafter issued its Order, granting Philip Gordon leave to 
withdraw as attorney of record for the Defendant/ Appellant. My understanding of the way the 
Idaho Appellate Rules operate, as conveyed to me by my prior Counsel, is that, once the Supreme 
Court grants an attorney in an appeal leave to withdraw, I must first apply to the District Court to 
obtain the services of the State Appellate Defender to represent me in continuing proceedings 
before the Idaho Supreme Court. Therefore, this Motion is brought to this Court. 
Dated: December {t, 2014. 
~~-~ 
Tricia Franklin 
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ISS 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on Decemberi(, 2014, I caused the within and foregoing 
document, to be on the following persons, by the method indicated below: 
Jay Rosenthal 
Boise County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
406 Montgomery Street 
P.O. Box 186 
Idaho City, Id 83631 
State of Idaho 
Office of Attorney General 
700 W. State Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
hand deli very 
U.S. mail 
__ overnight mail 
facsimile: 392-3760 
-~hand delivery 
U.S. mail 
-+--
--overnight mail 
facsimile: 854-8074 
cl&r~d~~ 
Tricia Franklin 
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D1STFl1CT COURT BOISE COUNTY, rDAHO 
cordsd in 
Tricia Franklin 
4007 Taft Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Pro Se 
Filed 2 1 
By __ ,__ ~Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TRICIA FRANKLIN, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Ada ) 
CASE NO. CR 2013-0000458 
AFFIDAVIT OF TRICIA FRANKLIN IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF STATE 
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
TRICIA FRANKLIN, being first duly sworn on her oath, does state and depose as follows: 
I. I am the Defendant in the above-entitled matter, and I make this Affidavit in support of my 
Motion for Appointment of State Appellate Public Defender; 
2. I am making Affidavit based upon my personal and direct knowledge, unless otherwise stated 
herein. 
3. I am indigent and unable to afford the services of private counsel to pursue the appeal in this 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER- Page 1 
-No. 
DEPUTY 
matter. 
4. I do not have education or experience to proceed with my appeal pro se. The principal 
issue in this appeal is one which was the subject of State of Idaho v. Micah Wulff, in which 
the Court issued its Opinion on October 29, 2014. As in that matter Mr. Wulff was 
represented by the office of the State Appellate Public Defender, and it is certain that 
members of that office have already done the great majority of the research and writing 
which would be necessary in order to successfully prosecute the appeal in the instant action. 
5. The Idaho Supreme Court granted Philip Gordon, who was my attorney in this Court, and 
who also began my appeal, leave to withdraw as my attorney of record on appeal. 
6. I believe that I have meritorious grounds for continuing my appeal, especially in light of the 
decision in State of Idaho v. Micah Wulff. 
Dated: December / r'", 2014. 
~~ 
Tricia Franklin 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for the State of 
Idaho, as of the day and year above written. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: Boise, Idaho 
My Commission expires: ~ -;2/i ·;zOJcf 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER- Page 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on December l(_, 2014, I caused to be served a trne and correct copy 
of the foregoing document in the above-captioned matter by the method indicated below and 
addressed to the following: 
Jay Rosenthal 
Boise County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
406 Montgomery Street 
P.O. Box 186 
Idaho City, Id 83631 
State of Idaho 
Office of Attorney General 
700 W. State Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
__ hand delivery 
U.S. mail 
--
--overnight mail 
facsimile: 392-3760 
~_ hand delivery 
___,__U.S. mail 
__ overnight mail 
facsimile: 854-8074 
Tricia Franklin 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER- Page 3 
\S~ 
II COURT BOISE COUNW,hQAHO 
~dedin 
f 
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THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRI 
STATE IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF B SE 
3 
4 
5 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS, 
TRICIA FRANKLIN, 
o Defendant, 
1 
CASE NO CR-2013-458 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
FOR APPOiNTMENT OF COUNSEL 
ON APPEAL 1 ( ~ ::::z 
Supreme Court N~C) 
9 
Having reviewed the Defendant's Motion for Appointment of Counsel, and being 
satisfied that the Defendant is a needy person entitled to appointment of counsel; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender be 
IO 
appointed to represented the Defendant in her Appeal. 
ll 
12 Dated: l- ( 1.-- ( S 
13 
14 
~!n~ 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
15 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this!]_ day of Rh ; 2015, I caused a true and 
l6 correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
17 Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
111 lnterdept. Mail 
19 State Appellate Public Defender 
364 7 Lake Harbor Lane 
20 Boise Id 83703 
21 Tricia Franklin 
4007 Taft St 
22 Boise Id 83702 
23 
25 
26 II Order for Appointment of Counsel 
Mary Prisco 
By: __ __,t...,,s;,::...::::.------
I l(,P 
i: 
IN DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, fN AND FOR BOISE COUNTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs 
Tricia Frnn..ldin, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
} 
) 
SUPREME COURT NO J../2 3lf O 
CASE NO. CR-201.3-45& 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF 
APPEAL 
Appeal from: Fourth Judicial District. Boise County, Honorable Patrick Owen Presiding. 
Case number from court: CR-2013-4 58 
Order or Judgment appealed from: Judgment of Conviction and Order Retaining 
Jurisdiction, filed June l~,, fQ14. 
Attorney for Appellant: Phi!lip Gordon 
Attorney for Respondent: Lawrence G Wasden 
Appealed by: Tricia Franklin 
Appealed against: State of Idaho 
Notice of Appeal filed: July 30, 2014 
Ametl.ded Notice of Appeal filed: 
Appellate fee paid: 0.00 
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's request foe additional record filed: No 
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's request for additional Reporter's Transcript filed: No 
Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested? Yes 
ff so Name of Reporter: No service. made 
CERTtFICATE OF SERVICE r FlLED - ORIGINAL I r-
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Eniered on ATS b·r __ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
VS. 
TRICIA FRANKLIN, 
Defendant/ Appellant, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUPREME COURT NO. 42390 
CASE NO. CR-2013-458 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, Mary T Prisco, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Boise do hereby certify: 
The following will be submitted as an exhibit to this Record on Appeal: 
(1) EXHIBIT LIST, which contains the exhibits, which were offered or admitted 
into evidence during the trial: 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. I 
Defendant's Exhibit No. A 
Idaho State Forensic Services Admitted 
E-Mail letter Admitted 
(2) TRANSCRIPT of July 22, 2013 PRELIMINARY HEARING 
WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
said Court this 30th day of March, 2015. 
Mary T Prisco 
Clerk of the District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS Dated 03/27/15 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
TRICIA FRANKLIN, 
Defendant/ Appellant, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
CASE NO. CR-2013-458 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Mary T Prisco, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State ofidaho, in and for the County of Boise, do hereby certify that the foregoing 
Record in this cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct, 
and complete Record of the pleadings and documents requested by Appellate Rule 28. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said court this 30TH day of March, 2015. 
Mary T Prisco 
Clerk of the District Court 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
lw.3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
TRICIA FRANKLIN, 
Defendant/ Appellant 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
-------------) 
SUPREME COURT NO. 42390 
CASE NO. CR-2013-458 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Mary T Prisco, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Boise, do hereby certify that I have personally 
served or mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the CLERK'S RECORD ON 
APPEAL to each of the Attorneys ofrecord in this cause as follows: 
LA WREN CE G. WASDEN 
IDAHO STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
P.O. BOX 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
MARCH 30TH, 2015 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ROBERT CHASTAIN 
ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT 
Mary T Prisco 
Clerk of the District Court 
Kelly White, Deputy Clerk 
